Essays in Bank Credit Ratings by Sifodaskalakis, Emmanouil
        
University of Bath
PHD








If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.









A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
University of Bath 










Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A 
copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must 
not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent 












This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my best friend, Manos Poulakas, 





Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have repeatedly faced widespread criticism 
in different occasions during the past two decades regarding the quality of their 
ratings. The most prominent incidents of note where the published ratings were 
challenged have been the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the high-profile corporate 
collapses in 2001-2 and lastly the global financial crisis of 2007-8. For the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8, the failure of large financial institutions was partly 
attributed to the failure of corporate governance and risk management of financial 
institutions, and partly to the CRAs rating methodologies with respect to financial 
institutions. In this dissertation, we investigate those two factors that have been 
claimed that were behind global crises during the past two decades. First, we 
examine whether the three principal CRAs have incorporated governance 
characteristics in their analysis. We examine the existence of corporate 
governance in bank ratings and how they differ among CRAs. Next, we examine 
the time variation in bank credit rating standards for the existence of structural 
breaks. The popular claim is that the CRAs have constantly followed an apparent 
stringency in the rating standards, which was interrupted by the loosening of rating 
standards before the global financial crisis of 2007-8. So, we examine the 
assertion that the CRAs followed such patterns in bank rating standards that could 
be a factor that precipitated the crisis. The third essay examines an alternative 
explanation to that of tightening rating standards. CRAs have also been criticized 
for the lack of timeliness in predicting some high-profile bankruptcies. We 
investigate the existence of stickiness in bank rating standards that could have 
been caused by the lack of timeliness in bank ratings. 
 In the essay 1 titled, “Governance and Bank Credit Ratings”, we examine 
whether the element of corporate governance is considered in the published bank 
credit ratings by the three principal CRAs. Our evidence is drawn by controlling 
for bank financial characteristics and sovereign ratings that prior research has 
shown to be related to credit ratings. Evidence is initially drawn using principal 
components drawn from PCA analysis of all available governance variables, and 
then results are confirmed using a selection of governance variables that 
formulate our base model for governance in bank ratings. Similar evidence to that 
for governance variables is presented using a set of country institutional 
components, and lastly we examine changes in relationship between governance 
variables and bank credit ratings for any of the three principal CRAs for the periods 




In Essay 2 titled "Structural Shifts in Bank Credit Ratings”, we examine the 
time-series variation in bank rating standards of the three principal CRAs for the 
period 1990-2015, for different geographical regions. We distinguish three 
structural breaks in the bank rating standards dividing the time-span of our 
analysis to the period before and after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses 
when credit rating standards tightened, the period before the global financial crisis 
started when bank credit rating standards loosened, and the period after the global 
financial crisis when bank credit rating standards tightened. Fitch has followed a 
constant tightening of bank rating standards throughout, while this ‘trend’ was 
intensified after the global financial crisis. This pattern for Fitch is more intense for 
European, and US and Canadian banks. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s were 
rather more aligned in the structural shifts of their rating standards for the period 
under investigation. For Moody’s the loosening of bank rating standards in the pre 
global financial crisis period is more evident for European banks, compared to the 
US and Canadian banks, while the hardening of bank rating standards in the post 
global financial crisis period is more intense for European, US and Canadian 
banks, and not evident for the rest of the world banks. For Standard & Poor’s the 
loosening of bank rating standards in the pre global financial crisis period is almost 
the same for all geographical regions, while the hardening of bank rating 
standards in the post global financial crisis period is very intense for the US and 
Canadian banks, and much less intense for European, US and Canadian banks. 
Lastly, in the presence of competition, Fitch gives higher credit ratings for US, 
Canadian and RoW banks. 
 Essay 3 discusses an alternative explanation to that of tightening rating 
standards. In Essay 3, titled “Stickiness in Bank Credit Ratings”, we examine the 
existence of stickiness in bank rating standards that could have been caused by 
the lack of timeliness in bank rating. The results support our assumption that bank 
ratings by the three principal CRAs are sticky. Another main finding is that there 
is clear evidence of asymmetry between upgrade and downgrade decisions in 
bank ratings by all three principal CRAs, with upgrades becoming increasingly 
difficult while downgrades remaining the same. Further evidence includes a 
further asymmetry with respect to high versus low credit quality bank ratings, and 




This dissertation makes significant contributions to the credit rating 
literature from both a policy and an academic perspective. For one thing, the focus 
on bank ratings adds to the existing rating literature that is typically focused on 
corporate ratings. All three aspects of bank credit ratings investigated give 
significant insights on how the three principal credit rating agencies rate banks, 
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Corporate governance has been blamed at different occasions in the past two 
decades as a key factor of financial turmoil. The most recent global financial crisis 
of 2007-8 has reopened the discussion of the importance of corporate governance 
that had gained much attention in the past on the aftermath of the 2001-2 high 
profile corporate collapses. Using a commonly accepted framework for evaluating 
bank ratings, we find evidence that governance attributes explain bank credit 
ratings. We come to this conclusion initially by using principal components drawn 
from PCA analysis of a large group of governance variables and then by a 
selection the governance variables. Similar evidence is presented using a set of 
country institutional components. Lastly, we find no evidence that the relationship 
between governance and bank credit ratings for any of the three principal CRAs 
changes in the periods before and after the global financial crisis, i.e. for the 






1.1.1 Corporate Governance and 2007-8 Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 has reopened the discussion of the 
importance of corporate governance that had gained much attention in the past 
on the aftermath of the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses. Clearly, the 
reasons that corporate governance has once again become a major issue are not 
the same as they were in the past. The 2001-2 corporate collapses were mainly 
involved with accounting fraud, whereas in the 2007-8 financial crisis the failure 
of large financial institutions has been partly attributed to failure of corporate 
governance and risk management. Within this context, during the past years 
substantial academic work and policy analysis has attempted to gain insight into 
the governance problems exposed by the financial crisis and in particular the 
governance of banks. 
It is widely known that at the basis of the developments in the financial 
markets, known as the global financial crisis, was the bursting of the U.S. housing 
bubble. This in turn was the consequence of a complex combination of policies 
that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans, overvaluation 
of subprime mortgages, etc. Many large institutions around the world were about 
to collapse, and this was prevented by the massive bailout programs by initiated 
by national governments. Nevertheless, the financial crisis led to the failure of 465 
banks in the U.S., whereas in the five years prior to 2008, only 10 banks had 
failed. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policymakers around the world tried to 
understand in some detail the causes that led to this point. One of the most 
distinctive conclusions for the financial crisis was that reached by the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission (F.C.I.C.) in the U.S. that was published in January 
2011. F.C.I.C. concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused 
among other reasons by "widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision," "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many systemically important financial institutions," "a combination of excessive 
borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions. 
Yet, even though empirical research on corporate governance and the 
global financial crisis of 2007-8 have found evidence that bank governance was 
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associated with the crisis, it has been difficult to establish a direct link between 
bank failures and corporate governance. There are two forces at play behind this 
lack of strong evidence. First, as governments have intervened to rescue banks 
that failed and thus camouflaged the extent to which bad governance had caused 
the failures. Second, despite these supporting policies, the global financial crisis 
exposed many illnesses of the financial system that have contributed to increased 
bank failures. As these two forces influence the opposite signs of the relationship, 
it was difficult to establish a robust statistical relationship on the net effect of bad 
governance. 
1.1.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
But before we address the question why and how the governance of banks 
differs from the governance of non-financial corporations; we should first briefly 
give a definition of corporate governance. 
According to the glossary of corporate governance-related terms in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), corporate 
governance is defined as a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders which provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. In other words, 
corporate governance helps define the way in which authority and responsibility 
are distributed within a firm and the way corporate decisions are made in order to 
ensure that all the financial stakeholders, i.e. both shareholders and other 
stakeholders, receive a fair share of the firm’s earnings and assets. 
Furthermore, according to Standard & Poor’s (2008) corporate governance 
can be used as means to minimize a firm’s non-financial risks. Most of the credit 
risk agencies like Standard & Poor’s, consider the assessment of corporate 
governance largely as a qualitative exercise, in contrast with other forms of 
analysis such as financial statement analysis where quantitative measures guide 
the assessment of a firm. 
1.1.3 Governance in Banking 
Corporate governance in banks differs from that of non-financial firms in many 
ways. The most distinct characteristic of bank governance is that it is not only 
shareholders that are at risk from a bank’s activities. The stakeholders of a bank 
are numerous and besides shareholders they consist of depositors, debtholders 
and in most countries the taxpayers or the government as the insurer of deposits. 
5 
 
Moreover, the financial well-being of a bank or the banking system is crucial for 
the financial system as a whole, which means that there exist externalities that 
need to be regulated in a most efficient way.  
Also, banks are characterized by the large size of their debt, which on average 
is over 90 percent of their balance sheet compared to about 40 percent of the 
average for non-financial firms. So, the situation is that the shareholders who are 
hold well diversified portfolios, reflecting their risk preferences, being a minority of 
a bank’s stakeholders, control the firm and impose their preference of risk 
composition which in most instances, shareholders’ risk preferences are in conflict 
with the preference of all other stakeholders. 
 A third distinct characteristic is the complexity of the banking business as 
compared to that of the average non-financial firm. The business of a bank is 
inherently complex and prone to swift changes. Levine (2004) notes that “banks 
can alter the risk composition of their assets more quickly than most nonfinancial 
industries”. So, opacity should be added to complexity in the banking business, 
as it is structurally inherent in banking assets (Morgan, 2002). So, not only 
complexity but also opacity play a significant role in bank governance and the key 
issue is how well boards of directors understand the inner workings of the bank in 
order to represent shareholders and protect all stakeholders. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 has not only reopened the discussion of 
the importance of corporate governance, but also about the validity of ratings 
awarded to banks by rating agencies, which has attracted the interest of both 
market participants and academics. Some of the most well discussed issues in 
the literature are: the role of the agencies in the market (e.g. Kraussl, 2005), the 
market‘ s reaction to rating announcements (e.g. Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007), 
the prediction of the credit ratings (e.g. Hwang et al, 2010), and the investigation 
of their determinants (e.g. Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). 
This essay is related to the last strand of the literature and aims to extend 
our knowledge of corporate governance, focusing on its role for the ratings 
assigned to banks. Even though there are many studies that examine corporate 
governance as a determinant of ratings of non-financial firms, the issuance of 
bonds, and sovereign ratings, there are considerably fewer studies that examine 
solely at bank ratings. 
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Knowledge of the relevant factors that determine the ratings and the 
creditworthiness of the banks is particularly important for a number of reasons as 
discussed above, with the most important being the central role banks have in the 
economy. The well-being of the banking system is vital for economic development 
and growth, while better understanding of bank ratings can alleviate information 
asymmetries for investors. 
Early studies focused on the financial profile of banks (Poon et al., 1999, 
2005) and the regulatory environment (Pasiouras et al., 2006), whereas more 
recent studies examine the impact of sovereign ratings (Williams et al., 2013), the 
subprime crisis (Salvador et al., 2014), country-specific variations (Caporale et al., 
2012), and information asymmetry (Shen et al., 2012). 
Thus, even simple characteristics such as the board members (e.g. 
education, experience, etc.) have been largely ignored in the literature. In fact, 
there are very few studies that examine the impact of corporate governance on 
credit ratings and they are all on non-financial firms (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Alali et al.,2012; Aman and 
Nguyen, 2013). 
The lack of research on corporate governance and bank ratings is surprising 
for at least two reasons. First, the rating agencies point out that they integrate 
governance analysis into bank overall credit rating (e.g. see Bauer et al., 2013, 
for the Moody’s methodology); and yet, the exact process and the weights 
assigned to the various governance characteristics remain a black box to 
outsiders. Second, a large number of studies show that corporate governance and 
board characteristics influence the performance (e.g. Aebi et al., 2012; de Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Erkens et al., 2012), efficiency (Kauko, 2009), and risk-taking 
(e.g. Berger et al., 2013) of banking institutions. 
One last aspect of the motivation for the present essay is that all studies 
that examine the impact of corporate governance on credit ratings are all single 
country studies (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). So, it is particularly important 
to examine how bank level corporate governance, country level governance (i.e. 
institutional development) and the regulatory environment jointly determine the 
credit ratings. For example, Bruno and Claessens (2010) conclude that there is a 
threshold level of country development (i.e. legal investor protection) above which 
stringent regulation hurts the performance of well governed companies or has a 
neutral effect for poorly governed companies. However, there is no evidence for 
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whether and how these characteristics interact in shaping the opinion of the rating 
agencies. 
 
1.3 Aim and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Aim 
Prior literature on both the effects of corporate governance on non-financial 
firms’ ratings from the shareholder’s perspective and on the relationship of bank 
governance to risk and performance will be the basis of this paper. Within the 
context discussed above, the essay aims to close the gap in the literature 
regarding the lack of research on corporate governance and bank ratings. Since 
research on bank governance is still an open issue to scholars and policy makers 
around the world, the intention here is to enhance knowledge on the inadequacies 
of bank governance that global financial crisis exposed in, while at the same time 
providing useful insight how the rating agencies incorporate the governance 
characteristics in their analysis and providing a comparison of the determinants of 
the three principal CRAs (i.e. Moody’s, Fitch, S&P).  Within the same context, we 
also aim to investigate how a country’s institutional set-up influences corporate 
governance and thus how this is taken into account in the credit rating process of 
banks. 
1.3.2 Research Questions 
Since there is further room for academic exploration in this research field, the 
following research topics are identified of particular interest and remain under-
explored: The relationship between corporate governance and bank credit ratings 
and its differences at national level; the evolution of this relationship before, during 
and after the global financial crisis and the way it has changed before and after 
the three principal CRAs begun to compile company ratings with corporate 
governance practices; a comparison of the bank governance determinants of t the 
three principal CRAs. 
In more detail, the essay aims to shed light on the following questions:  
1. Using an international sample of banks, do corporate governance and 




2. What are the different ways that the three principal CRAs incorporate the 
governance characteristics in their analysis, and what are the key 
determinants for each rating agency? 
3. Is there a difference in the relationship of bank governance and bank credit 
ratings, among the three principal CRAs? 
4. Is there a difference in the relationship of bank governance and bank credit 
ratings before the (i.e. until 2008), and after (i.e. after 2009) the global 
financial crisis? 
Before conducting a formal investigation of empirical evidence, we first 
provide a literature review comprising the theoretical framework in governance 
and the empirical studies in governance that is followed by the view of bank 
governance by CRAs, and policy implications. In the last part, we first present our 





2. Literature Review 
This section will provide a systematic review on exiting literature. Firstly, the 
theoretical background for this thesis will be introduced, which includes the 
principal-agent framework in governance. Secondly, different strands of empirical 
studies on corporate governance will be presented. Thirdly, the approach to 
corporate governance that has been followed by the three principal CRAs will be 
discussed. Fourthly, some policy implications will be discussed with regard to 
corporate governance in banking. 
2.1 Principal-agent framework in governance 
The principal-agent literature has given significant insights into the role of 
governance in firms’ ratings, positively or negatively. Probably the first paper to 
open the “black box” called the firm, was the seminal paper of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), which set the principal-agent framework to develop a theory of 
the ownership structure of the firm and the implications of management behaviour. 
Within this framework, the separation of ownership and control creates the 
conditions for managers to make decisions according to their own interests rather 
than the interests of the shareholders. 
As we know the principal-agent problem is observed when the interests of a 
principal and an agent are in conflict. This may take place because, even though 
the agent is expected to represent the best interests of the principal without regard 
for his self-interest, the agent is motivated to act in his own best interests rather 
than those of the principal. Such circumstances arise within firms, when conflicting 
interests of one stakeholder may turn against another and causing inefficiencies 
and financial losses. This leads to the principal-agent problem and the question in 
corporate governance: How to manage the conflicts of interest that arise from 
fundamental principal-agent problems in firms? 
Since conflicts of interest give rise for moral hazard, firms should try to 
minimize these situations through the adoption of solid corporate policy. With this 
respect, in the following sub-sections three major sources of agency conflicts will 
be discussed. The first is the conflict between management and all external 
stakeholders—both bondholders and shareholders; the second agency conflict 
faced by bondholders is the conflict with shareholders, since shareholders in 
levered firms have incentives to undertake actions that can transfer wealth from 
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bondholders to themselves. Thirdly, in the last sub-section the effects of large 
shareholders in corporate governance will be discussed. 
2.1.1 Conflicts between management and external 
stakeholders 
The first type of agency conflicts within the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
agency theory framework is between management and all external 
stakeholders—both bondholders and shareholders. The separation of ownership 
and control in firms causes information asymmetry problems among the parties 
involved, i.e. all external stakeholders and management. In turn, information 
asymmetry problems are the root to a moral hazard problem because managers 
have incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of external 
stakeholders. 
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the problem of inducing 
an “agent” or a manager to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” or 
owner’s equity is quite general. It exists in all sorts of organizations and at every 
level of management. Self-interested managerial behaviour can take several 
forms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) such as shirking, enjoying privileges, 
overcompensation, and empire building. For instance, managers may choose to 
take less risk than shareholders would like them to do so, because their under-
diversified wealth -which in most cases is their human capital- is linked to the firm 
(Holmstrom, 1999). Also, managers may have incentives to increase the firm’s 
size and scope in order to enjoy greater prestige and more privileges, and also 
greater compensation, since executive pay tends to increase with firm size and 
scope. However, unrestrained or unjustified asset growth of a firm has been 
proved to be highly damaging for shareholders (Cooper et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the above forms of self-interested managerial behaviour can 
potentially result in a decrease of the expected cash flows of the firm, and as a 
result decrease the expected cash flows of its external stakeholders and 
simultaneously increase the default risk of bondholders, leading to lower credit 
ratings. So, it is expected that governance mechanisms that promote better 
managerial decision making or in other words less self-interested managerial 
behaviour is expected to promote the interests of all stakeholders. 
2.1.1.1 Managerial Compensation 
An apparent way to mitigate the agency conflicts between management and 
stakeholders discussed above is to provide financial incentives to managers. This 
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is in accordance with principal-agent theory that dictates that shareholders want 
to increase managers’ performance-based compensation by compensation linked 
to stock performance, i.e. stock options. In this way, managers are rewarded for 
taking decisions that are beneficial to shareholders and punished for the opposing 
decisions. In other words, shareholders are induced to compensate managers 
with stock options since they increase the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity. 
However, this approach that motivates managers to pursue riskier investment 
strategies, benefit shareholders at the expense of bondholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
The approach of managerial compensation described above can be 
considered as a partial remedy to the agency problem. Another approach is the 
“managerial power approach” that states that managerial compensation is not only 
a potential instrument for addressing agency problems, but also a part of the 
agency problem itself. Under this approach, compensation of managers is 
excessive, not consistent with basic principles of optimal contracting theory, and 
it is a result of managerial power (Winter and Michels, 2012). 
With respect to empirical research, even though older research suggests that 
compensation incentives are sufficient to induce managers to make decisions 
aligned with the interests of shareholders, empirical research before financial 
crisis of 2007-8 suggested that excess managerial compensation is related to 
weak governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006). Mehran et al. (2011) make a 
literature review on the link between Compensation, Performance, and Risk 
Taking in the financial industry during the financial crisis of 2007-8 and find that 
most empirical research converge to the view that higher risk-taking incentives 
lead to higher volatility and that the incentives shareholders gave to managers to 
pursue riskier investment strategies, did not pay out. 
2.1.1.2 Effects of Governance Structures 
There has been extensive literature on the role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance, as it is considered as the shareholders’ first line of defence 
in corporate governance. Some of important factors of governance structures are 
board size, number or ratio of independent or outside directors and transparency 
issues, while other less important factors may be board members’ education, 
experience, age, etc. 
As far as board size is concerned, it has been considered to have inverse 
relationship with firm value, because large boards suffer from coordination 
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problems (Jensen, 1993). On the other hand, more recent research claims that 
large boards can provide better monitoring (Lehn et al., 2009). Nevertheless, 
recent empirical results concerning the relation of board size with risk give 
ambiguous results (Pathan, 2009; Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2010). 
The presence of independent directors is also an important factor of the 
corporate governance literature, as it reinforces the reliability of firm reports on 
which investors rely heavily to make investment decisions. So, in order to reinforce 
the reliability of those reports, boards of directors have added more independent 
directors who are expected to make decisions that are the best for the firms, even 
if it means that it might go against the financial interest of the insiders. In order to 
induce greater transparency, independent board members have been either 
institutionalized or legislated, especially in the US, in a way that it has become an 
integral part of boards of directors and overall governance. 
Regarding empirical literature findings are ambiguous. Adams and Mehran 
(2010) find that bank performance is unrelated to the outside director ratio. At the 
same time, empirical results have found that the proportion of outside directors is 
negatively related to risk (Pathan, 2009; Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2010)). 
But more on empirical literature will be discussed on section 2.2. 
2.1.2 Conflicts between bondholders and shareholders 
The second type of agency conflicts within the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
agency theory framework are those between bondholders and shareholders. 
Shareholders in leveraged firms have the motivation to undertake actions in order 
to reallocate firm wealth to themselves (e.g. share repurchases). In such a case, 
this is done at the expense of bondholders, since independently of the form that 
wealth transfer takes place, the expected cash flows of the firm decrease, leading 
to lower credit ratings and increased risk for bondholders. 
A different aspect of the same problem is when shareholders have greater 
appetite for risk. In this case, shareholders may demand that managers make 
investments in riskier projects so as to satisfy their appetite. But then again is done 
at the expense of bondholders, because riskier projects mean increased variance 
of the firm’s expected cash flows, again leading to lower credit ratings and 
increased risk for bondholders. 
So, even though bondholder and shareholder interests are generally aligned 
with respect the first type of agency conflicts discussed previously, certain 
elements of corporate governance have an ambiguous impact on bondholders. 
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These elements are those that can give greater power to shareholders (or some 
groups of shareholders), so that they can exploit this power to obtain preferential 
treatment at the expense of other stakeholders. 
To conclude, while it is beneficial for shareholders, certain elements of 
corporate governance can be detrimental to bondholders or form the opposite side 
of view elements of governance that weaken shareholder rights may actually be 
viewed positively from the bondholders. 
2.1.3 Ownership structures and corporate governance 
A key issue in corporate governance is whether large shareholders (or 
institutional shareholders or blockholders1) contribute to better corporate 
governance or not. And speaking in terms of principal-agent problems, the 
question is whether large shareholders mitigate or exacerbate agency problems. 
2.1.3.1 Effects of large shareholders in corporate governance 
The first aspect of the presence of large shareholders in firms is the potential 
positive impact in corporate governance due to their incentive for effective 
monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) explore a model where large shareholders 
have incentives to exert control over management. In this way large shareholding 
may be considered as a mechanism to achieve effective monitoring and thus have 
positive impact into the financial wellbeing of the firm. Thus, the agency problem 
is addressed by large shareholders in that they both have interest in profit 
maximization, and enough control of the firm to serve their interests (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
Jensen (1993) argues that as firm equity concentrates in institutional hands, 
free-rider problems of many individual shareholders can be resolved and 
institutional investors can exercise corporate control rights more effectively than 
otherwise. In a similar way, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large investors 
have the financial incentives to collect information and monitor management, 
thereby avoiding the free-rider problem. So, institutional shareholders have the 
financial incentives and independence to view firm management and policies in 
an unbiased way, and they have the voting power to put pressure on management 
if they observe self-serving behaviour. 
Institutional shareholders are also expected to have better knowledge and 
expertise compared to small shareholders in the industries that they choose to 
 
1 Blockholders are shareholders who own at least 5% of a company's shares. 
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invest. Overall, institutional investors appear to be associated with better 
corporate decisions. With this respect, there are many studies that report that the 
existence of large shareholder ownership result in strong financial performance 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). Also, Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) show that institutional investors achieve better operating 
performance and lower capital expenditures.  
Nevertheless, the theoretical relationship between large owners and firm 
value is sometimes ambiguous in literature. Thomsen et al. (2006) examine the 
relationship between blockholder ownership and firm value as a measure of 
performance. They find that high ownership is associated with lower subsequent 
firm value and accounting profitability in European countries, in contrast to 
contrary that holds in the market-based common law systems in the US and the 
UK. Denis and McConnell (2003) argue that blockholder ownership has a more 
positive effect on firm value in countries with lower levels of investor protection 
because it is more necessary to deal with managerial agency problems in these 
countries. Their findings are consistent with Thomsen et al. (2006), as they find 
that this is broadly consistent with a review of the empirical evidence outside the 
US and the UK. 
Furthermore, very large ownership may lead to entrenchment of owner-
managers that expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). But this aspect of the agency problem will be discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
Therefore, all the above suggest that large shareholders are essential to a 
corporate governance system because they lead to more efficient monitoring of 
management and less managerial opportunistic behaviour, which benefits all 
stakeholders. 
2.1.3.2 Conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
The second aspect of the presence of large shareholders in firms is the 
conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. Even though 
large shareholders can contribute to efficient corporate governance, as explained 
above, they may arise situations of conflicts between the majority and minority 
shareholders in a firm (Thomsen et al., 2006). In terms of principal-agent 




Principal–principal conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are 
due to reasons such as concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and 
control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders (Young et al, 2008). In such circumstances, majority shareholders 
abuse their control of firm’s ownership to exercise undue influence over 
management in order to secure benefits for themselves, which may be detrimental 
to minority shareholders. Thus, although large investors can be effective in solving 
the principal-agency problem, they may be also inefficient in redistributing wealth 
from other investors to themselves and consequently creating the principal-
principal problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The causality of this phenomenon 
can by explained in cases of very large ownerships (above a certain level), the 
owners’ portfolio risk increases with their exposure, which in turn may influence 
their risk taking behaviour (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). 
Thomsen et al. (2006), in their finding that high ownership is associated with 
lower 0 between majority and minority shareholders. 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies on Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance has been a wide field of research in financial 
economics, but also a wide range of other disciplines have contributed to the 
literature of corporate governance, such as law, accounting, marketing, 
management and organizational studies (Brown et al, 2011). With respect to 
financial economics, according to Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) review, “corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. Therefore, financial 
empirical studies on corporate governance have been concerned with the financial 
outcomes related to governance characteristics, mainly firm performance and cost 
of debt, namely from the shareholder’s and bondholder’s view respectively. 
In the two subsections to follow, empirical studies related to corporate 
performance and cost of debt will be analysed, while on the third subsection 
research focusing solely on corporate governance of banks will be investigated. 




2.2.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
The creation of corporate wealth –or firm performance- is probably what 
ultimately matters to firms, its shareholders and also scholars, so the effects of 
corporate governance on firm performance is also of equal importance. The 
literature on corporate governance and firm performance has been extensive and 
it has examined the way different governance attributes affect different 
performance measures. 
Early research on corporate governance and firm performance has mainly 
dealt with attributes such as inside ownership (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). However, subsequent research took under consideration the 
existence of endogeneity and concluded that no causal relationship between 
insider ownership and firm performance could be found (Loderer and Martin, 
1997; Cho, 1998). Specifically, Loderer and Martin (1997) initially found a 
significantly positive relationship between firm performance and inside ownership, 
but when they used a 2SLS regression, no relationship was present. 
Director independence has also been examined with respect to firm financial 
performance (Block, 1999; Lin et al., 2003). Block (1999) finds that market reacts 
positively to the appointment of outside directors, under the condition that strong 
monitoring practices are not already in place. Yet again when considering 
endogeneity, recent studies provide no conclusive evidence for a relationship 
between board independence and firm performance. Bhagat and Black (2002) 
show that a firm with poor past performance is likely to have increased board 
independence, which is evidence of reverse causation. In a broader way, Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) find that there exist endogenous relationships between firm 
performance and corporate governance, capital structure and ownership 
structure. So, while some studies show favourable market reactions to the 
appointment of outside directors, evidence that outside directors matters to long-
term firm performance is ambiguous and contradictory (Brown et al., 2011). 
Other attributes of corporate governance that have been examined are 
shareholder rights and block holder ownership. Gompers et al. (2003) construct a 
governance index called G-index and find that firms with strong shareholder rights 
yielded higher abnormal returns. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) also find that stronger 
shareholder rights are associated with better current and short-term firm 
performance. Lastly, Khan (2006) shows that as far as outside blockholders are 
concerned, what matters in firm performance is institutional investors. 
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2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Cost of Debt 
 Under the principal agent theory, strong corporate governance can not 
only reduce the probability of default, but also it can improve the availability of 
credible financial information necessary for accurate estimation of risk. In this way, 
information asymmetries between the firm and its lenders can be alleviated, thus 
reducing the firm’s risk premium. So, governance can have a significant effect on 
firms’ cost of debt, by being an important determinant of credit ratings. 
Literature on firm credit ratings mostly considers as determinants of credit 
ratings firms’ financial ratios and data, while ignoring the importance of corporate 
governance. However, there have been some studies considering as 
determinants of credit ratings firms’ corporate governance. 
 Sengupta (1998) might be considered as one of the first studies to 
investigate effects of governance attributes on cost of debt. Even though his study 
was restricted to firms’ disclosure quality ratings, he found an inverse relationship 
with the cost of debt financing. 
Soon after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses, a series of studies on 
credit ratings begun investigating more on the relation between credit ratings and 
governance. Such studies were by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Anderson et al. 
(2004) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) that in different ways showed that 
stronger monitoring power of the board over management is associated with 
higher credit ratings and a lower cost of debt for US firms. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), using a sample of 1,005 industrial bond issues 
between 1991 and 1996, found that higher percentage of outside directors and 
greater institutional ownership lead to lower bond yields and higher ratings on 
firms’ new debt issues. Other early papers that examine the influence of corporate 
governance on bond ratings, are those of Anderson et al. (2004), which using a 
sample of S&P 500 firms for the period of 1993–1998, found that the cost of debt 
is inversely related to board independence, board and audit committee size, and 
meeting frequency, and Cremers et al. (2007), which show that shareholder rights 
can have divergent and economically important effects on bondholders. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) extend the studies of Sengupta (1998) and 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), evaluating a broader set of governance variables, 
thereby providing a more comprehensive analysis of the relevance of corporate 
governance from the perspective of bondholders. They provide evidence that 
credit ratings are higher for firms characterized by high accrual quality, earnings 
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timeliness and board independence, but are lower for firms with a large number 
blockholders, excessive CEO power and stockholder rights. 
Another more recent study is that of Alali et al. (2012), in which by using the 
methodology of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), they find that firms that have strong 
corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this 
relationship is enhanced for smaller firms relative to larger firms. They additionally 
find that improving corporate governance is particularly beneficial for smaller firms 
than for larger firms. 
Thus, the existing literature provides strong support that creditors take into 
account a firm’s corporate governance practices in their assessment of the firm’s 
risk. 
2.2.3 Corporate Governance of Banks 
 Corporate governance of banks has been the topic of much recent 
academic work due to the inadequacies of bank governance exposed in global 
financial crisis in. What is noticeable is that all recent academic work examines 
the relationship between bank governance and in most cases risk measures and 
in few cases performance measures. 
 Laeven and Levin (2009), use several measures of bank risk and 
governance but focus primarily on z-score. They find that the presence of 
institutional investors increases the riskiness of the bank, which is consistent with 
the one of the findings of the subsequent work of Ellul and Yerramilli (2010). 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) us multiple measures of riskiness, such as the 
standard deviation of stock returns and the mean implied volatility estimated using 
put options, controlling for a risk management index (RMI), that the authors have 
constructed, plus financial characteristics, institutional ownership and governance 
using the G-Index of Gompers et al. (2003). Their main finding is that banks with 
higher RMIs had lower risk measures of aggregate and downside risk, and higher 
stock returns. They also find banks with high RMI in the year 2006 (before the 
beginning of the financial crisis) had lower downside risk in the subsequent year 
when the financial crisis begun. 
A whole host of papers find that different measures of bank risk are positive 
related with risk-taking incentives for bank managers (Mehran and Rosenberg, 
2008; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2010; Suntheim, 2010). Mehran and Rosenberg (2008), 
using a sample of US banks, find that stock option compensation results to CEOs 
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to undertaking riskier investments. In a similar way, Suntheim (2010) examines 
the compensation practices using an international sample of banks and finds that 
there exists a positive relationship between bank risk and CEOs’ risk taking 
incentives.  
 Another host of papers on bank governance and risk taking (?) concentrate 
on board characteristics (Pathan, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2010; Erkens et al., 
2012). Pathan (2009) use multitude proxies of bank risk (standard deviation of 
stock returns, beta and residual risk) in a sample of US banks and find that small 
bank boards affect positively risk taking attitude. Adams and Mehran (2010) 
examine the relationship between board structure and bank performance, and 
they find that the organizational structure of a bank is significantly related to bank 
board size, which is the reason why banking firms with larger boards do not 
underperform their peers. Erkens et al. (2012) measuring bank performance 
during the crisis period, find that independent boards and institutional ownership 
are negatively related to stock returns. 
Lastly, Mehran et al. (2011) offer a literature review in recent academic work 
on bank governance, in order to analyse the flaws of the banking system that were 
exposed by the financial crisis of 2007-8. They examine four topics of bank 
governance: executive compensation, boards, risk management and market 
discipline, while discussing promising solutions in each of the four topics that the 
authors showcase. 
2.2.4 Econometric techniques used in Literature 
The general model found in the literature which examines credit ratings as a 
function of corporate governance attributes and firm characteristics, is the 
following: 
Credit Rating = 𝑓(corporate governance attributes, 𝑓irm characteristics) 
So, apart from the corporate governance attributes, a number of additional 
explanatory variables are included. The variables determining corporate bond 
ratings found in the literature, among others include firm size, ratios of debt-to-
assets, return-on-assets, etc (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006; Alali et al., 2012). 
As far as the statistical methods applied in literature, when the dependent 
variable is firm performance or risk measures, we find that ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) is used. Howevee, when the dependent variable is credit ratings, we find 
either ordered logit or ordered probit models (see Table 1) being used. 
Ordered logit is mostly found in most recent studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Alali et al., 2012). Intuitively this model is more appropriate than ordered 
probit due to its a priori assumptions. It recognises the ordered structure of the 
ratings and it can also adjust to the specific features of the rating scale. Whilst the 
ordered probit model assumes a constant influence of variables across all rating 
categories. 
One last point that should be emphasized is the issue of endogeneity 
addressed in the previous subsections. The above relationship treats governance 
attributes as being exogenously determined. In this case having found a positive 
relationship between firm performance and governance attributes, one can 
conclude improving some governance attributes will improve firm performance. 
But this is not the case because causality may run in both directions, i.e. firms with 
strong governance experience strong performance but also firms with strong 
performance choose strong management. The problem of endogeneity can be 
addressed by alternative specifications as robustness checks. 
Table 2.1 presents a brief list of the models linking attributes of corporate 
governance and metrics od hare performance. 
 
Table 2.1: Econometric Techniques used in Corporate Governance Literature 
Authors Regression Technique 
Used 
Treatment of Endogeneity 
Alali et al. (2012) Ordered Logit Simultaneous equation approach 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) Ordered Logit / 
Logistic Regression 
Simultaneous equation approach 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) Ordered probit Simultaneous equation approach 
using 3SLS 




2.3 Credit Rating Agencies and Corporate 
Governance 
The credit rating that a credit rating agency (CRA) issues for a firm reflects 
the agency’s view of the overall creditworthiness of the firm and its ability to meet 
its financial obligations (Standard & Poor’s, 2002). Within this context, CRAs have 
been concerned with corporate governance because weak governance can impair 
a firm’s financial position and disturb its ability to meet its financial obligations, as 
in the case of the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses. The following sections 
will present the approach of corporate governance that has been followed by the 
The Big Three CRAs, i.e. Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch Ratings. 
2.3.1 Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Practices 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) was the first CRA to begin the development of 
corporate governance benchmark in early 1998. In 2002, S&P formed a dedicated 
unit called Governance Services, which developed a comprehensive framework 
for evaluating corporate governance for firms in emerging markets (Standard & 
Poor, 2002). This framework was named Corporate Governance Score (CGS) and 
it reflected S&P assessment of a firm’s corporate governance practices and 
policies with an emphasis on the shareholders’ interests. CGS framework was 
based on four governance components: (1) ownership structure and influence, (2) 
financial stakeholders rights and relations, (3) financial transparency and 
disclosure, and (4) board structure and processes. It should be made clear that 
even though CGS scores were assigned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), 
they were not credit ratings. 
S&P CGS was improved in the years following its initial launch (see also 
Standard & Poor, 2004), until 2007, when the CGS methodology of stand-alone 
governance analysis underwent a major overhaul. A new framework named 
GAMMA methodology was introduced in 2008, likewise for firms in emerging 
markets and it included a firm’s enterprise risk management and strategy-making 
processes. The word GAMMA is coming from the words Governance, 
Accountability, Management Metrics and Analysis, and the new methodology was 
comprised offour new governance components: (1) Ownership Influences, (2) 
Shareholder Rights, (3) Transparency, Audit, and Enterprise Risk Management, 
and (4) Board Effectiveness, Strategic Process, and Compensation practices. 
This new methodology again used a numeric scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), 
but its breakthrough was that it recognized the importance of stakeholders’ rights 
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beyond the rights of the shareholders, by addressing the interests of both creditors 
and shareholders. This development took place because of the increasing debate 
that corporate governance should include a firm’s other stakeholders such as 
creditors, employees, customers, and the local community. 
We should note that while S&P provides the aforementioned stand-alone 
governance score, i.e. non-financial-risk assessment or assessment of corporate- 
governance risk, its credit ratings include both financial and non-financial factors, 
and in particular management and corporate governance attributes. 
2.3.2 Moody’s Corporate Governance Practices 
In 2002, Moody’s established a new corporate governance section in order to 
conduct Corporate Governance Assessments for selected major North American 
debt issuers. These Corporate Governance Assessments were constructed  
based on public information and they were supplemented with discussions with 
firms’ management. A distinct characteristic of these assessments was that 
evaluation of governance practices does not result in a score or rating. Instead, 
Moody’s provided “a textual opinion on the quality of governance.” 
A few years later, Moody’s published an assessment report (Moody’s, 2006), 
given its up to this time accumulated experience, where it gave details on the 
categorization of the impact of a firm’s governance. The categorization was in a 
scale of 5 as follows: Governance is a credit strength, Governance is relatively 
strong, Governance is neutral, Governance is relatively weak and Governance is 
a credit weakness. 
2.3.3 Fitch Ratings’ Corporate Governance Practices 
In 2004, Fitch Ratings (FR) published a special report titled “Evaluating 
Corporate Governance: The Bondholders’ Perspective” (Fitch Ratings, 2004). In 
their special report, FR publicised their approach to incorporate corporate 
governance into their overall credit rating process, even though, according to FR, 
they had always considered corporate governance aspects in their ratings. The 
core elements of corporate governance considered by FR in their special report 
in 2004 were: (1) Independent and effective board of directors, (2) Oversight of 
related-party transactions, (3) Audit process integrity, and (4) Reasonable and 
performance-based management compensation. 
FR corporate governance methodology was developed in the years to follow 
and nowadays FR evaluates governance matters on two levels: country-specific 
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and issuer-specific (Fitch Ratings, 2012). The country-specific governance part 
assesses the jurisdictional environment of a firm’s country of incorporation, 
whereas the issuer-specific part focuses on the characteristics shaped by the 
industry in which the firm operates and the relationships among its stakeholders. 
In detail, the core elements of issuer-specific part are (1) board effectiveness, (2) 
management effectiveness, (3) transparency of financial information, and (4) 
related-party transactions. 
 
2.4 Policy Implications for Governance of Banks 
 Bank governance has not only been the topic of recent academic work, 
but it has also been the topic of policy discussion. Besides the numerous reports 
that have been issued for the causes of the financial crisis, such as the 
aforementioned report of F.C.I.C. and  the Levin-Coburn Report of the U.S. 
Senate, there have been reports such as the Walker Report (2009) and the report 
of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2010) analyzing the failure 
of bank governance. Furthermore, supervisory authorities around the world have 
taken actions to engage dialogue on risk management practices in banking. The 
most prominent examples are the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the Senior Supervisors Group, which will be discussed in the next two sections. 
2.4.1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a special committee of the 
Bank of International Settlements which acts as forum for the cooperation of its 
member countries on banking supervisory matters. The Committee’s objective is 
to enhance the understanding of key supervisory issues in banking and to improve 
banking supervision around the globe. 
The Committee has been issuing principles for enhancing corporate 
governance since 1999. The latest revised principles, which were published in 
July 2015, stress the importance of risk governance as part of a bank's overall 
corporate governance framework and promotes the value of strong boards and 
board committees together with effective control functions. 
The revised principles have five key points which include the following: (1) 
enhanced role of board of directors in overseeing the implementation of effective 
risk management systems, (2) emphasis on the board's collective competence 
and individual board members sufficient time for their duties, (3) enhanced 
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guidance on risk governance of the bank’s three lines of defense2 and 
establishment of a sound risk culture, (4) guidance in evaluating the selection 
processes of board members and senior management; (5) reevaluation of 
compensation and incentive structure of senior management in order to convey 
acceptable risk-taking behavior and reinforce the bank's operating and risk 
culture. 
2.4.2 Senior Supervisors Group 
According to its mission statement, the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) is 
also a forum for senior representatives of financial supervisory authorities of the 
participating countries and institutions3, with scope of engaging in dialogue on risk 
management practices, governance, and other issues concerning complex, 
globally-active financial institutions. 
Since its establishment, SSG uses its network to share information and facts 
on supervisory issues and approaches, while engaging with the financial industry 
to develop a better understanding of the challenges and the risks that important 
institutions faced systematically. 
Two of the most prominent reports that SSG has published (Senior 
Supervisors Group, 2008, 2009) are concerned commenting extensively on the 
conclusions on risk management functions before the crisis years, 2007 and 2008. 
SSG’s reports have been useful not only to policymakers but also to academics. 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) in their analysis of U.S. bank holding companies risk 
management practices, conduct their analysis based on the main finding of SSG’s 
report in 2008, which said that institutions with strong risk management functions 
identified risks and started taking corrective actions as early as in 2006. 
  
 
2 Business units, risk management teams, and internal audit and control functions. 
3 As of today, 10 countries and institutions participate in SSG. 
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3. Bank Governance and Credit Ratings 
3.1 Introduction 
This essay aims to investigate whether, at international level, banks with 
strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings. We are interested 
to distinguish the key determinants of corporate governance in bank ratings and 
how they differ for each rating agency. Also, we seek similar empirical evidence 
when bank enjoy strong country institutional characteristics. Our empirical work 
concludes by examining the evolution in the relationship of bank governance and 
credit ratings before, and after the global financial crisis. Following the review of 
literature on fundamental theories, empirical research and market practices, this 
section will focus on examining the research questions developed in section 1.3 
through empirical analysis of data and discussion of results. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
In Section 2.2.4 we shortly discussed the econometric techniques used in 
literature and indicated that ordered logit is mostly found in studies where the 
dependent variable is credit ratings, as it is more appropriate due to its a priori 
assumptions.  
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
credit ratings, we estimate an ordered logit model where bank ratings are 
modelled as a function of financial explanatory variables and governance 
explanatory variables. The model is: 
         17      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇8, ∞) 
         16      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇7, 𝜇8) 
         15      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇6, 𝜇7) 
       𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =     ⋮   (1) 
         3      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇2, 𝜇3) 
         2      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇1, 𝜇2) 
         1      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ (−∞, 𝜇1) 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    (2) 
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where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the credit rating of bank i at year t according to the latent 
variable 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and the partition points μi that distinguish each rating category. 𝛽 is 
the vector of slope coefficients for the matrix 𝛸𝑖𝑡 of the financial explanatory 
variables, and 𝛾 is the vector of slope coefficients for the matrix 𝑌𝑖𝑡 of the 
governance explanatory variables. All explanatory variables are year-end 
variables, but the credit ratings are observed at the end of each year-end. This is 
because we make the assumption that CRAs must first receive the publicly 
available financial and governance information for a bank and then decide for the 
bank’s credit rating. For example, year-end financials of 2010 are announced from 
early February till mid-March of 2011, while governance data are available at the 
end of 2010, and accordingly the credit rating is observed at the end of the first 
quarter of 2011, when we assume that the CRA has made its decision. This 
approach is similar to Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) that consider the first 
rating available three months after the fiscal year-end and match this rating with 
the fiscal year-end financial statement data. 
 
3.3 Sample and variables 
Consistent with the aim of this essay, data for the analysis are compiled by 
the following two sources: BoardEx database and Bankscope databases. 
BoardEx is one of the most comprehensive databases for business intelligence 
that among other contains data for management of firms from all over the world, 
even though extensive coverage is for North American countries and Europe. The 
years of coverage on BoardEx start at 1999 and all observations are yearly -most 
of the times for the end of year-. So, our main source of governance data is 
BoardEx and the biographical information on most board members and senior 
executives for financial institutions around the world. Out of this information, we 
use all relevant corporate governance attributes for our analysis. The time period 
for which we have at our disposal data from BoardEx is from 1999 to 2014. The 
total number of banks that governance data are available in BoardEx are 
presented in Table 3.1. 
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Despite high numbers from each world region, the useable reduces 
significantly, as for example most of the US banks that are in the North Amerca 
(NA) region are small banks that are not rated. Also, Bankscope database, which 
is our second source, has information on roughly 22,500 banks (according to their 
website 32,000 banks) around the world. The information we use from BaskScope 
database is the credit ratings of the banks that will be included in our analysis and 
banks’ financial characteristics as the control variables to surrogate bank’s default 
risk. In order to have homogeneity in our sample, we apply a number of selection 
criteria in Bankscope. Those criteria are bank’s specialization and whether the 
bank considered is the ultimate owner in the ownership structure. For the 
specialization criterion we choose from Bankscope only values of Commercial 
Banks, Savings Banks, Cooperative Banks and Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies (BH&HCs), so as to maintain homogeneity in our sample by 
concentrating broadly on commercial banks (i.e. excluding investment banks, 
custodian banks, etc), which play have a fundamental role in the economy. The 
ultimate owner criterion is to avoid double-counting ratings of banks that are junior 
within a single ownership structure (e.g. while Citigroup Inc is included as the 
ultimate holder in the Group, all its subsidiaries are excluded). 
When we combine the available data from BoardEx with Bankscope data, the 
number of banks reduces to a total of 243 banks from the around the world as 
presented Table 3. In the end, we have an unbalanced panel as displayed in the 
last column of Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.1: BoardEx Database Sample 
World Region Number of Banks 
Europe 222 
North America 927 




3.3.1 Bank Credit Ratings and Financial Variables 
The credit ratings of each CRA we choose to use in our analysis are the long-
term issuer ratings which are used in all related literature for bank ratings (Hau, 
Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012; Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens, 
2012; Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de Guevara, 2014). The long-term issuer 
ratings are the primary issuer ratings of each CRA and in particular for Fitch we 
use their the long-term issuer default rating (IDR), for Moody’s we use their long-
term Issuer rating (foreign) and for Standard and Poor’s we use their foreign 
currency long-term Issuer Credit Rating (ICR). All credit ratings obtained are 
transformed from their letter form into a numerical value that corresponds to an 
ordinal scale. In all related literature for credit ratings we find studies that use 
ordinal scales from 4 categories to 17 categories. E.g. Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay 
(1998) use an ordinal scale of 4 categories, Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and 
Pastor (2018) use a numerical scale of 11 categories, whereas Van Laere, 
Vantieghem and Baesens (2012) use an ordinal scale of 17 categories. Given the 
size of each CRA’s subsample, we choose to also use an ordinal scale of 17 
categories, according to Table 3.3. 
In Table 3.4 we present the basic summary statistics for the bank credit 
ratings of our combined sample, by each CRA for the world sample and for each 
world region separately. The period for the summary statistics are for the period 
from 1999 to 2014, when governance bank data is available from BoardEx (i.e. 
we disregard available credit ratings before 1999 and after 2014). Fitch on 
average assigns lower ratings compared to Moody’s and S&P, while S&P has the 
lowest standard deviation. In the second part of Table 3.4 we present the basic 
summary statistics for the bank credit  ratings of the three CRAs, but for the period 
before and after the global financial crisis, i.e. from 1999 to 2008 and from 2009 
to 2014.It is interesting that all three CRAs’ average bank ratings decrease by 
Table 3.2: Combined Final Sample 
World Region Number of Banks Bank-year observations 
Europe 117 1,069 
North America 85 1,048 
Rest of the World 41 241 
Total 243 2,358 
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more than one notch while at the same time their volatility increases. Moody’s has 
the greatest drop of 1.91 notches in their average bank ratings, then S&P follows 
with 1.56 notches and then Fitch with 1.14 notches. 
Table 3.3: Rating Transformation Table 
Fitch Rating Scale Number Moody’s Rating Scale Number S&P Rating Scale Number 
AAA 17 Aaa 17 AAA 17 
AA+ 16 Aa1 16 AA+ 16 
AA 15 Aa2 15 AA 15 
AA- 14 Aa3 14 AA- 14 
A+ 13 A1 13 A+ 13 
A 12 A2 12 A 12 
A- 11 A3 11 A- 11 
BBB+ 10 Baa1 10 BBB+ 10 
BBB 9 Baa2 9 BBB 9 
BBB- 8 Baa3 8 BBB- 8 
BB+ 7 Ba1 7 BB+ 7 
BB 6 Ba2 6 BB 6 
BB- 5 Ba3 5 BB- 5 
B+ 4 B1 4 B+ 4 
B 3 B2 3 B 3 
B- 2 B3 2 B- 2 
CCC+ 1 Caa1 1 CCC+ 1 
CCC 1 Caa2 1 CCC 1 
CCC- 1 Caa3 1 CCC- 1 
CC 1 Ca 1 CC 1 







    
D 1 
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 As far as the financial explanatory variables are concerned, we choose to 
use five financial variables that are mostly found in related literature (e.g. Ellul and 
Yerramilli,  
 2010, Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, Van Laere, Vantieghem 
and Baesens, 2012). Those financial characteristic variables cover bank size, 
profitability, leverage, asset structure and funding structure. For bank size we the 
natural log of total assets, for profitability we choose Return on Average Assets 
(ROAA), for leverage we choose Total Assets divided by Equity, for asset 
structure is measured by both Net Loans divided by Total Assets, and for funding 
structure we choose short-term funding divided by total assets. In Table 3.5 we 
present the basic summary statistics for the financial explanatory variables. 
Apart from the financial explanatory variables described above which relate 
to the intrinsic risk of a bank, we need to an explanatory variable for the external 
support element. Following Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012) and 
Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018), we choose to add as an 
explanatory variable the sovereign credit rating to proxy, not only the external 
support as considered by the CRAs but also the economic environment of the 
bank. So, we choose the sovereign credit rating by the same CRAs and the 
equivalent time periods (i.e. if we have a bank rating for a bank at period t by Fitch, 
Table 3.4a: Summary Statistics for Bank Credit Ratings 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs 
Full Sample 9.48 3.17 2,371 9.85 3.40 2,035 9.49 2.90 1,928 
Europe 9.58 3.30 1,178 9.72 3.71 1,065 9.59 3.33 855 
NA 9.81 2.77 911 10.83 2.64 649 9.70 2.40 767 
RoW 7.97 3.43 282 8.33 3.06 321 8.67 2.60 306 
Table 3.4b: Summary Statistics for Bank Credit Ratings for different periods  
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs 
1999-2008 9.94 3.08 1,419 10.71 3.01 1,124 10.16 2.58 1,099 
2009-2014 8.80 3.20 952 8.80 3.55 911 8.60 3.06 829 
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i.e. 3 months after year end, we obtain the bank’s country credit rating again for 
period t, for the year end).  
Equivalently, we use the same ordinal scale of 17 categories to transform 
sovereign ratings from their letter form into a numerical value, according to Table 
3.3. In Table 3.6 we present the basic summary statistics for the sovereign credit 
ratings. 
3.3.2 Governance variables 
The central idea of our hypothesis is that governance features impact credit 
ratings by controlling agency costs that result from conflicts between managers 
and all external stakeholders as well as between bondholders and shareholders. 
Most studies on corporate governance focus on board independence instead of a 
broad set of attributes to cover stakeholders’ claims to firms’ resources (e.g. 
Sengupta, 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Our available governance 
variables from BoardEx cover the first aspect of governance, i.e. between 
managers and all external stakeholders, but do not cover the conflicts as between 
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for Financial Variables 
 Full Sample Europe NA 
 Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs 
Bank size 7.52 .78 3,517 7.70 0.80 1,662 7.36 0.74 1,224 
Profitability 0.78 4.53 3,514 0.55 6.22 1,659 0.85 2.12 1,224 
Leverage 23.07 565.2 3,516 37.10 818.32 1,661 11.75 11.74 1,224 
Asset structure 57.47 16.63 3,512 57.14 16.79 1,657 61.23 15.50 1,224 
Funding structure 165.5 949.9 3,495 204.40 1,383.2 1,643 132.08 67.48 1,221 
          
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs 
Full Sample 13.11 4.11 3,471 13.91 3.87 2,931 13.08 4.05 3,687 
Europe 12.40 4.17 1,699 13.22 4.04 1,237 12.48 4.09 1,800 
NA 15.98 0.13 1,268 16.00 0.00 1,339 15.76 0.43 1,360 
RoW 8.31 3.37 504 8.46 4.32 355 8.20 3.73 527 
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bondholders and shareholders. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) use Standard & 
Poor’s framework (Standard & Poor, 2002) to identify which governance attributes 
affect credit ratings. This framework consists four components of governance: 
Ownership structure and influence, financial stakeholder rights and relations, 
financial transparency, and board structure and processes. Out of this framework, 
we cover the third and fourth components of financial transparency, and board 
structure and processes. In Table 3.7 we present all the governance variables 
available from Bankscope. 
The first component of ownership structure and influence requires variables 
that show the concentration in ownership. Ownership concentration shows how 
shareholders are allowed to exercise influence on management so as to secure 
their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders or debtholders. Other 
variables could be the ownership percentage of institutional investors and the 
percentage of shares owned by officers or directors (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006). The second component of financial stakeholder rights and relations ideally 
requires a governance index such as the aforementioned G-index by Gompers et 
al. (2003). But as already explained, BoardEx governance data do cover neither 
the first component nor the second. It should also be noted that even though 
Bankscope has ownership data for banks, those data concern only current 
ownership. Similarly, FitchConnect, which is a financial database that also 
contains information for bank around the world, similarly has only current 
ownership data for banks. The third component of financial transparency requires 
variables that portray the information asymmetry between the bank and its 
bondholders and shareholders. Unfortunately, there are no such data available in 
BoardEx for the transparency of the banks’ financial reporting, or even in its 
prudential reporting. 
The fourth component of board structure and processes concerns issues 
such as the size of the board and it’s composition, the existence and structure of 
committees, competency of board members, the existence of independent 
directors on the board and on committees and remuneration structure of board 
members. BoardEx database contains many variables that will allow us to 
evaluate the relationship of the fourth component and bank ratings. The variables 
available from BoardEx database relevant to board structure and processes are 
presented in Table 3.7. A note should be made that the last variable named CRO, 
which is not a variable directly extracted in BoardEx database, but a variable 
created from the individual role variable for board members in BoardEx. So, in this 
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way we have constructed a variable to denote the presence of a director in the 
board, whose title or role is either Chief Risk Officer or similar (e.g. Head of Risk 
Management, Risk Management/Control, etc). Similar to Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2010) we believe that the presence of a chief risk officer is interrelated with the 
risk management function and we shall examine how it overall affects bank 
ratings. Additionally, the variables in the last rows of Table 3.7 regarding the Audit, 
Remuneration/Compensation and Nomination Committees are expected to 
contribute to a bank’s overall risk management function. 
Table 3.7a: Governance Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
#Brd_Mbrs Total number of the members of the bank’s board of directors. 
#Brd_NEDs Number of non-executive directors (NEDs) in the bank’s 
board of directors. 
%NEDs Percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs) in the bank’s 
board of directors (i.e. #Brd_NEDs/#Brd_Mbrs). 
#BRD_IndNEDs Number of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) in 
the bank’s board of directors, i.e. members of the board who 
are not an employee of the bank. 
%IndNEDs Percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) 
in the bank’s board of directors (i.e. 
#Brd_IndNEDs/#Brd_Mbrs). 
Chairman_CEO CEO and Chairman Roles are combined on the Board (1- 
Yes, 0 - No). 
AvgTimeEDs Average time in years that Executive Directors (EDs) have 
been in their current role. 
AvgTimeNEDs Average time in years that NEDs have been in their current 
role. 
AvgBoardTdNEDs Sums all the quoted boards that NEDs have sat on to-date 
then divided by the number of NEDs. 
AvgBoardCurEDs Sums all the quoted boards that Eds currently sit on and is 
then divided by the number of Eds. 
AvgAgeEDs Average age of Eds. 
AvgAgeNEDs Average age of NEDs. 
AvgEduEDs Total qualifications gained by EDs divided by the number of 
EDs, where all qualifications have a rating of one. 
AvgEduNEDs Total qualifications gained by NEDs divided by the number of 
NEDs, where all qualifications have a rating of one. 
%GendEDs Percentage of male sex of EDs. 




In Table 3.7b we present the basic summary statistics for the all the 
governance variables. Similar as above, in the last two columns, we can see for 
each governance variable the mean value for the period before and after the 
global financial crisis, i.e. from 1999 to 2008 and from 2009 to 2014. The most 
interesting difference in the mean values before and after the global financial 
crisis, is the CRO variable for which we observe a quadruple mean value in the 
after period compared to the before the financial crisis period. 
ExChairBoard Executive Chairman present on Board or Combined role of 
CEO & Chairman is present (1- Yes, 0 - No). 
#IndNEDsPastCFO/FD Number of independent NEDs with past CFO/FD role. 
AuditSize Number of members of the Audit Committee 
RenumSize Number of members of the Remuneration/Compensation 
Committee 
NominSize Number of members of the Nomination Committee 
#IndNEDsAudit Number of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) in 
the Audit Committee 
%IndNEDsAudit Percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) 
in the Audit Committee 
#IndNEDsRenum Number of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) in 
the Remuneration/Compensation Committee 
%IndNEDsRenum Percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) 
in the Remuneration/Compensation Committee 
#IndNEDsNomin Number of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) in 
the Nomination Committee 
%IndNEDsNomin Percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) 
in the Nomination Committee 
CRO Presence of a director in the board, whose title/role is either 
Chief Risk Officer or similar (1- Yes, 0 - No). 
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Table 3.7b: Summary Statistics for Governance Variables 
 Full sample 1999-2008 2009-2014 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Mean 
#Brd_Mbrs 14.80 5.12 15.51 14.03 
#Brd_NEDs 12.00 4.26 12.63 11.32 
%NEDs 81.56 0.13 81.61 81.52 
#BRD_IndNEDs 7.66 4.70 8.02 7.27 
%IndNEDs 54.13 0.30 54.84 53.36 
Chairman_CEO 0.006 0.077 0.007 0.004 
AvgTimeEDs 4.59 3.75 4.58 4.61 
AvgTimeNEDs 5.78 3.38 5.95 5.60 
AvgBoardTdNEDs 2.64 1.48 2.63 2.65 
AvgBoardCurEDs 1.54 0.88 1.59 1.48 
AvgAgeEDs 55.76 6.46 55.47 56.07 
AvgAgeNEDs 59.86 4.99 59.55 60.19 
AvgEduEDs 1.99 3.08 1.92 2.06 
AvgEduNEDs 1.69 0.67 1.61 1.79 
%GendEDs 97.30 8.97 97.97 96.57 
%GendNEDs 86.67 11.43 88.83 84.34 
ExChairBoard 0.56 0.50 0.65 0.46 
#IndNEDsPastCFO/FD 0.54 0.91 0.43 0.67 
AuditSize 3.830 2.08 3.71 3.97 
RenumSize 3.37 2.16 3.29 3.46 
NominSize 3.04 2.78 2.80 3.30 
#IndNEDsAudit 3.03 2.14 3.02 3.03 
%IndNEDsAudit 67.51 0.41 68.15 66.82 
#IndNEDsRenum 2.68 2.05 2.69 2.68 
%IndNEDsRenum 63.37 0.42 63.31 63.43 
#IndNEDsNomin 2.33 2.40 2.30 2.35 
%IndNEDsNomin 49.86 0.45 48.78 51.03 
CRO 0.046 0.21 0.019 0.075 
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3.3.3 Country Institutional Characteristics 
 The last group of explanatory variables is for assessing how country 
institutional characteristics affect bank ratings. For this purpose, we use the 
International Country Risk Guide by PRS Group, which is a rating system that 
comprises a group of variables in three subcategories of risk: political, economic, 
and financial risk ratings. We use their political risk index which has 12 
components: Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment 
Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religion 
in Politics, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and 
Bureaucracy Quality. Some of the components have subcomponents, e.g. 
Government Stability’s subcomponents are Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength, and Popular Support, and components have scores of up to 12, 6 or 4 
points. Data are yearly and they are available from 1984 for more than 140 
countries around the world. So, for our sample of banks, there are available data 
for all banks’ countries.  
 For the purpose of our analysis we choose to the following components of 
the political risk index: Government Stability (max 12 points), Socioeconomic 
Conditions (max 12 points), Investment Profile (max 12 points), Corruption (max 
6 points), Law and Order (max 6 points), Democratic Accountability (max 6 points) 
and Bureaucracy Quality (max 4 points). So, we believe that all the selected 
components are relevant to a country’s institutional characteristics and can help 
us in our analysis. Short description for each of the selected component is given 
below: 
Government Stability Government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, 
and its ability to stay in office. 
Socioeconomic Conditions Socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could 
constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. 
Investment Profile Assessment of Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits 
Repatriation, and Payment Delays that affect the risk to 
investment. 
Corruption Assessment of corruption within the political system. 
Law and Order The strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the 
assessment ofpopular observance of the law. 
Democratic Accountability Government’s responsiveness to its people. 
Bureaucracy Quality Institutional strength and quality of the country’s 
bureaucracy. 




3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section we proceed with the empirical results. First, we perform 
Principal Component Analysis for the governance variables in order to simplify our 
analysis and explore the existence of a relationship between bank ratings and 
bank governance. Next, we propose a common base model for all three CRAs 
with a selection of the available governance variables to examine the relationship 
between bank ratings and bank governance. Next, we incorporate in our model 
country institutional characteristics to examine how they affect bank credit ratings, 
and in the last subsection we proceed with structural break tests to examine if 
there is difference in the relationship of bank governance and bank credit ratings 
before and after the global financial crisis. 
 
3.4.1 PCA Analysis for Governance Variables 
Given the number of our available governance variables, we initially chose 
to use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) so as to reduce the dimensionality of 
our data set and also to identify a smaller number of variables (component scores) 
for the purpose of our analysis. We can then use the component scores in the 
model of equations (1) and (2) as to answer the question whether corporate 
governance affect bank credit ratings. In Table 3.8 we present the results of our 
PCA analysis for all our 28 governance variables. Interestingly enough 28 
components, i.e. the same number with the variables, are extracted from the PCA 
analysis and the first eight have eigenvalues above 1. Due to the relatively large 
number of components with eigenvalues above 1, we chose only to keep the first 
five for our analysis, which have a cumulative percentage of explained variance 
above 0.55. 
In Table 3.9 we estimate the model of equations (1) and (2), where matrix 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 instead contains the first five principal components from Table 3.8. The 
coefficients of almost all financial explanatory are uniformly statistically significant 
and have the same expected signs across CRAs. Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. are 
highly significant across all three CRAs with positive signs as expected. ST 
Funding/Total Assets is also highly significant across all three CRAs has a 
negative sign as expected, while the other two financial ratios have low statistical 
significance. Country Rating coefficients have, again as expected, a positive sign 




Table 3.8: Principal Component Analysis for Governance Variables 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 7.708 5.229 0.275 0.275 
Comp2 2.479 0.251 0.089 0.364 
Comp3 2.229 0.509 0.080 0.444 
Comp4 1.720 0.206 0.061 0.505 
Comp5 1.514 0.107 0.054 0.559 
Comp6 1.407 0.228 0.050 0.609 
Comp7 1,179 0.175 0.042 0.651 
Comp8 1.004 0.023 0.036 0.687 
Comp9 0.981 0.055 0.035 0.722 
Comp10 0.926 0.117 0.033 0.755 
Comp11 0.809 0.038 0.029 0.784 
Comp12 0.771 0.013 0.028 0.812 
Comp13 0.758 0.033 0.027 0.839 
Comp14 0.725 0.069 0.026 0.865 
Comp15 0.656 0.041 0.023 0.888 
Comp16 0.615 0.055 0.022 0.910 
Comp17 0.560 0.106 0.020 0.930 
Comp18 0.454 0.122 0.016 0.946 
Comp19 0.332 0.008 0.012 0.958 
Comp20 0.324 0.060 0.012 0.970 
Comp21 0.265 0.072 0.009 0.979 
Comp22 0.192 0.049 0.007 0.986 
Comp23 0.143 0.029 0.005 0.991 
Comp24 0.114 0.066 0.004 0.995 
Comp25 0.048 0.011 0.002 0.997 
Comp26 0.038 0.003 0.001 0.998 
Comp27 0.035 0.023 0.001 1.000 




The five principal components are less interpretable and do not have any real 
meaning since they are constructed as linear combinations of the initial 
governance variables. So, we cannot infer any meaning either from their 
coefficient levels or the coefficients signs. However, we can infer from their 
significance levels that governance variables add to the explanatory power of the 
model for all three CRAs’ bank ratings. In order to confirm this, we perform an LR 
test to assess the difference in fit comparing the fit of the restricted model, i.e. the 
same model presented in Table 3.9 but without the five principal components, 
Table 3.9: Estimation results for full samples with principal components 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of the full samples. The dependent variable is equivalently 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P long-term issuer ratings as defined in subsection 3.3.1, while the financial 
explanatory variables are also defined in subsection 3.3.1 and instead of governance variables we use 
the first five principal components from Table 3.8. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-
correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the 
coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Variables Fitch Moody’s S&P 
     Financial Variables Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
LN of Total Assets 2.49*** 10.90 1.74*** 7.79 2.22*** 7.43 
ROAA 0.41*** 4.46 0.34*** 3.78 0.55*** 4.45 
Total Assets/Equity -0.0002 -0.19 0.02 1.51 0.02* 1.84 
Net Loans/Total 
Assets 
-0.0004 -0.03 0.01 0.96 0.002 0.13 
ST Funding/Total 
Assets 
-0.01*** -3.96 -0.0000*** -3.42 -0.01*** -3.55 
Country Rating 0.60*** 11.21 0.57*** 11.40 0.65*** 11.29 
     Principal Comp.       
Principal Component 1 -0.18*** -3.28 -0.06 -1.03 -0.24*** -4.02 
Principal Component 2 0.16* 1.90 0.08 0.91 0.20* 1.76 
Principal Component 3 0.16** 2.32 0.08 1.18 0.12 1.50 
Principal Component 4 -0.11 -1.42 -0.08 -1.09 0.04 0.43 
Principal Component 5 0.23** 2.43 0.20*** 2.70 0.16 1.60 
Number of Obs 1,733 1,268 1,522 
Pseudo R2 0.2634 0.2170 0.2539 
Cluster of Banks 191 167 167 
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against the full model with the principal components in Table 3.9, for each CRA 
separately. Results of the LR test are presented in Table 3.10. 
The results in Table 3.10 indicate that for all three CRAs the full model as 
in Table 3.9 fits significantly better than the restricted model respectively for each 
CRA. This is interpreted that adding the five principal components as predictor 
variables together (not just individually) results in a statistically significant 
improvement in model fit, thus all governance variables used for the five principal 
components in our above analysis affect bank ratings and have explanatory 
power. 
 
3.4.2 Base model for Governance and Bank Ratings 
In this subsection we propose a base model to be used commonly for all 
three CRAs that embodies a selection from the available governance variables in 
Table 3.7 so as to examine the relationship between bank ratings and bank 
governance but also to compare the results with the previous results of the PCA. 
We decide this base model after attempting many different specifications in 
combining the available governance variables. We choose governance variables 
that represent different aspects of governance, and all correspond to the fourth 
component of corporate governance as explained in section 3.3.2. We choose 
#BRD_IndNEDs for the structure of the board of directors, AvgTimeEDs for the 
experience in the executive directors’ current roles, #IndNEDsPastCFO/FD for the 
specialized experience necessary for the independent directors, %GendNEDs and 
AvgAgeNEDs for the gender and age characteristics of independent directors, and 
AvgEduNEDs for the education level of independent directors. %IndNEDsAudit and 
%IndNEDsNomin refer to the structure of committees, and together with CRO 
represent the contribution of governance to the bank’s risk management function. 
So, we estimate the model of equations (1) and (2) and results are presented in 
Table 3.11. 
Table 3.10: LR test for the PCA model against the restricted model 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
LR χ2 170.17 45.42 177.40 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 




 The results for all the financial explanatory variables are similar to the 
results in Table 3.9, i.e. almost all financial explanatory variables are uniformly 
statistically significant and have the same expected signs across CRAs. With 
respect to corporate governance variables, now the results in Table 3.11 are more 
Table 3.11: Estimation results for Governance and Bank Ratings 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of the full samples. The dependent variable is equivalently 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P long-term issuer ratings as defined in subsection 3.3.1 together with the 
financial explanatory variables, and the governance variables are defined in subsection 3.3.2. Standard 
errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the 
asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 
5% and 1%. 
Variables Fitch Moody’s S&P 
     Financial Variables Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
LN of Total Assets 2.83*** 11.50 2.00*** 8.59 2.45*** 8.87 
ROAA 0.37*** 3.69 0.27*** 3.60 0.55*** 4.17 
Total Assets/Equity -0.001 -0.78 0.02 1.47 0.03*** 2.59 
Net Loans/Total 
Assets 
-0.003 -0.25 0.01 0.66 0.003 0.25 
ST Funding/Total 
Assets 
-0.004*** -2.82 -0.0001*** -3.87 -0.004** -2.48 
Country Rating 0.65*** 13.42 0.65*** 13.32 0.70*** 12.35 
     Governance 
Variables 
      
#BRD_IndNEDs 0.06** 2.06 0.05*** 2.01 0.06*** 2.19 
AvgTimeEDs 0.05* 1.82 0.08*** 3.00 0.03*** 1.09 
#IndNEDsPastCFO/
FD 
-0.28*** -2.19 -0.26** -2.46 -0.23** -2.18 
%GendNEDs 0.02*** 2.10 0.004 0.46 0.01 1.48 
AvgAgeNEDs -0.05*** -2.15 -0.04 -1.55 -0.03 -0.83 
AvgEduNEDs 0.30* 1.82 0.35** 2.41 0.33* 1.74 
%IndNEDsAudit -0.72*** -2.71 -0.48* -1.85 -1.54*** -4.58 
%IndNEDsNomin -1.06*** -3.37 -0.91*** -3.29 -0.93*** -2.58 
CRO -1.11** -2.41 -1.80*** -4.23 -0.49 -0.94 
Number of Obs 1,735 1,268 1,523 
Pseudo R2 0.2753 0.2355 0.2658 
Cluster of Banks 191 167 167 
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interpretable since we can now infer from their coefficient signs. A note should be 
made that coefficient estimates for all explanatory variables are uninformative with 
respect to the magnitude each variable affects bank ratings because coefficient 
estimates are in units of the latent variable 𝑍𝑖,𝑡. #BRD_IndNEDs is positive and 
statistically significant for all three CRAs, which can be interpreted that the higher 
the number of independent directors in a bank’s board of directors affects 
positively its governance and thus can contribute to a higher credit rating for all 
three CRAs. Similarly, coefficient estimates of AvgTimeEDs, 
#IndNEDsPastCFO/FD and AvgEduNEDs, which are statistically significant for all 
three CRAs, can be respectively interpreted according to their signs that the more 
time executive directors have been in the current role the better, the less 
independent directors with past CFO/FD role participate to the board the better 
and the more qualification independent directors have the better. So, the 
coefficient estimates for the four aforementioned variables indicate that board 
structure, expertise of EDs, professional experience and education of 
independent directors all matter for bank governance and bank ratings for all three 
principle CRAs. Coefficient estimates of %GendNEDs and AvgAgeNEDs have 
respectively positive and negative signs for all three CRAs but are statistically 
significant only for Fitch. This can be interpreted that the gender and the age of 
the independent directors respectively affect positively and negatively bank 
governance and thus bank ratings for Fitch. The last three coefficient estimates 
which we have identified to represent the contribution of governance to the bank’s 
risk management function, i.e. %IndNEDsAudit, %IndNEDsNomin and CRO are 
all statistically significant for all three CRAs and also they all have negative signs 
across all three CRAs. On the one hand statistically significant coefficient 
estimates for all three CRAs show that a bank’s risk management function is taken 
into account within the governance evaluation and thus for bank ratings, but on 
the other hand the negative signs bring an unexpected result. We would expect a 
positive sign for all three coefficient estimates, since the participation of a bank’s 
chief financial officer (CRO) to the bank’s board of directors can only be perceived 
positively as it gives the CRO more power and allows him to influence more the 
decisions of the board of directors. Similarly, the higher the participation of 
independent non-executive directors in the Audit and Nomination Committees can 
only be perceived positively, in the same way that #BRD_IndNEDs has a positive 
sign for all three CRAs.  
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 With respect to the overall predictive power of the model of Table 3.11, 
similarly to the previous subsection we perform an LR test to assess the difference 
in fit and results are presented in Table 3.12. 
Again, the results in Table 3.12 indicate that for all three CRAs the full 
model of Table 3.11 fits significantly better than the restricted model respectively 
for each CRA. This is interpreted that adding the nine selected governance 
variables together (not just individually) results in a statistically significant 
improvement in model fit, thus those governance variables affect bank ratings and 
contribute explanatory power. 
 
3.4.3 Country Institutional Characteristics and Bank 
Ratings 
In this subsection we examine how a country’s institutional set-up can 
affect a bank’ s credit rating. When we refer to a country’s institutional set-up it 
should not be confused with either the external support element or the macro-
prudential indicators for the bank’s country. The external support element is 
mainly how CRAs assess the potential Government or Institutional Support for a 
bank, while macro-prudential indicators are systemic risk measures that CRAs 
use in the process of sovereign ratings. In a similar study by Caporale, Matousek 
and Stewart (2012) where an international sample of bank ratings is analysed, the 
authors develop a country index to reflect cross-country differences and their 
effect on ratings. We choose to use in our model the seven country institutional 
components presented in subsection 3.3.3 in order to examine how each country’s 
institutional characteristics affect bank credit ratings. 
Again, we estimate the model of equations (1) and (2), where matrix 𝑌𝑖𝑡 
instead contains the seven country institutional components. Results are 
presented in Table 3.13 and we observe that the coefficient estimates of all seven 
country institutional components are statistically significant across the three 
Table 3.12:  LR test for the base governance model against the restricted model 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
LR χ2 271.74 163.77 263.36 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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CRAs. Coefficients of Investment Profile and Bureaucracy Quality are statistically 
significant across all three  
 CRAs, while the rest of the coefficients are statistically significant for either 
two or one of the CRAs. Thus, the use of those indicators adds to the explanatory 
power of the model. With respect to the signs observed, the expected signs for all 
coefficients are positive since all components give the maximum value when a 
Table 3.13: Estimation results for Country Institutional Characteristics 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of the full samples. The dependent variable is equivalently 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P long-term issuer ratings as defined in subsection 3.3.1 together with the 
financial explanatory variables, and the country institutional characteristics defined in subsection 3.3.3. 
Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, 
and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance 
levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Variables Fitch Moody’s S&P 
     Financial Variables Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
LN of Total Assets 2.71*** 13.56 2.05*** 10.85 2.03*** 6.49 
ROAA 0.25*** 4.27 0.29*** 4.05 0.4026*** 4.22 
Total Assets/Equity -0.0001*** -12.45 0.0014 0.17 -0.0001*** -11.51 
Net Loans/Total 
Assets 
-0.01 -0.70 0.01 0.62 -0.02 -1.39 
ST Funding/Total 
Assets 
0.00*** -2.84 -0.0001*** -5.67 -0.01** -2.11 
Country Rating 0.29*** 4.67 0.29*** 4.19 0.45*** 6.15 
     Country Institutional 
Characteristics 
      
Law and Order  0.21 1.20 0.04 0.19 0.41** 2.39 
Investment Profile  0.47*** 5.62 0.42*** 4.07 0.34*** 3.93 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
0.25*** 3.69 0.36*** 4.41 0.14 1.33 
Government Stability  0.16*** 3.07 0.08 1.50 -0.03 -0.47 
Corruption 0.24* 1.68 0.43*** 2.62 0.09 0.59 
Democratic 
Accountability 
0.47*** 3.31 0.16 0.87 0.33** 1.98 
Bureaucracy Quality -1.05*** -3.83 -0.66** -2.04 -1.25*** -4.11 
Number of Obs 2,207 1,550 1,876 
Pseudo R2 0.2706 0.2287 0.2280 
Cluster of Banks 197 174 169 
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country best performs for a particular category. So, all coefficients have the 
expected positive sign, except for the coefficient of the corruption components 
that is negative for all CRAs. 
Lastly, once again we perform an LR test to assess the difference in fit and 
results of the LR test are presented in Table 3.14. 
Again, the results in Table 3.14 indicate that for all three CRAs the full model of 
Table 3.13 fits significantly better than the restricted model respectively for each 
CRA. So, by adding the seven country institutional components together (not just 
individually) results in a statistically significant improvement in model fit, thus 
those country institutional components variables affect bank ratings and 
contribute to the explanatory power. 
 
3.4.4 Structural Break in Bank Governance 
 In this subsection we aim to examine whether the relationship of bank 
governance and bank credit ratings changed in the periods before and after the 
global financial crisis, i.e. for the periods until 2008 and from 2009. In order to do 
so, we again estimate the model of equations (1) and (2) again for the base model 
proposed of the nine governance variables defined in sub-section 3.4.2, but for 
two subsamples, i.e. for the periods until 2008 and from 2009. Our analysis for 
structural breaks in Table 3.15 is focused only for the nine governance variables, 
so results for the remaining coefficients are disregarded. For Fitch, all the null 
hypotheses that the coefficient estimates for each of the nine governance 
variables are equal in the periods until 2008 and from 2009 are not rejected, which 
is an indication that the relationship between governance and bank ratings did not 
change, i.e. there is no indication of structural breaks in governance for Fitch. For 
Moody’s, two of the null hypotheses are rejected, i.e. for the coefficient estimates 
of #IndNEDsPastCFO/FD and %GendNEDs, but still this is not enough to 
conclude that the relationship between governance and bank ratings changed, i.e. 
Table 3.14: LR test for the Country Institutional Characteristics against  
the restricted model 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
LR χ2 315.56 159.37 182.00 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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there is no strong indication of structural breaks in governance for Moody’s. Lastly, 
for S&P, only one of the null hypotheses is rejected, i.e. for the coefficient estimate 
of AvgTimeEDs, and again this is not enough to conclude that the relationship 
between governance and bank ratings changed, i.e. there is no strong indication 




Table 3.15: Estimation results for Structural Breaks in Governance Variables 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (2) for the periods until 2008 and 
from 2009. The dependent variable is equivalently Fitch, Moody’s and S&P long-term issuer ratings as 
defined in subsection 3.3.1 together with the financial explanatory variables, and the governance 
variables are defined in subsection 3.3.2. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust 
estimate of variance at the bank level, and in each row we observe the values of χ2 and p-value for 
Wald χ2 test for the Hypothesis that the respective governance variables’ coefficient estimates for each 
CRA are equal in the periods until 2008 and from 2009. The asterisks * next to the p-values correspond 
to significance levels 5% and denote that can reject the null hypothesis  
Variables Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value 
     Governance 
Variables 
      
#BRD_IndNEDs 0.14 0.7097 1.42 0.2336 0.06 0.8138 
AvgTimeEDs 3.78 0.0519 1.89 0.1693 4.06 0.0439* 
#IndNEDsPastCFO/FD 0.00 0.9689 5.13 0.0236* 2.98 0.0842 
%GendNEDs 0.34 0.5601 4.61 0.0319* 0.04 0.8403 
AvgAgeNEDs 0.18 0.6671 1.87 0.1718 0.55 0.4568 
AvgEduNEDs 0.05 0.8293 0.55 0.4601 0.30 0.5832 
%IndNEDsAudit 0.03 0.8557 0.03 0.8697 0.03 0.8641 
%IndNEDsNomin 2.41 0.1207 0.13 0.7139 0.79 0.3743 




 Weak corporate governance has been blamed in the past as a key factor 
in different occasions of financial turmoil during the past two decades. The two 
most prominent cases were the high-profile corporate collapses in 2001-2, where 
accounting fraud was attributed to weak governance, and in 2007-8, when the 
failure of large financial institutions was partly attributed to the failure of corporate 
governance and risk management of financial institutions. 
This essay uses a mechanism to model governance in bank credit ratings 
by the three principal CRAs for a worldwide sample from 1999 to 2014. We use a 
simple model of prediction of bank ratings that controls for bank financial 
characteristics and sovereign ratings that prior literature has shown to be related 
to bank credit ratings. Due to the large number of available governance variables, 
we initially perform PCA analysis for the governance variables and using the 
component scores in our model of prediction of bank ratings we conclude that all 
governance together have a statistically significant improvement in model fit, and 
thus have explanatory power for bank ratings. 
Next, we decide a base model specification choosing a number of the 
available governance variables to examine different aspects of governance. Bank 
ratings improve from the number of independent directors in a bank’s board of 
directors, from the time directors have served in the current role, from the less 
independent directors with past CFO/FD role participate to the bank’s board, from 
the more qualifications of independent directors, and from male and younger 
independent directors. Results for risk management related governance variables 
result in an unexpected negative sign. 
 Besides governance we examine if a country’s institutional set-up can 
affect a bank’ s corporate governance and thus its credit rating and find that for 
the seven country institutional components are statistically significant across the 
three CRAs. The components used are Government Stability, Socioeconomic 
Conditions, Investment Profile, Corruption, Law and Order, Democratic 
Accountability and Bureaucracy Quality. 
Lastly, we find that the relationship of bank governance and bank credit 
ratings did not change in the periods before and after the global financial crisis, 
i.e. for the periods until 2008 and from 2009. For the governance variables used 
in our base model, we find that there is no indication of structural breaks in 
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It is an often noted fact that the quality of credit ratings is questioned after different 
occasions of financial turmoil. In the event of the most recent global financial crisis 
of 2007-8, the popular claim is that the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) loosened 
their rating standards before the crisis, and in the aftermath of the crisis revised 
their rating methodologies to tighten rating standards. Even though empirical 
literature on the evolution and the determinants of credit ratings is extensive 
regarding corporate (non-financial) ratings, similar investigations on bank credit 
ratings banks is scant, which is surprizing especially in the light of the 2007-8 
financial crisis. In this essay, I contribute to the empirical literature by investigating 
the time variation in credit rating standards for financial institutions by the three 
principal CRAs from 1990 to 2015 for in a world-wide context. We distinguish three 
structural breaks in the bank rating standards dividing the time-span of our 
analysis to the period before and after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses 
when credit rating standards tightened, the period before the global financial crisis 
started when bank credit rating standards loosened, and the period after the global 
financial crisis when bank credit rating standards tightened. Overall we can say 
that for the period of our study, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s were rather more 
aligned in their structural shifts of  bank credit rating standards, and all three 
principal CRAs were unanimous in the hardening of bank credit rating standards 
for US and Canadian banks in the post global financial crisis period. Fitch, as the 
last entrant to the credit rating industry, seems to have followed a more 
conservative policy before the global financial crisis compared to the other two 
agencies which dominated the market of credit ratings. Lastly, Fitch gives higher 









 Besides the governance issues that the three principal Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) faced in the aftermath of the 2001-2 high profile corporate 
collapses, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-8 the ability of the three 
principal CRAs (i.e. Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) to assess risk once 
again came under increased scrutiny, this time for their rating methodologies with 
respect to financial institutions. It is indicative to say that many banks that failed 
during the crisis enjoyed investment grade ratings just before defaulting, while 
similar situations existed for ratings of bank products. Many large institutions 
around the world were threatened with collapse, and national governments were 
forced to facilitate massive bailout programs to prevent serious financial and 
subsequent economic downturns. The overall impression has been that the entire 
rating system was flawed, and in line with this, the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (F.C.I.C.) in the U.S, in its report that was published in January 2011 
mentioned that “the three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial 
meltdown”. 
 In response, all three principal CRAs immediately proceeded to major 
downgrades in the banking sector and, right after the global financial crisis of 
2007-8, and started revising their rating methodologies and assessments (e.g. 
Fitch Ratings, 2011a, 2011b; Moody's, 2009), which resulted to further 
downgrades in the banking sector. The three principal CRAs made efforts to 
increase transparency in the process of assessing banks’ creditworthiness, while 
enhancing the role of official support. So, the overall picture changed and rating 
agencies became more stringent while at the same time in greater agreement 
about bank ratings methodologies. 
 Despite the significance of credit ratings for the financial system, their 
determinants are poorly understood even though empirical literature on this field 
is abundant. In parallel to this, despite the significance of the financial sector in 
the economy as a whole, empirical literature specifically on bank credit ratings 
and the quality of such ratings is scant. This last fact is surprising given the 
aforementioned discussion about the role of banks and CRAs in the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8. Moreover, credit ratings are expected to be truly 
informative on banks’ riskiness throughout the cycle that is not otherwise available 
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to the market, so it’s an additional reason that empirical literature would have been 
expected to be rich on the analysis and comparisons of bank credit ratings. 
 
1.2. Motivation 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 has triggered an increase in theoretical 
literature of agency and incentive problems relating to bank credit ratings (Mathis, 
McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009; Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012; Opp, Opp, 
and Harris 2013). Some of the most well discussed topics of agency problems on 
credit ratings are the conflict of interest between the rating consumer (financial 
investor) and the issuer; the rating-contingent financial regulation of banks and 
other investors, the agency problems related to the reputational capital of CRAs 
and the competition among rating agencies. 
Literature on the information content of corporate credit ratings has always 
been of great interest due to their importance in their financial system. Blume, Lim, 
and Mackinlay (1998) were the first to document the phenomenon of stringency 
(or hardening or conservatism) in assigning ratings. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, the interest in the literature for the time variation of corporate rating 
standards was augmented and two prominent studies first by Alp (2013) and 
subsequently by Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014). Both studies found no 
evidence that rating agencies reduced their rating standards. But as already 
mentioned empirical literature on bank ratings was and remained scant despite 
the potential interest due to their connection with global financial crisis of 2007-8. 
Namely, it is apparent that the quality of bank credit ratings was crucial for the 
development of the global financial crisis of 2007-8, but also for the turmoil in the 
financial sector in the following years. So, the empirical analysis of the quality of 
bank rating standards before, during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-
8 can give valuable answers to the causes of the crisis. 
This paper is related to two strands of the literature on credit ratings. The 
first strand is examining the quality (what do you mean by quality/ determinants) 
of credit ratings, while the second is focused the information content of bank credit 
ratings. So, the first strand solely involves studies for non-financial firms, while the 
second strand involve few studies for the information content of bank ratings. 
It should be highlighted that factors that determine the ratings and the 
creditworthiness of the banks are particularly important for a number of reasons, 
with the most important being the central role banks have in the economy. The 
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well-being of the banking system is vital for economic development and growth, 
while better understanding of bank ratings can alleviate information asymmetries. 
 
1.3. Aim and Research Questions 
1.3.1. Aim 
Prior literature on credit rating standards have been adequate while mainly 
focusing on corporate credit ratings (Lucas and Lonski, 1992, Blume, Lim, and 
Mackinlay, 1998, Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009, Becker and Milbourn, 2011, Alp, 
2013). At the same time, literature on modelling and prediction of banking ratings 
is sparse. The aim of this study is to identify time-series variation in bank credit 
rating standards from 1990 to 2015 by the three principal CRAs, i.e. Moody’s, 
Fitch and S&Ps. Within the context discussed above, this essay aims to close the 
gap in the literature regarding the lack of research on bank credit ratings 
standards. So, the intention here is to enhance knowledge on the shortfalls that 
global financial crisis of 2007-8 exposed in bank rating standards, while at the 
same time giving useful insights on how the three principal CRAs have tightened 
or loosened their standard within the period under investigation. 
So, given the publicly available information set to three principal CRAs 
since the beginning of the period under investigation, we aim to examine the time 
variation of bank rating standards and explore possible structural shifts for all three 
principal CRAs. 
1.3.2. Research Questions 
The research topics of interest that are identified and remain under-
explored are: the changes in bank rating standards and the possible existence of 
structural shifts in bank rating standards. More specifically, this paper aims to shed 
light on the following questions: 
i. Using an international sample of banks, have there been changes in bank rating 
standards of each of the three principal CRAs from 1990 to 2015? 
ii. Have there been structural shifts in bank rating standards of each of the three 
principal CRAs that divide the period under investigation into subperiods? 
iii. Are changes in bank rating standards different for each or for one of the three 




iv. Does the presence of competition affect the rating decisions of each of the 
three principal CRAs? 
Before proceeding with the investigation of the empirical evidence, we first 
proceed with a review of the related literature on credit ratings and then with a 




2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
Theoretical literature for the role of rating agencies is related to the 
literature on information intermediaries. In this literature, information 
intermediaries are generally involved in obtaining and verifying information by 
committing to disclosure rules (Lizzeri, 1999). Credit rating agencies do not 
commit to disclosure rules but are motivated by the reputation costs when they 
provide inaccurate information.  
An early paper in this field is by Kuhner (2001), which uses a static model 
to determine the conditions under which rating agencies have incentives to 
misreport ratings during a period of crisis. Similarly, most of the early literature 
considers non-strategic rating agencies, i.e. agencies that do not strategically 
build on their reputation to later inflate their reported ratings in order to gain more 
business by their clientele. In line with this static modelling and not strategic rating 
agencies literature there are studies such this by Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits 
(2006) that examines the role of CRAs in financial markets, Farhi, Lerner and 
Tirole (2008) that focuses on other aspects of ratings such as their transparency 
and coarseness, and also by Skreta and Veldkamp (2009). The latter study 
investigates the problematic ratings of structured credit products, which were one 
of the main contributors to the global financial crisis of 2007-8. The authors model 
the characteristics of rating shopping and rated assets complexity to find that a 
systematic bias could be created in disclosed ratings when assets are sufficiently 
complex. When competition increases among agencies the problem worsens and 
switching to an investor-initiated ratings system reduces the bias but could 
collapse the market for information. 
Theoretical literature on rating agencies increased when the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8 started, as the role of rating agencies was under scrutiny, 
not only by regulator but also by academia. Two of the most cited papers are the 
one by Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) who tackle the issue of reputation 
building by a strategic CRA in a dynamic model, and the other by Bolton, Freixas, 
and Shapiro (2012) who examine further the effects of competition among rating 
agencies. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) examine how a CRA’s concern 
for its reputation affects its ratings quality. They present a dynamic model of 
reputation in which a monopolist CRA may mix between lying and truth-telling to 
build up or exploit its reputation. The authors focus on whether an equilibrium in 
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which the CRA tells the truth in every period exists, and they demonstrate that 
truth-telling incentives are weaker when the CRA has more business from rating 
complex products. Empirical support is presented, showing that the percentage of 
AAA rated residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) increased from 2001 
to 2007. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) also use a dynamic model of strategic 
CRAs to examine the outcome of equilibrium in a competition setting among 
CRAs. CRAs face more conflicts of interest when reputation costs are lower, and 
investors are more trustworthy. As a result, the authors find that competition 
among CRAs reduces reporting efficiency (here say something about the use of 
information) because of rating shopping and that ratings can be inflated in good 
times of economic expansion. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) examine incentive 
framework for rating analysts at CRAs and find that CRA accuracy is non-
monotonic and countercyclical. Ratings accuracy increases at first because of 
more effort from the analysts, but then it may decrease because of the lower CRA 
training incentives due to the probability that analysts may have outside offers 
from banks. 
Other studies in line with the above are by Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache, and 
Quesada (2009), who also find that that competition between rating agencies may 
result in less information disclosure, and by Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013), The 
authors of the latter  study show that ratings inflation in structured products can 
be explained by the differences in the regulatory reliance on ratings across various 
instruments and also the differences in the complexity of instruments, whereas 
this does not hold for corporate ratings. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) also use a 
dynamic model of endogenous reputation formation and changing economic 
environment to find that ratings quality is procyclical. Additional factors that reduce 
ratings quality are increased fee-income, high competition for analysts in the 
labour market, and naive investors. According to the authors, the same results 
hold under a competitive environment. These findings for the procyclical character 
of ratings by Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) are interesting for the scope of our 
study, since while examining structural shifts the procyclical or countercyclical 
nature in ratings quality is important. 
 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
 The empirical study in this essay is mostly related to the work of Alp (2013) 
and Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012). The study of Alp (2013) belongs 
62 
 
to a strand of studies that examine the characteristics of credit ratings, including 
their informativeness, perceived bias, and changes over time, while the study of 
Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) belongs to a strand of studies that 
specifically examine the information content of bank ratings. 
 
2.2.1. Literature on the characteristics of credit ratings 
The paper by Alp (2013) is a study on S&P Long-Term Issuer ratings of 
US non-financial firms testing the time-series variation of rating standards. The 
main findings are that from 2002 to 2007 a structural shift occurs towards 
stringency, and that from 1985 to 2002 a “divergent pattern” exists between 
investment-grade and speculative-grade rating standards, i.e. investment-grade 
standards tighten, and speculative-grade standards loosen. The work of Alp 
(2013) is closely related to the paper of Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998). Blume, 
Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) also study investment-grade rating standards of US 
corporations between 1978 and 1995 using the S&P bond-level ratings. They 
show that the evident deterioration in the credit quality of U.S. firms seems to be 
driven at least in part by the stricter standards employed by the rating agencies. 
These two studies, even though they concentrate on changes of rating 
standards over time, they are indicative of the first strand of studies mentioned 
above that examine how publicly available information predict credit ratings. The 
studies in this strand are for non-financial firms mainly in the US.  
These are preceded by studies within this context such as those of 
Horrigan (1966), Pogue and Soldofsky (1969), and West (1970) and later studies, 
those of Pinches and Mingo (1973, 1975) and Altman and Katz (1976) and Kaplan 
and Urwitz (1979). The latter study is probably the first to use an ordered probit 
model to examine whether publicly available data predict bond ratings in the US, 
while it summarized and criticised previous studies. 
More recent studies include those of Ederington (1985), that compares the 
statistical approaches of earlier studies, and Jackson and Boyd (1988) that uses 
a probit model to identify which variables are important in affecting raters’ 
perceptions of bond quality rather than which variables increase the percentage 
of correctly classified ratings. Lucas and Lonski (1992) describe changes across 
the full spectrum of Moody’s ratings. They document that long-term downgrades 
versus upgrades deteriorated (explain) from a 1.17 average in the 1970s to 2.17 
in the 1980s, and to 4.93 in 1990. They also document that while this declining 
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trend existed in ratings, at the same time ratings activity increased. Carty and 
Fons (1993) record similar findings, i.e. a deterioration in the credit quality and 
increase in rating activity since the end of the 1970s. Cantor and Packer (1995) is 
a study for the whole credit rating industry and one of the first studies also 
concentrate on bank ratings. The authors examine the correspondence of ratings 
with default rates and find differences among principal agencies in their ratings for 
junk bonds, international banks, and mortgage-backed securities. The same 
authors, Cantor and Packer (1997) examine rating split with respect to different 
rating scales and selection bias and find only limited evidence of the later. 
In a different context, Altman and Saunders (1998) analyses the 
techniques traditionally used in the literature for identification of the determinants 
and prediction of ratings, which are identified by multivariate discriminant analysis, 
the logit model and the probit model. Kisgen (2006) examines the extent that a 
firm’s credit rating fluctuations affect its capital structure decisions, while Beaver, 
Shakespeare and Soliman (2006) is a study that examines the differences in 
published ratings of certified versus non-certified bond-rating agencies in the US, 
and finds that certified agencies are more conservative and consistent. Amato and 
Furfine (2004), using a sample of US firm ratings by S&P, examine the effect of 
the business cycle on credit ratings and find that CRAs do not assign ratings that 
are excessively procyclical. However in contrast to Amato and Furfine (2004), Auh 
(2013) finds that rating standards are in fact procyclical, i.e. ratings during an 
economic downturn are stricter compared to ratings during an expansion, whilst 
deHaan (2017) finds no deterioration in the performance of corporate credit 
ratings during or after the crisis. deHaan (2017) concludes that corporate credit 
rating performance improves after the crisis, which is attributed to the response of 
CRAs to investor criticism and regulators. 
Other studies addressing the information context of credit ratings relate to 
credit ratings’ lack of timeliness. It is indicative to mention the renowned 
bankruptcies such as that of Enron, which maintained investment-grade rating 
days before its declared bankruptcy. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) examine the 
quality of ratings with respect timeliness, accuracy and stability before and after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which is considered to have increased the 
regulatory pressure and criticism to CRAs due to the high profile corporate 
collapses like that of Enron. The authors define two periods, the period before 
SOX (1 January 1996 - 25 July 2002) as the pre-criticism period and the period 
after SOX (25 July 2002 - 31 Dec 2005) as the criticism period, using credit ratings 
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by the three principal CRAs. They find that on average ratings of defaulted 
companies in the one-year period leading to default are lower in the criticism 
period compared to pre-criticism period. They conclude that CRAs improved both 
in timeliness and accuracy of their ratings after SOX, also reducing ratings 
volatility. Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015) examine the impact of the Dodd-Frank 
act (which took place in July 21, 2010) on corporate bond ratings by all three 
principal CRAs in the US. The authors find that because of the act, CRAs assign 
lower ratings, and thus give more false warnings, and issue downgrades that are 
less informative. The effect of increased competition by the presence of Fitch, 
lessens the effect of lower ratings, while results are not procyclical. 
Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) is a study very close to that of Alp 
(2013), since both belong to the growing sub-strand of literature that focuses on 
the time-series variation in rating standards. Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) 
use a sample of US firms ratings by S&P, from 1985 to 2009, and find that CRAs 
have become more stringent or conservative during this period, with average 
ratings dropping by three notches. According to the authors, this finding is not 
consistent with the observed decrease in the default rates during this period. 
Jiang, Stanford, and Xie (2012), that find that S&P assigned higher ratings in 1974 
after it changed its pay model from the investor-pay to the issuer-pay. Another 
interesting finding is reported by Becker and Milbourn (2011). The authors 
examine how the entry of Fitch, as a third material entry in the credit rating 
industry, affected competition and ultimately the quality of ratings. Their key 
finding is that when Fitch increases its market share in certain industries, rating 
standards become slightly relaxed. 
Contrary to the vast majority of studies that converge to the stringency or 
conservatism of rating standards, Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2009) argue that the 
apparent tightening of rating standards can be attributed primarily to improvement 
in accounting quality over time. The authors use a sample of U.S. firms from 1985 
to 2002 for S&P long-term issuer credit rating and come to this conclusion only for 
investment-grade issuers. 
2.2.2. Literature on bank ratings 
What characterises the literature on modelling and prediction of bank 
ratings is its sparsity (Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de Guevara, 2014), as few 
studies focus exclusively on bank ratings.  
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The second study mentioned above of Hau, Langfield and Marques-
Ibanez (2012) belongs to this strand of studies that examine bank ratings, and it 
is one of the most comprehensive analysis of bank credit ratings. The authors 
examine the information content of bank credit ratings, based on approximately 
39,000 quarterly bank ratings over the period 1990–2011 from the three principal 
CRAs and for banks in Europe and the US. The authors use a new method for 
evaluating rating quality, that employs two ranks and transforms bank credit 
ratings in a strictly ordinal manner. They find that ordinal rating quality is 
countercyclical, i.e. the information content of credit ratings is higher during 
banking crises, and that bank ratings in the upper investment grade range do not 
correspond to their expected default probabilities, i.e. are less risky. Also, other 
findings are that large banks enjoy systematically better credit ratings relative to 
their expected default risk, and banks that provide large securitization business to 
a CRA are expected to receive a more favourable rating from this CRA. 
 One of the earliest studies on bank ratings is that of Cantor and Packer 
(1995) also mentioned above. This study finds evidence that uncertainties about 
banks’ creditworthiness lead agencies to disagree more about bank ratings than 
about the ratings of firms in other industries, which is also found in a later study 
by Morgan (2002). Morgan (2002) finds similar results comparing ratings from 
Moody’s and S&P. He uses ordered logit regressions in an attempt to identify the 
determinants of the difference in bank rating assignments. His work is motivated 
by the inherently opaque nature of banks to outside agents, including CRAs, who 
assess the risks taken by banks. Cantor et al. (2001) is also a study that 
concentrates on banks and non-banks. Comparing ratings among US and non-
US firms, the authors find that US firms had higher annual default rates both for 
banks and non-banks. 
Other studies in this strand are Peresetsky and Karminsky (2008), who 
find that Moody’s ratings also take into account external factors such as political 
risk, while Bellotti et al. (2010), who focuses on the prediction techniques of bank 
ratings using both ordered logit modelling and  Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
techniques. Caporale, Matousek and Stewart (2011) through the use of probit and 
logit models find that significant differences exist among Fitch bank ratings of 
different countries in the European Union, i.e. bank country is a crucial factor of 
ratings. Similarly, Caporale, Matousek and Stewart (2012) again using country 
indices but this time in an international sample of 90 countries emphasize both the 
significance of fundamental quantitative financial analyses and the country effect. 
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In addition the authors find that during periods of financial instability both CRAs 
and quantitative models are likely to produce highly inaccurate predictions of 
ratings. The two aforementioned studies are close to the results obtained by 
Peresetsky and Karminsky (2008) since they all show the influence on bank 
ratings of external factors, such as the legal framework, government support, 
ownership, etc. In a similar context but in the same strand of literature on bank 
ratings, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2013) examine the influence of government 
ownership of European Union Banks on all three principal CRAs ratings. Using an 
ordered logit model, the authors find evidence that banks that are publicly owned 
receive higher ratings than banks that are privately owned. 
Packer and Tarashev (2011) observe the behaviour of all three principal 
CRAs’ bank ratings and provide evidence that after the outbreak of the subprime 
crisis bank ratings fall and the differences between different agencies’ bank 
ratings decrease. The authors also highlight the importance of the external 
support banks received from national authorities. Van Laere, Vantieghem and 
Baesens (2012) find that S&P sets more strict rating standards for banks than 
Moody’s, while Moody’s is more sensitive to the economic climate. They also find 
that although the CRAs rating standards changed (in response to the financial 
crisis) they have not become aligned, and the level of discretion in the rating 
process increases with bank opacity. In another study, Shen, Huang and Hasan 
(2012) examine why bank credit ratings are different for banks with constant 
financial ratios but in different countries. The authors model the issuer ratings of 
Standard and Poor’s to determine the reasons behind the variation of ratings and 
they conclude that asymmetric information differences among banking systems 
are the key factor explaining the differences in ratings. Similarly, Huang and Shen 
(2015) examine the effect of sovereign credit ratings on bank credit ratings and 
conclude that the sovereign rating is an important determinant that affects the 
bank ratings but in a different fashion for S&P and Fitch. 
Finally, two of the most current studies in the field of bank credit ratings 
are by Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de Guevara (2014) and Salvador, 
Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018). Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de 
Guevara (2014) is a study for the Spanish banking sector for ratings by the three 
principal CRAs during 2000-2009. The main finding is that ratings are pro-cyclical 
as the worsening of bank credit ratings that followed the global financial crisis of 
2007-8 is partly attributed to the hardening of rating standards. Salvador, 
Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018) using a sample of bank from Europe, 
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US and Japan during the period of 2004 to 2013, find that the hardening of rating 
policies as a result of the global financial crisis, was more in an descending order 
by Fitch, S&P and then Moody’s. In another study, King, Ongena and Tarasev 
(2017) examine and conclude that the decision of Fitch rating to release 
standalone ratings for rated banks did not affect bank all-in ratings. The change 
in Fitch’s rating methodology had more positive than negative ratings surprises of 





3. Bank Rating Methodologies by the three big 
CRAs 
3.1. Introduction 
A broad definition for credit ratings is that they are an opinion for the 
creditworthiness of entities, may it be a sovereign, an institution or a financial 
instrument. Fitch’s credit rating description for entities is that it is an opinion on the 
relative ability to meet financial commitments, such as interest, preferred 
dividends, repayment of principal, insurance claims or counterparty obligations. 
Moreover, credit ratings should not vary in a procyclical manner, as they are 
expected to distinguish the relatively risky entities from the relatively safe entities 
(Amato and Furfine, 2004). In this way, credit ratings are expected to be ordinal 
rankings of risk across entities at a particular point in time, rather than absolute 
measures of default probability that are constant through time (Cantor and Mann, 
2003). 
Rating agencies, together with other market participants like credit 
markets and financial analysts, face increased difficulties in forecasting the 
performance of banks not only due to the their complexity but also due to the 
unique role they hold in the economy as financial intermediaries and more notably 
their importance for financial stability. The latter is the reason for the external 
assistance they receive which is inevitably taken into account by the rating 
agencies, besides the bank financial profile. 
In the following section, we first observe how the average bank ratings of 
the three principal CRAs have evolved during the period of 2000-2015 in order to 
have a foretaste before we examine the evolution of bank rating methodologies. 
While examining the evolution of bank rating methodologies of the three principal 
agencies, we focus on changes after the global financial crisis. In the last section, 





3.2. Global mean evolution of bank credit ratings by 
the three principal CRAs 
Soon after the global financial crisis of 2007-8, all three credit rating 
agencies started reassessing bank rating methodologies, which resulted in 
prominent downgrades for bank ratings, especially for European and US 
institutions (Parker and Tarashev, 2011). For all three CRAs, the most important 
changes in their bank methodologies took place in 2011, at a point that lessons 
were learned for the financial industry (Fitch Ratings, 2011a, Moody’s, 2009 and 
Standard & Poor’s, 2011a).  
In order to have an insight for the evolution of bank rating methodologies, 
we first observe the evolution of the global mean of bank credit ratings by the three 
principal CRAs. Credit ratings are transformed from their letter form into a 
numerical value that corresponds to an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17, as 
explained in the subsequent subsection 4.3.1.1. A close first look at the global 
mean of bank credit ratings for the three principal CRAs in the Figure 3.1 is 
revealing. 
Figure 3.1 Plot of mean values of bank credit ratings from 2000 to 2015, 
for the three principal CRAs4 
 
 
4 Means are calculated for our world sample of bank credit ratings, after transforming credit 
ratings from their letter form into a numerical value that corresponds to an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 to 17. Value of 1 corresponds to the lowest rated banks (CCC+/Caa or 
worse) and value of 17 to the highest rated banks (AAA/Aaa), according to Table 4.2. 
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Some first key findings can be inferred from the above figure. First, all three 
principal CRAs’ average bank ratings demonstrate a U-curve from 2000 to 2007. 
This is translated as a deterioration of average bank credit rating in the first years 
after 2000, and then an improvement until 2007. Second, after 2007 bank ratings 
worsened in two stages, during the period 2008-9 and then during the period 
2010-12, where a sharper deterioration took place. Third, bank ratings of the three 
principal CRAs converged and stabilized during the period after 2013. 
 
3.3. Bank rating methodologies of CRAs 
All three principal CRAs have developed distinct methodologies for rating 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, all methodologies have in common two main 
elements: the intrinsic or stand-alone and the external support element. 
Assessment methodologies applied to banks do not apply to non-bank financial 
institutions, for which different methodologies apply. In the following subsections 
the rating methodologies of each of the three principal CRAs are briefly discussed. 
3.2.1. Fitch Ratings bank rating methodology 
Fitch Ratings methodology for banks includes specific factors of bank 
credit risk that are divided into the intrinsic creditworthiness of the bank and the 
potential of external support (Fitch Ratings, 2018). Intrinsic creditworthiness 
concerns a stand-alone rating called Viability Rating (VR), while the potential of 
external support concerns Support Rating (SR) and Support Rating Floor (SRF). 
The overall or all-in rating is called Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and is derived from 
the Viability Rating and the External Support Ratings. Long-term IDRs are 
assigned to all banks, while short-term IDRs are assigned for the likelihood of 
default in the short term (if the bank has short-term obligations), where “short term” 
means up to 13 months. 
So, Fitch Ratings’ current rating framework for banks (Fitch, 2018) is comprised 
from the following Issuer Ratings: 
- Long-Term or Short-Term IDRs 
- Viability Ratings 
- Support Ratings 
- Support Rating Floors 
- Derivative Counterparty Ratings 
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The first four ratings were defined above while Derivative Counterparty 
Ratings (DCR) are issuer-level ratings and unlike the Long-Term IDRs are only 
assigned to selected banks. Also, Long-Term IDRs are assigned to all banks with 
international ratings (i.e. a combination of intrinsic and external support analysis), 
where Short-Term ratings are assigned to rare cases of banks that issue 
exclusively short-term debt. 
Before further discussing Viability Ratings, which reflect the fundamental 
creditworthiness of a bank, a few words should be added for the two support 
ratings that represent the potential of external support. SR reflects the likelihood 
that a bank will receive extraordinary support in case of need, where the source 
will be either the bank’s shareholders (i.e. institutional support) or the national 
authorities of the country (i.e. sovereign support). SRF indicates the minimum 
level to which the entity’s Long-Term IDR could fall for the level of extraordinary 
support assumed, based on sovereign support. In this context, both the ability and 
propensity of the potential supporter to provide assistance are taken into account. 
Fitch Ratings’ methodology for banks has evolved in time to become as 
described above. One of the changes in the methodology took place in 2011 when 
Viability Rating was introduced (Fitch Ratings, 2011a, 2011b) as the stand-alone 
rating of bank institutions. Until 2011, Fitch’s stand-alone rating was called 
Individual Rating and had a 10-point rating scale (‘A’ best to ‘F’ worse). In early 
2011, Fitch first signalled its intention to refine the scale of standalone ratings 
(Fitch Ratings, 2011a, 2011b), which existed ever since Fitch begun rating banks. 
Fitch’s Individual Rating was withdrawn in early 2012 as more transparency was 
needed by directly corresponding its all-in rating (“issuer default ratings”). Viability 
Rating has a 19-point scale that corresponds exactly to that of its all-in ratings, 
although using the lower case ('aaa', 'aa+' etc). Even though the replacement of 
Individual Rating by Viability Rating appears as a major change that could affect 
the all-in rating, as already mentioned according to King, Ongena and Tarasev 
(2017), the all-in ratings were not affected. 
When first presented, Viability Rating’s key factors (Fitch Ratings, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c) were as follows:  a. Industry profile and operating environment, b. 
Company profile and risk management, c. Financial profile, and d. Management 
strategy and corporate governance. The key factors mentioned in Fitch’s most 
recent bank rating criteria (Fitch Ratings, 2018) are: a. Operating Environment, b. 
Company Profile, c. Management and Strategy, d. Risk Appetite, and e. Financial 
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Profile. Some changes have taken place in the factors determining Viability 
Rating, but still do not appear substantial.  
In the same manner, changes of the key elements of a bank’s financial 
profile do not seem substantial. In 2011 (Fitch Ratings, 2011a), the key elements 
for the financial profile assessment were: a. profitability, b. funding, and c. liquidity 
and capitalization. Asset quality was mentioned as an important rating driver that 
could be considered part of a bank’s financial profile. In the latest bank rating 
criteria report (Fitch Ratings, 2018), Fitch identifies four factors for the financial 
profile assessment: a. Asset Quality, b. Earnings and Profitability, c. Capitalisation 
and Leverage, d. Funding and Liquidity. For each financial profile factor, Fitch 
uses a core metric and complementary metrics, where core metrics have the 
greatest relative explanatory power in determining factor scores for banks 
globally. In the following table the core and the complementary metrics are listed 
according to Fitch Ratings (2018). 
Fitch’s Financial Profile Factors’ core metric and complementary metrics 
Financial Profile 
Factor 
Core Metric (ratio) Complementary Metrics 
Asset Quality - Impaired loans / gross loans 
(%) 
- Growth of gross loans (%) 
- Loan loss allowances/impaired 
loans (%) 
- Loan impairment 




- Operating profit / risk-
weighted assets (%) 
- Net interest income/average 
earning assets (%) 
- Non-interest expense/gross 
revenues (%) 
- Loans and securities 
impairment charges/pre-
impairment operating profit (%) 
- Operating profit/average total 
assets (%) 
- Net income/average equity (%) 
Capitalisation 
and Leverage 
- Fitch Core Capital / FCC-
adjusted risk-weighted assets 
(%) 
- Basel leverage ratio (%) 
- Tangible common 
equity/tangible assets (%) 




- Impaired loans less loan loss - 




- Loans / customer deposits 
(%) 
- Liquidity coverage ratio (%) 
- Customer deposits/total 
funding (including preference 
shares & hybrids; %) 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2018) 
 
Another important change that Fitch Ratings was first to introduce, is the 
two systemic risk measures to characterise the economic and financial stability of 
a country. This change took place in 2005 (Fitch Ratings, 2005) and the two 
systemic risk measures were a system-wide (country-wide) average of individual 
banks’ standalone ratings and an average based on macro-prudential indicators 
designed to capture abnormal growth of bank credit to the private sector and 
unusually strong asset price increases. The two systemic risk measures used as 
input to Fitch’s are sovereign ratings rather than directly being used in the stand-
alone rating of banks. In this manner, Fitch’s all-in ratings indirectly include 
systemic risk measures, since even though sovereign ratings reflect Fitch’s view 
only on the likelihood of the government servicing its own debt, in practice this is 
usually closely associated with its broader financial flexibility, and therefore the 
country’s ability to provide support to the banking sector (Fitch, 2018). 
Lastly, support ratings (SRs and SRFs) were introduced in 2007 to reflect 
the likelihood of the bank receiving future extraordinary support by a third party, 
either the state or an institutional owner (Fitch Ratings, 2011c, 2018). So, clearly 
support ratings do not express an opinion of a bank’s intrinsic credit quality, which 
is reflected by the VR. SRs incorporate an assessment of a potential supporter’s 
(either a sovereign state’s or an institutional owner’s) propensity and its ability to 
support a bank, which is set by the potential supporter’s own Fitch long-term IDR. 
SRs are assigned on a five-point scale, i.e. from 1 to 5, with 1 representing an 
extremely high probability of support, and 5 indicating that no support can be 
expected. SRFs are derived directly from the SR and reflect the likelihood a bank 
will receive extraordinary support specifically from government authorities, i.e. 
SRFS do not capture the potential for institutional support from the entity’s 
shareholders., SRFs indicate the minimum level to which a bank’s Long-Term 
IDRs could fall if Fitch does not change its view on potential sovereign support. 
Even though, support ratings definitions have slightly changed in time (Fitch 
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Ratings, 2011c, 2018), they materially remain the same since they were first 
introduced. It is indicative to mention that SRFs were originally assigned on the 
lower case ‘aaa’ rating scale, while they are now assigned on the ‘aaa’ rating 
scale. 
 
3.2.2. Moody’s Investors Service bank rating methodology 
Moody’s Investors Service rating methodology for banks (Moody’s, 2018) 
is overall similar to that of Fitch as it is comprised of the intrinsic, or standalone, 
element and the elements of external support. The assessment of the standalone 
financial strength of a bank is called Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) and 
according to this definition measures the probability of default in the absence of 
any kind of external support. The assessment of external support is based upon 
the Joint Default Analysis (JDA) framework and it is comprised by the following 
three elements: a) Affiliate Support, b) Loss Given Failure (LGF) and c) 
Government Support. Affiliate Support considers the support from affiliated 
entities, e.g. entities within the same consolidated group, and the outcome of this 
assessment is the Adjusted BCA that measures the probability of a bank requiring 
support in order to avoid default (beyond the support provided by its affiliates). 
The next element is LGF which measures the impact of the failure of the bank, 
having considered the capacity of affiliate support (i.e. affiliate support having 
been either denied or exhausted). The last element of external support is 
Government Support, which is based on the previous element, i.e. the probability 
of public sector support, the capacity to provide support and lastly the inter-
relationship between the public’s body support provider and the bank. From this 
analysis the result is the long-term local and foreign currency ratings for different 
instruments ranging from bank deposits to preferred stock. 
Moody’s rating framework for banks (Moody’s, 2018) is comprised from the 
following Issuer Ratings: 
- Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) 
- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) 
- Long-Term or short-term Issuer Ratings (Foreign or Domestic) 
- Long-Term or short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Foreign or Domestic) 
- Bank Deposit Ratings 
The first two ratings were defined above, and the third and the fourth are the 
all-in ratings assigned to banks according to the above methodology. According 
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to Moody’s (2018), the Issuer Rating is an opinion of the ability of a bank to honour 
their senior unsecured debt and debt like obligations, while the Counterparty Risk 
Rating is an opinion of the ability of a bank to honour the uncollateralized portion 
of non-debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also reflect the 
expected financial losses in the event such liabilities are not honoured. Other bank 
ratings may be issued for a bank such as the ones mentioned above, i.e. Bank 
Deposit Rating, which is for the most junior class of uninsured deposits and do not 
apply to deposits that are subject to a public or private insurance scheme. 
A major change in Moody’s methodology for banks took place in 2007, just 
before the beginning of the financial crisis. Moody’s in order to encapsulate in its 
all-in ratings the external support available to banks, introduced a new bank rating 
methodology (Moody’s, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) called joint default analysis (JDA). 
This was motivated by studies that showed that the default frequency of banks 
was consistently lower than that of non-bank corporates with similar ratings. JDA 
framework at that early stage assessed four types of support: operating parent, 
cooperative group, regional government, and national government, in order to 
arrive at all-in ratings or issuer ratings. For each type of support the capacity and 
willingness to provide support are considered but also the probability that the 
external support entity is in default when the bank needs support (or the joint 
default probability). JDA framework evolved in time and as described above and 
in its present form, as summarised in the beginning of this section. 
Moody’s direct reaction to the global financial crisis was to recalibrate the 
relative importance attached to certain rating factors (Moody’s, 2009). Throughout 
the crisis, the willingness of national authorities to provide system-wide support 
programs, and bank-specific support turned out to be stronger than Moody’s had 
originally expected. As a result, a wider gap existed between all-in and standalone 
ratings that required some refinements of the weights and relative importance 
attached to certain rating factors within the existing methodologies. 
Moreover, some years later after the Global Financial Crisis, Moody’s 
proceeded with significant proposals in its global bank rating methodology 
(Moody’s, 2014). Among the changes, was the withdrawal of the rating used until 
then for bank’s standalone intrinsic strength, i.e. Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
(BFSR). BFSR had been refined in 2009 (Moody’s, 2009) in the context of 
calibrating bank ratings due to the Global Financial Crisis, and a mapping was 
presented form BFSR to BCA. Based on this mapping and further recalibration, 
Moody’s started announcing BCA for banks in 2011. In 2015 BFSR, which used 
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a less granular scale (from “A” to “E”), was eventually withdrawn and replaced by 
BCA which used a more granular scale (from “aaa” to “c”). The new standalone 
rating put greater emphasis on forward looking assessments of bank capital ratios, 
based on analyses of expected losses for risk assets in stress scenarios. 
According to the latest effective methodology for banks by Moody’s (2018), 
BCA has three sub-components: a) Macro Profile, b) Financial Profile and c) 
Qualitative Adjustments (Moody’s, 2018). Each sub-component has 2-4 factors 
and some of the factors have sub-factors. Financial Profile has two factors: 
Solvency and Liquidity. Solvency has three sub-factors: Asset Risk, Capital and 
Profitability, while Liquidity has two sub-factors: Funding Structure and Liquid 
Resources. 
Analysing further Financial Profile which represents the relative financial 
strength of a bank, solvency is the combination of asset risk, leverage and 
earnings, while liquidity is a bank’s funding profile combined with its ability to 
access cash. The two factors and the five fundamental credit sub-factors of the 
Financial Profile are identified with weights and then sub-factors are assigned 
scores (from “aaa” to “c”) to each of these using  historical financial ratios, even 
though Moody’s considers no single historical ratio or set of such ratios can 
capture the complexity of a bank’s financial profile. In the following table the 
factors and sub-factors are listed with their corresponding core metrics/ratios and 
their other sub-factor metrics. 
Moody’s Financial Profile Factors, Sub-factors and Ratios 
Factor / Sub-
factor 
Core Metric (ratio) Other Sub-factor Metrics 
1. Solvency 
(total weight 65%) 
  
a. Asset Risk 
(weight 25%) 
- Problem Loans / Gross Loans 
and Leases to Customers 
- Loan Growth * 
- Credit Concentration * 
- Problem Loan and Collateral 
Coverage * 
- Long-Run Loan-Loss 
Performance * 
- Differences in Problem Loan 
Recognition 
- Non-lending Credit Risk 





- Tangible common equity / 
risk-weighted assets 
-Tangible common equity (TCE) 
to risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
- Nominal Leverage 
- Regulatory Minimum 
Requirements 
- Capital Quality 
- Capital Fungibility 





- Νet income / tangible assets - Earnings Stability  
2. Liquidity 





- Market funds / tangible 
banking assets 
- Quality of Market Funding 
- Quality of Deposit Funding 
- Term Structure 





- Liquid banking assets / 
tangible banking assets 
- Quality of Liquid Assets 
- Intra-group Restrictions 
Source: Moody’s (2018) 
 
The core metrics/ratios above are the same as the ones in the framework 
presented for the revised BCA in 2014 (Moody’s, 2014), but substantial 
differences exist with the equivalent ratios in BFSR (Moody’s, 2007a). The most 
prominent difference is that instead of the sub-factor of Funding Structure in BCA, 
the sub-factor of Efficiency was considered in BFSR along(?) with core ratio the 
Cost/Income Ratio. 
Lastly, it should be noted that Moody’s does not publish a specific 
summary measure of banking system risk. As a result, Moody’s implicitly 
acknowledges a bank’s role) and exposure to systemic risk, which are inputs when 
estimating the extent of support from national authorities (Moody’s, 2018).  
3.2.3. Standard & Poor’s bank rating methodology 
Standard & Poor’s methodology for banks (Standard & Poor’s, 2011c) is 
also like the other two CRAs as it is comprised of two elements for intrinsic risk 
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and for external support. The first element is called the Stand-alone Credit Profile 
(SACP) and the second Extraordinary or Group Support. Once SACP is 
determined for a rated bank, the likelihood of extraordinary support is established 
and an indicative issuer credit rating (ICR) is assigned. The indicative ICR is a 
component of the ICR, which according to criteria (e.g. comparative analysis of 
the bank versus banks with similar SACP) may be a notch higher or lower than 
the indicative ICR. 
Overall, Standard & Poor’s is the agency that has implemented the most 
significant revisions to its bank rating methodology since the financial crisis. After 
a series of proposed revisions in the aftermath of the financial crisis (e.g. Standard 
& Poor’s, 2010a, Standard & Poor’s, 2010b and Standard & Poor’s, 2011a), the 
agency published a new rating methodology for banks which is valid until today 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2011c). Since it was first published, there have been only a 
number of minor updates on the methodology, which mainly remains the same 
until today. 
It should be noted that SACP is not a rating, but a component of the issue 
rating or issuer credit rating (ICR). So, Standard & Poor’s may assign a SACP as 
a component of a rating to provide information on an issuer's creditworthiness. 
The SACP is an opinion of an issuer's creditworthiness in the absence of 
extraordinary support or burden and -similarly to Fitch’s standalone metric- it has 
a lower case scale ('aaa', 'aa+' etc) which parallels the ICR rating scale. The 
assessment of SACP is based on six factors. The first two factors represent macro 
analysis (or macro factors) of the creditworthiness of a bank, while the latter four 
represent microanalysis (or bank-specific factors). 
The first two factors are economic and industry risk and they draw from 
the Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) methodology (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2011b). Those two factors depict the strengths and weaknesses of the 
operating environment of the entity and set the basis for the SACP. The remaining 
four factors represent the bank specific strengths and weaknesses such as 
Business position, Capital and Earnings, Risk Position, and Funding and liquidity.  
The Business position factor consists of three subfactors: business 
stability, concentration or diversity, and management and corporate strategy, 
which practically assess the qualitative aspects of a bank. The remaining three 
bank-specific factors are a combination of qualitative and quantitative metrics. In 
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the following table the key quantitative metrics for the three remaining bank-
specific factors are presented. 
Standard & Poor’s Bank-Specific Factors and Quantitative metrics 
Factor Quantitative metrics 
Capital and 
Earnings 
- risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio =  
Total adjusted capital (TAC*) / Risk-weighted assets (RWAs*) 
 
* TAC and RWAs are according to Standard & Poor’s definition and calculation 
Risk Position - Management of growth and changes in its risk positions 
- Impact of risk concentrations or risk diversification 
- How increased complexity adds additional risk 
- Whether material risks are not adequately captured by risk-
adjusted capital framework (RACF) 
- Comparative analysis on the current mix of business with those 





- loan-to-deposit ratio 
- long-term funding ratio 
- reliance on short-term wholesale funding 
- net stable funding ratio 
- overall funding mix 
Liquidity: 
- liquid assets to wholesale funding - net broad liquid assets to 
short-term customer deposits 
- broad liquid assets to short-term wholesale funding 
- short-term wholesale funding to total wholesale funding 
Source: (Standard & Poor’s, 2011c) 
 
What is obvious from the above is that Standard & Poor’s, unlikely with the other 
two CRAs, do not use common financial ratios. Standard & Poor’s either use its 
own metrics as for the Capital and Earnings factor, or a number or ratios or figures 
for the other two factor, whereas the other two CRAs use one core metric (ratio) 




3.4. Geographical factor in bank credit ratings 
In the related empirical literature, the geographical or country factor is 
found to be important for bank credit ratings. For example, Parker and Tarashev 
(2011) observe remarkable differences across geographical regions when 
examining the downgrading of banks in the context of the global financial crisis. 
The authors find that all three principal CRAs have substantially lowered the 
ratings of US and European banks relative to the rest of the world regions, i.e. 
Asia and Pacific. This according to the authors reflects that banks in US and 
Europe were at the epicentre of the global financial crisis.  
In the previous section, we saw that all three principal CRAs incorporate 
the external support factor, which reflects sovereign’s ability and propensity to 
support a bank. In this context, the starting point to assess the external support 
factor is the country rating (e.g. Fitch, 2018). However, the inclusion of sovereign 
ratings in the external support factor of bank credit ratings cannot explain the 
findings for the geographical factor as in Parker and Tarashev (2011). If the 
opposite would hold true, there should have been a corresponding lowering or 
hardening of sovereign ratings as a result of the global financial crisis for the 
sovereign credit ratings of the US and the European countries, which of course is 
not the case. 
In another study by Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018), 
the authors find that the hardening of bank rating policies as a result of the global 
financial crisis by the three principal CRAs was different depending on the country 
or geographical area. This is attributed to the fact that factors used as explanatory 
variables for the adjustment of ratings do not have the same relative importance 
in all groups of countries. Factors include bank size, loan loss provisions, 
loans/total assets ratio, etc, but also the sovereign rating. This last finding could 
only be consistent if the external support factor in the rating methodologies 
changes as a result of the global financial crisis for some countries or a 
geographical area. But still, the findings in the aforementioned study concern other 
variables, so there seems to be a hidden reason behind the country or 
geographical area factor. 
It should be noted that Fitch assigns a country operating environment 
score for each market in which they rate banks which is one of the five factors of 
VR (Fitch, 2018). This score derives from two metrics: GDP per capita and the 
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World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking5. The implied operating 
environment score is adjusted for a number of sub-factors: Sovereign Rating, Size 
and Structure of Economy, Economic Performance, Reported and Future 
GDP/Capita, Macroeconomic Stability, Level and Growth of Credit, Financial 
Market Development, Regulatory and Legal Framework, Regional Focus and 
International Operations. The latter two are bank specific and they may adjust the 
assigned country score accordingly. Nevertheless, the operating environment in 
VR, similarly cannot explain the findings for the geographical factor in the related 
literature as noted above. 
A possible explanation for the geographical factor could either be that the 
three principal CRAs use different calibrations of their rating methodology or have 
a bias in different geographical areas. It is interesting to know that each of the 
three principal CRAs breaks down their research departments into a number of 
offices/areas around the world which are responsible for the research in their 
region of responsibility. This operating structure in all three CRAs could be the 
reason behind a different calibration or a bias in the application of bank rating 
methodologies. For example, Fitch’s office in Americas, when assessing a bank’s 
VR may use slightly different regional parameters than Fitch’s office in Asia-
Pacific. 
In the following table the geographical breakdown for the research of each 
principal CRA is presented. 
Structure of world research for the three principal CRAs 






- Emerging markets 
- Europe 
- Middle East and 
Africa 
- United States 
- Asia Pacific 
- Europe, Middle East 
& Africa 
- Latin America & 
Caribbean 
- North America 
- Americas 
- Europe, Middle 




5 Fitch calculates a percentile rank for each country, which is the percentage of all 
countries (including those with sovereigns not rated by Fitch) with a lower score on the 
Ease of Doing Business Index 
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It should be noted that Moody’s further breaks down: 1. Asia Pacific into 
Asia and Pacific Islands, 2. Europe, Middle East & Africa into Africa, Europe and 
Middle East, 3. Latin America & Caribbean into Caribbean, Central America and 
South America, and lastly 4. North America into United States, U.S. territories, 
Canada and Bermuda. Standard & Poor’s also further breaks down: 1. Americas 
into Americas and Latin America (Spanish and Portuguese), 2. Europe, Middle 
East & Africa into Europe, Maalot and Russia, and 3. Asia into Australia/New 




4: Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Introduction 
In this part we proceed first with the empirical strategy and then with the 
presentation of our dataset. Next, we review econometric issues that have to be 
taken into account. In the fourth part we proceed with the empirical strategy and 
results, together with our structural break tests, and finally we conclude with 
robustness tests. 
 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
 The aim of this study is to identify time-series variation in bank credit rating 
standards. As mentioned earlier, the methodology used is close to the work of Alp 
(2013), which in turn is based on Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998). Both Blume, 
Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) and Alp (2013) also uses an ordered probit model to 
study rating standards of rating by S&P as a function of firm characteristics and 
year indicator variables. Year indicator variables in both studies are used to 
capture the time-series variation in credit rating standards that it is not captured 
by the other variables in the ratings equation. 
 Our analysis will also use an ordered logit model to study credit ratings 
standards of commercial banks for a period that starts from the late 1980s until 
year 2015. Bank credit ratings are modelled as a function of financial explanatory 
variables that will be presented in subsection 4.3.3, and year indicator variables. 
Year indicator variables used in Alp (2013) and Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) 
capture stringency or loosening of rating standards relative to the first year in their 
equivalent samples (1985 and 1978), i.e. the first year of the sample in each study 
is the reference year. As noted in Alp (2013), this is a narrow definition stringency 
since the question is formulated as if a firm holding the same risk characteristics 
receives a higher or lower rating using the model used in 1985.  
In our sample, which is analysed in the following section, credit ratings 
start from year 1986 with scarce observations before 1990 and few observations 
before 2000. Also, most of the observations before 1990 are not accompanied d 
by financial data (i.e. there are a lot of missing financial variables or no financial 
variables in quarters before 1990). It is indicative to mention that for Fitch the sum 
of all available bank credit ratings up to year 1999 is approximately 600 compared 
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to the 625 bank credit ratings of year 2000. So, we use a broader definition of 
stringency which dictates that if rating agencies use the same model until 1999 to 
rate banks, the question is whether a bank, having the same risk characteristics 
receives a better or worse credit rating from year 2000 and on. All years until 1999 
are represented as one and thus year indicator variables capture stringency or 
loosening of rating standards from 2000 until 2015. So, if rating agencies use the 
model they used up until 1999 to assign ratings after this year, we study whether 
a commercial bank having the same characteristics receives a higher or lower 
rating. Higher ratings imply a comparative loosening of rating standards, while 
lower rating imply stringency. 
The ordered logit model used in our analysis can be broken down into two 
parts. The first part corresponds to the 17 rating categories, according to the rating 
transformation presented in subsection 4.3.1.1 below (also see Table 4.2). The 
dependent variable, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the credit rating of bank i at quarter t according 
to the latent variable 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and the partition points μi  distinguish each rating category 
as follows: 
 
     17      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇16, ∞) 
     16      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇15, 𝜇16) 
     15      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇14, 𝜇15) 
       𝑅𝑖𝑡 =    ⋮    (1) 
       3      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇2, 𝜇3) 
       2      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇1, 𝜇2) 
       1      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ (−∞, 𝜇1) 
The second part, relates the latent variable to the explanatory variables: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the latent variable of bank i at quarter t, as already mentioned, 𝑎𝑡 is 
the intercept for quarter t, 𝛽 is the vector of slope coefficients, and 𝛸𝑖𝑡 is vector of 
the explanatory variables of bank i at quarter t. In vector 𝛸𝑖𝑡  the included financial 
explanatory variables are the values observed at quarter t-1. In this way, credit 
ratings are regressed on the previous quarters’ financial data, or on the data 
available up to the fourth quarter of the previous year as explained above. We 
adopt this formulation because we assume the CRAs, first receive the publicly 
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available information of a bank and then decide on the bank’s credit rating. For 
example, year-end financial results are announced in the beginning of the 
following year, e.g. the results of 2018 are announced within the first quarter of 
2019 (usually from early February till mid-March), so the credit ratings observed 
at the end of the first quarter of 2019 should include the year-end information of 
2018, which are the previous quarter’s published values. This approach is similar 
to Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014), which using annual data, consider the 
first rating available three months after the fiscal year-end and match this rating 
with the fiscal year-end financial statement data. This three-month lag is to ensure 
that the financial data are available to the rating agencies at the time the rating is 
issued. In a similar fashion, Alp (2013), who estimates a model with yearly 
variables, uses the calendar year-end values of the ratings and match them with 
financial data available before the year-end. 
 
4.3. Data 
Our data consists of a worldwide panel of 1,208 commercial banks with 
their equivalent credit ratings by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. The financial database 
used to collect bank credit ratings and financial data is Bankscope by Bureau Van 
Dijk. 
 
4.3.1. Bank Selection in Bankscope 
The selection criteria used in Bankscope to construct our sample of banks 
with credit ratings from the three CRAs are bank’s specialisation, size and whether 
the bank considered is the ultimate owner in the ownership structure. For the 
specialisation criterion we consider values of Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, 
Cooperative Banks and Bank Holding & Holding Companies (BH&HCs)6. The 
reason for this selection is to maintain a homogeneity in our sample concentrating 
on commercial banks that play a fundamental role in the economy, i.e. their 
function is vital for economic development and growth. For the size criterion we 
consider banks that had book value of assets greater or equal to $5bill. in 2006 
(i.e. the year before the global financial crisis begun) or in the last year that a 
 
6 Many banks from the initial sample were excluded “by hand” because even though they 
were as BH&HCs in Bankscope, they were not commercial banks (e.g. Citigroup Inc and 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc in the US are both characterised as BH&HCs in Bankscope, 
but the former is a commercial bank and is retained in the sample while the latter is an 
investment bank and excluded from the sample). 
86 
 
bank’s data are available. The reason for the size criterion is to have a sample 
that will account for most of the global banking system (i.e. at least 90% of the 
total book value of assets of the global banking system7), while not take into 
account smaller banks that are normally not rated. Lastly, the use of the ultimate 
owner criterion is to avoid double-counting ratings of banks that are junior within 
a single ownership structure (e.g. while Banco Santander SA is included as the 
ultimate holder in the Santander Group, all its subsidiaries such as Santander UK 
Plc are excluded). 
 
4.3.2. Bank Credit Ratings 
The measures of credit ratings used in our dataset are the long-term issuer 
ratings of each CRA which is what is mostly used in literature (Alp, 2013; Hau, 
Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012; Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens, 
2012) as they are the primary issuer ratings of each CRA and are considered to 
represent opinions of creditworthiness through the business cycle rather than 
short-term fluctuations (Moody’s, 2018; Kiff, Kisser and Schumacher, 2012). 
Specifically, the credit ratings we use are the long-term issuer default rating (IDR) 
for Fitch, the long-term Issuer rating (foreign) for Moody’s and the foreign currency 
long-term Issuer Credit Rating (ICR) for S&P. Credit ratings are recorded at the 
end of each quarter thus constituting a time series of quarterly data. 
In the end, we obtain an unbalanced panel of approximately 90,000 
quarterly bank ratings from 19878 to 2015. Bank ratings are distributed among the 
three CRAs as follows: 30,173 quarterly bank ratings by Fitch, 31,161 quarterly 
bank ratings by Moody’s and 28,445 quarterly bank ratings by Standard and 




7 In Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) their sample is comprised by the 100 largest Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) in the US, with respect to the book value of their total assets at the 
end of 2007. Although the BHCs in the US were over that 5,000 by the end of 2007, the 
sample of the 100 largest BHCs in Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) accounts for approximately 
92% of the total book value of assets in the US banking system. So, given our size criterion 
our US sample is comprised of the 260 largest commercial banks in the US, which should 
account for more than 90% of the total book value in US banking system. 
8 Our initial sample contained 76 additional quarterly bank credit ratings from 1980 to 1986, 





Table 4.1: Credit Ratings per World Region/CRA 
World 
Region 
Fitch Moody’s S&P Grand Total 
Europe 13,335 12,941 11,850 24,791 
US & Canada 6,635 7,246 7,734 21,615 
RoW 9,903 10,974 8,861 29,738 
 30,173 31,161 28,445 89,779 
 
4.3.1.1. Rating Transformation 
All credit ratings obtained are transformed from their letter form into a 
numerical value that corresponds to an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17, 
according to Table 4.2. Value of 1 corresponds to the lowest rated banks 
(CCC+/Caa or worse) and value of 17 to the highest rated banks (AAA/Aaa), 
according to Table . This transformation is same as in Alp (2013), Shen, Huang 
and Hasan (2012) and Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012)9, where an 
ordinal scale of 17 numbers is also used and the lowest ratings (CCC+/Caa or 
worse) are pooled in one category because of their limited numbers of institutions 
in each of the categories. 
 
 
9 In Alp (2013) and Shen, Huang and Hasan (2012) number 17 corresponds to the highest 
credit rating, while in Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012) the opposite is true, i.e. 
number 1 corresponds to the highest credit rating. 
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 By and large in the related literature, we usually find the transformation of 
credit ratings to an ordinal numerical scale of consisting of no more than 10 
categories. Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) use an ordinal scale of 4 categories 
to map the 4 investment grade rating categories (AAA, AA, A and BBB) of S&P 
bond-level ratings of US corporations. Amato and Furfine (2004) use an ordinal 
scale of 8 categories to map the 8 upper rating categories (AAA, AA, …, CC) of 
S&P corporate ratings of US firm.Finally , Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and 
Pastor (2014) use an ordinal numerical scale of 6 categories to map all rating 
categories of Spanish bank credit ratings by the three principal CRAs, an in a 
companion paper the sme authors Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor 
(2018) use an ordinal numerical scale of 11 categories to map ratings from all 
three principal CRAs, and group in a single category  the lowest notches that 
contain only a small number of observations.  
 The reason for using an ordinal scale of 17 numbers instead of a more 
restricted scale that most studies in related literature use, is that our sample is 
Table 4.2: Rating Transformation Table 
 
Fitch Rating Scale Number Moody’s Rating Scale Number S&P Rating Scale Number 
AAA 17 Aaa 17 AAA 17 
AA+ 16 Aa1 16 AA+ 16 
AA 15 Aa2 15 AA 15 
AA- 14 Aa3 14 AA- 14 
A+ 13 A1 13 A+ 13 
A 12 A2 12 A 12 
A- 11 A3 11 A- 11 
BBB+ 10 Baa1 10 BBB+ 10 
BBB 9 Baa2 9 BBB 9 
BBB- 8 Baa3 8 BBB- 8 
BB+ 7 Ba1 7 BB+ 7 
BB 6 Ba2 6 BB 6 
BB- 5 Ba3 5 BB- 5 
B+ 4 B1 4 B+ 4 
B 3 B2 3 B 3 
B- 2 B3 2 B- 2 
CCC+ 1 Caa1 1 CCC+ 1 
CCC 1 Caa2 1 CCC 1 
CCC- 1 Caa3 1 CCC- 1 
CC 1 Ca 1 CC 1 
C 1 C 1 C 1 
RD 1   R 1 
D 1   SD 1 
    D 1 
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large compared to the available data in the previous studies. The choice of 17 
categories is comparable to the of studies mentioned in the beginning that have 
comparable sample sizes (e.g. more than 20,000 observations). 
4.3.1.2. Ratings Summary Statistics 
 Table 4.3 presents the basic summary statistics for the bank credit ratings 
by each CRA for the world sample and for each world region separately. 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Bank Credit Ratings 
          
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs 
World Sample 9.23 3.32 30,173 9.71 3.62 31,161 9.72 3.22 28,445 
Europe 10.08 3.17 13,335 10.35 3.57 12,941 10.63 3.15 11,850 
US & Canada 9.66 3.16 6,935 10.83 2.93 7,246 9.92 2.80 7,734 
RoW 7.78 3.15 9,903 8.21 3.61 10,974 8.32 3.16 8,861 
          
Some interesting remarks can be made from the table above. Fitch on 
average assigns lower ratings compared to Moody’s and S&P. This can be 
attributed to the lower ratings Fitch assigns to each of the three world regions 
compared again to Moody’s and S&P. Also, Fitch assigns lower ratings to each 
world region separately compared to Moody’s and S&P. Moody’s assigns the 
highest ratings to US & Canada banks and S&P assigns the highest ratings to 
European and RoW banks. The final observation from the presented statitics is 
that European and US & Canada banks receive significantly higher ratings 
compared to RoW banks for all three CRAs. 
In Table 4.4 we present again the basic statistics for the bank credit ratings 
by each CRA for the world sample and for each world region separately, but for 
different periods. We have chosen to report them over, two pre-crisis periods, i.e. 
2000-5 and 2006-8 and the period after the global financial crisis 2009-15. The 
period before 2000 is ignored as observations are really scarce before 1990 and 
only few observations before 2000. The pre-crisis period is split into two 
subperiods because we believe it is interesting to see how CRAs may have 
assigned on average higher ratings just before the crisis begun (which is more 
observable in the analysis presented in the next sub-section). For the period after 
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the global financial crisis we expect a decrease in the average ratings assigned 
to banks. 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Bank Credit Ratings for different periods 
2000-5 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs 
World Sample 9.35 3.44 8,409 10.31 3.22 7,878 9.91 3.21 7,678 
Europe 10.06 3.62 3,361 11.55 2.43 2,906 11.07 3.09 3,028 
US & Canada 10.18 2.57 2,750 11.11 2.62 2,717 10.11 2.59 2,741 
RoW 7.33 3.24 2,298 7.75 3.32 2,255 7.80 3.18 1,909 
          
2006-8 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs 
World Sample 9.54 3.12 6,753 10.12 3.72 6,245 10.01 3.06 5,595 
Europe 10.52 3.03 2,820 11.32 3.20 2,857 11.11 2.67 2,300 
US & Canada 9.84 2.94 1,559 11.28 2.73 1,175 10.26 2.90 1,365 
RoW 8.17 2.83 2,374 7.97 3.83 2,213 8.53 3.02 1,930 
          
2009-15 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs 
World Sample 8.93 3.33 14,415 8.90 3.73 14,422 9.05 3.25 12,446 
Europe 9.86 2.99 6,831 9.17 3.83 6,517 9.73 3.27 5,458 
US & Canada 8.71 3.70 2,386 9.55 3.35 2,053 8.90 3.04 2,267 
RoW 7.81 3.22 5,198 8.37 3.68 5,852 8.34 3.17 4,721 
          
 The results in the table above are close to what was expected. All CRAs’ 
ratings exhibit an increasing tendency in the periods 2006-8, just before the onset 
of the crisis compared to the 2000-5 period. This is more pronounced as Fitch and 
S&P on average assign slightly higher ratings for the period 2006-8 (just before 
the global financial crisis begun). Not surprisingly all CRAs assign lower ratings in 




4.3.3. Control Data 
 Rating agencies face many difficulties in the process of assessing banks’ 
creditworthiness due to the unique features of the banking industry. Moreover, 
there is evidence that agencies disagree more about bank ratings than for 
corporate ratings, because banks are inherently more opaque (Morgan, 2002) So, 
assessing bank ratings is an even more difficult task to perform, which means 
choosing the most appropriate explanatory variables is crucial to our purpose. 
4.3.3.1. Financial Explanatory Variables 
In the process of assessing a bank’s rating we first must assess the 
intrinsic, or standalone, creditworthiness element of a bank as analyzed in the 
previous essay for rating methodologies. For this reason, we choose six key 
financial characteristics variables that are mostly used in the literature and also 
are related to the CRAs’ financial profile factors presented in subsections 3.2.1, 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Those financial characteristic variables cover bank size, 
profitability, leverage, asset structure, funding structure and trading share. 
Bank size is measured by the natural log of total assets, which is found in 
almost all relevant literature (Erkens et al, 2012, Laeven and Levine, 2009, Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2010, Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, Van Laere, 
Vantieghem and Baesens (2012), etc). Size is a very important factor because it 
relates to the external support element of all three principal CRA methodologies. 
This is also noted in related literature (Caporale et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2012), 
and the assumption is that greater size implies greater likelihood of external 
support from authorities in the event of the bank encountering problems. A 
secondary element of size is that as bank size increases their opaqueness 
increase and thus it is more difficult to rate it. Profitability is measured by Return 
on Average Assets (ROAA)10 which is also a commonly used variable in the 
relevant literature (Erkens et al, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2010, Hau, Langfield 
and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, etc). Leverage is measured by Total Assets divided 
by Equity11, also found in Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) and Van 
Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012), where the inverse ratio is used 
(Common equity to total assets). Asset structure is measured by both Net Loans 
divided by Total Assets and Net profits on trading and derivatives divided by Total 
 
10 Alternatively, Net Income to equity or Profits/Assets are also used in similar literature. 
11 Alternative measures for leverage found in similar literature are Total liabilities divided 




Assets, something found in Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) which 
aims to capture the traditionally more stable activity of granting loans versus the 
less predictable financial market activity. Lastly, funding structure is measured by 
Short-term Funding divided by Total Assets also as in Hau, Langfield and 
Marques-Ibanez (2012).  
All financial variables are also collected from Bankscope on a quarterly 
basis. If no data is available for a specific quarter, we assume as valid value the 
value from the previously available quarter, but up to the fourth quarter of the 
previous year. This is because if no quarterly data is available then we either have 
data for only for the fourth quarter or semi-annual data (i.e. only for the second 
and fourth quarter). For example, if we have annual data, the values for the first, 
second and third quarter are assumed the value of the previous year’s fourth 
quarter (or end of year financial data values). If we have semi-annual data, the 
value for the first quarter is assumed the value of the previous year’s fourth 
quarter, and the value of the third quarter is assumed the value of the second 
quarter.  
In this way, since in our empirical strategy (see section 4.2) the quarterly 
value of the bank credit rating is at quarter t and the financial explanatory variables 
at quarter t-1, credit ratings are regressed on the previous quarters’ financial data, 
or on the data available up to the fourth quarter of the previous year as explained 
previously. With respect to the consolidation level for the financial data, in 
Bankscope the available data is at consolidated or unconsolidated level, with 
further categorization12. In line with the three principal CRAs (Fitch, 2018; Moody’s 
2018; Standard & Poor’s, 2011c), if at the same quarter data exists at both 
consolidated and unconsolidated level, we choose the data at consolidated level 
data for our analysis. When no data exists at the consolidated level, we choose 
the data at unconsolidated level. Such cases are for the years prior to 2000 or of 
banks that are solo entities (with no subsidiaries). 
 
12 The following consolidation codes are found in Bankscope: 
C1: statement of a mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or 
branches with no unconsolidated companion. 
C2: statement of a mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or 
branches with an unconsolidated companion. 
C*: Additional Consolidated statement (IFRS). 
U1: statement not integrating the statements of the possible controlled subsidiaries or 
branches of the concerned bank with no consolidated companion. 
U2: statement not integrating the statements of the possible controlled subsidiaries or 
branches of the concerned bank with an consolidated companion. 
U*: Additional Unconsolidated statement (IFRS). 
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Lastly, we choose not to winsorize any of the financial control variables, 
an approach that is sometimes found in related literature in order to rule out 
outliers and mitigate their impact on the results. For example, Alp (2013), Baghai, 
Servaes, and Tamayo (2014), and Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor 
(2018) winsorize all continuous financial explanatory variables but in different 
ways13. We decide not to proceed with winsorizing as the regression results hardly 
differentiate when we attempt to do so. 
4.3.3.2. Year Effects 
 Year effects are key for the purpose of this study. We use year dummy 
variables to capture year effects which is a common practice in all related literature 
that examines the time-series variation in rating standards. Blume, Lim, and 
Mackinlay (1998), Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2008), Alp (2013) and Baghai, Servaes, 
and Tamayo (2014) all use year dummies to capture year effects. In this way, year 
indicators are used to capture the tightening (or stringency) and the loosening or 
of the rating standards relative to the omitted year, which is in most cases the first 
year in the sample used. As we already explained in subsection 4.2, we use a 
broader definition of stringency so that all years until 1999 are represented as one 
and thus year indicator variables capture stringency or loosening of rating 
standards from 2000 until 2015. 
 4.3.3.3. Other Explanatory Variables 
 Apart from the financial control variables described above which relate to 
the intrinsic risk of a bank, the other major element of bank credit ratings as 
described in Section 3 is the external support element. This is defined by Fitch as 
the Support Rating and the Support Rating Floor, by Moody’s as the Affiliate 
Support, the Loss Given Failure and the Government Support, and lastly by 
Standard & Poor’s as the Extraordinary or Group Support. Regardless of the 
different definitions of the external support element, it is in mainly about the ability 
and likelihood of government or sovereign support to a bank for all three CRAs. 
So, for this common element in the methodology of all three CRAs, we consider 
that it can be best proxied by country sovereign credit ratings. In this way, for all 
banks we obtain their country’s sovereign credit rating by the same CRAs and the 
equivalent time periods (i.e. if we have a bank credit for a bank at period t by Fitch, 
 
13 Alp (2013) winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%, Baghai, Servaes, and 
Tamayo (2014) winsorize all explanatory variables: all variables at 99th percentile and 
some at the 1st percentile, while Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018) 
winsorize the explanatory variables at 1% and 99%. 
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we obtain the bank’s country credit rating again for period t), and the country 
ratings are similarly transformed from their letter form into a numerical value that 
is corresponds to the same ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17. The source of 
sovereign credit ratings is again Bankscope. 
A note should be made that the use of sovereign credit ratings as an 
explanatory variable is not often found in related literature. However, the 
sovereign crisis in the Eurozone Countries uncovered how a country’s banks are 
strongly related to the creditworthiness of the country, and vice versa (BIS, 2011). 
Studies such as Huang and Shen (2015) highlight the importance of sovereign 
credit ratings on bank credit ratings, while also find evidence of an asymmetric 
impact of sovereign credit ratings on bank credit ratings. Also, in studies where an 
international sample of bank ratings is analysed what is usually found is country 
fixed effects act as a proxy of the economic environment on bank credit ratings 
(e.g. Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 
2013, etc). Similarly, in Caporale, Matousek and Stewart (2011) and in Caporale, 
Matousek and Stewart (2012) a country index is developed to reflect cross-country 
differences as it would not be feasible to estimate their model using country fixed 
effects because of the 90 countries in their sample.  
Yet, in section 3 we clearly observed that it is not the economic 
environment per se that is taken into account by the three principal CRAs as the 
external support element. For example, Fitch includes systemic risk measures in 
sovereign ratings and thus they indirectly incorporate them in the stand-alone 
rating of banks through the sovereign ratings. So, including country fixed effects 
as a proxy of the economic environment while not taking into account the 
sovereign credit rating appears not to be in line the three principal CRAs’ 
methodologies. Two of the rare case of studies that sovereign credit ratings are 
used as an explanatory variable are Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor 
(2018), where the authors also include GDP growth rate as a measure of the 
economic environment, and Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012). 
Lastly, the last explanatory variable used in our regressions is a dummy 
called Multiple Rating Dummy and aims to capture the effect of the level of 
competition among the three CRAs, if any exists. According to the literature of 
industrial organization the role of competition is positive for product quality. So, 
we would expect that rating competition could provide the rating agencies with 
incentives to improve their rating process and methodology in order to acquire a 
good reputation for accurate ratings. Nevertheless, Becker and Milbourn (2010) 
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claim that the entry of Fitch in CRAs’ market in late the 1990s led to deterioration 
in ratings’ quality. Such a phenomenon is attributed to another channel of rating 
competition: higher competition among rating agencies can lead to a reduction of 
quality in order to induce rating shopping (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2012). In 
another context, Bongaerts, Martijn Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012) examine 
three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating 
shopping, and regulatory certification, to infer about the economic role credit rating 
agencies play in the corporate bond market. Under the information production 
theory, investors are averse to uncertainty and shopping extra ratings reduces 
their uncertainty. Under the rating shopping theory, issuers shop for an additional 
rating hoping to improve their existing rating. And under the regulatory certification 
theory, market and regulatory forces create the need to separate issues, so that 
speculative-grade ratings (the weaker ones) need a third rating. These theories 
are not mutually exclusive. But, given the scope of this essay, we chose not to 
broaden the measures used in our analysis for competition. So, similar to Hau, 
Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) our Multiple Rating Dummy takes the value 
of 1 whenever for the given period another rating agency has issued a rating for 
a particular bank, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.4. Econometric Issues 
In this section, we examine various econometric issues before we set out 
the estimation of the econometric model. 
4.4.1. Unbalanced Panel Data 
We are using a panel data (also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional 
time-series data) since the behaviour of entities of banks are observed across 
time. Panel data enjoy great advantages in controlling for individual heterogeneity 
and acquiring more reliable estimates from a larger data set with more variability 
and less collinearity (Baltagi and Song, 2006). However, panel data is subject to 
problems arising from sample selection, which include nonresponse in both cross-
sectional and time series data sets. In our case we have an unbalanced panel 
data since some observations in time periods are missing for some banks (Greene 
and Hensher, 2009). Our sample covers a total of 117 quarters, however with 
significant gaps since hardly any bank has credit ratings for the full time period. 
Moreover, some banks are liquidated or taken over during the sample period, or 
for other banks CRAs are withdrawn, while some information (financial data) is 
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missing just due to recording errors. This randomly missing data may not cause 
inconsistent estimation, leading us to false inference (Greene and Hensher, 
2009). 
4.4.2. Fixed Effects vs Random Effects 
Since we have panel data, there is bound to be heterogeneity among 
individual units of banks and persistence due to the time series character of the 
data. So, our panel data poses several estimation and inference problems that 
need to be addressed by adopting the appropriate estimation technique. We begin 
by a discussion of the choice between techniques are the fixed effects (FE) and 
the random effects models (RE).  
A note should be made that with panel data, we can include variables at 
different levels of analysis that in our case would mean banks, countries, or world 
regions. The most appropriate level of analysis seems to be banks, since for the 
country and world region effects our data are included in country ratings. 
In the FE model, we are interested in analysing the impact of variables that 
vary over time and thus try to capture the causes of changes within an entity. We 
assume that something within the entity may impact or bias (the independent or 
dependent variables and we need to control for this. This is the rationale behind 
the assumption of the correlation between entity’s error term and independent 
variables. In FE model, the intercept is allowed to differ among entities in 
recognition of the fact that each entity may have some special characteristics of 
its own. A time-invariant characteristic could not cause such a change, because it 
would have been constant for each entity. In the RE model, the variation across 
entities is assumed to be random (a random drawing from a much larger 
population with a constant mean value) and uncorrelated with the independent 
variables included in the model. In other words, the RE model it is not about the 
variation is stochastic or not. The RE model should be used when differences 
across entities can have impact on the dependent variable only and being 
uncorrelated (or statistically independent) with all the independent variables. 
To sum up the above, RE model assume that the entity’s error term is not 
correlated with the independent variables which allows for time-invariant variables 
to play a role as explanatory variables. So, an advantage of RE model is that you 
can include time invariant variables (i.e. gender), whereas in the FE model these 
variables are absorbed by the intercept. However, in the RE model we need to 
specify those individual characteristics that may or may not influence the 
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independent variables. The problem with this is that some variables may not be 
available therefore leading to omitted variable bias in the RE model. Also, when 
the number of cross-sectional entities is large, and the number of time periods is 
short (i.e. having a short panel), the appropriateness of each model is based  on 
whether we can safely assume that the cross-sectional entities in our sample are 
random drawings from a larger sample or not. 
In our case, our sample has a large number of cross-sectional entities with 
relatively small number of time series data. This means that the estimates 
obtained by each of the two methods can differ significantly and thus the 
appropriate method should be carefully selected. The key is whether the 
individual, or cross-sectional entities, i.e. banks, in our sample are random 
drawings from a larger sample or not. Our sample consists of approximately the 
1.200 largest banks around the world, which means that our sample is not a 
random drawing and thus the RE model seems inappropriate. Moreover, if we 
chose the RE model it would be extremely difficult to specify the missing variables 
that affect the independent variables, leading us to omitted variable bias in the 
model. So, the appropriate estimation technique seems to be the FE model. 
However, since we are not using OLS, using FE in an ordered logit model could 
create problems due to the consistency of estimators. For this reason we decide 
to use the Huber–White robust estimator clustered at the bank level also used in 





4.5. Empirical Results 
In this section we proceed with the empirical results. First, we estimate the model 
for the full world sample of banks, and then we estimate the model for separate 
world regions. In the following subsection, we then proceed with structural break 
tests equivalently for the full world sample and for the three world regions. 
4.5.1. Results with full world sample 
 In this sub-section we estimate the ordered logit model of equations (1) to 
(2) for the full world sample of banks. Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c show the 
coefficient estimates for the full world sample for using the ratings of Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P. The coefficients of Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. are all 
significant and have the same sign, as expected according to literature and 
expectations. For the rest of the financial characteristics the results are less 
straightforward for the full world sample. The coefficient of Total Assets/Equity has 
a negative sign as expected, for both the Fitch and the S&P, but it is not significant 
for the Moody’s. Similarly Net Loans/Total Assets coefficient has a negative sign 
for Fitch as expected, but is not significant neither for Moody’s or S&P. The 
coefficient of Deposits&Short-term Funding/Total Assets has a negative sign for 
Fitch and is not significant for Moody’s and S&P. Other operating income/Average 
Assets coefficient has negative sign as expected, for both Moody’s and S&P but 
is not significant for Fitch  
Aside from the financial characteristics include above, our model 
incorporates the rest of the explanatory variables described in the previous 
section. The Country Rating coefficient has a positive sign and is significant for all 
three CRAs. The positive sign for the Country Rating coefficient for all three CRAs 
accompanied by the high significance levels (Z  
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 stats) is indicative of the importance in determining a bank’s credit rating. Multiple 
rating dummy coefficient has positive sign and significance for Fitch but is not 
significant for both the Moody’s and S&P sample. This as a noteworthy finding for 
the ratings competition, i.e. Fitch gives higher credit ratings when at least one of 
the other two CRAs have also rated a particular bank at the same quarter, an 
inference which does not hold for the other two CRAs. 
 
Table 4.5a: Estimation results for Fitch / full world sample 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. The 
dependent variable is the Fitch long-term issuer default rating converted into an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 to 17, whereas CCC+ or worse corresponds to 1 and AAA corresponds to 17. The 
explanatory variables are defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using 
cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next 
to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 







Log of Assets 1.1130 *** 11.26 0.7292  
R.O.A.A. 0.1029 *** 2.75 0.2004  
Total Assets/Equity -0.0001 *** -9.37 -0.0160  
Net Loans/Total Assets -0.0118 *** -3.26 -0.1840  
Dep.&Funding/Total 
Assets 
-0.0016 *** -3.53 -0.1605  
Oth r Op. Income/Avg 
Assets 
       -0.0587 -1.39 -0.1142  
Country Rating 0.4868 *** 19.67 1.8747  
Multiple rating dummy 0.3996 *** 2.76  0.3730 
Year Indicators     
2000 -0.4166   ** -2.38  -0.3888 
2001 -0.4671 *** -3.17  -0.4359 
2002 -0.6198 *** -4.50  -0.5785 
2003 -0.8779 *** -6.47  -0.8194 
2004 -0.9042 *** -6.91  -0.8440 
2005 -0.9162 *** -7.11  -0.8552 
2006 -0.9194 *** -7.16  -0.8582 
2007 -0.8910 *** -7.17  -0.8317 
2008 -1.0046 *** -7.86  -0.9377 
2009 -1.1455 *** -8.67  -1.0691 
2010 -1.0591 *** -8.08  -0.9885 
2011 -1.0229 *** -7.39  -0.9547 
2012 -1.1139 *** -7.38  -1.0397 
2013 -1.1685 *** -7.57  -1.0907 
2014 -1.1991 *** -7.75  -1.1192 




Pseudo R2 0.184  
Clusters of Banks 777  
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Lastly, the Year indicator coefficients, which are the epicentre of this study, 
also give noteworthy results. We observe that all year indicator coefficients for all 
three CRAs have negative signs, and most of them are statistically significant. 
Negative signs can be interpreted that rating standards from 2000 until 2015 have 
become more stringent relative to the period until 1999.  
All the coefficient estimates of the ordered logit model in our analysis described 
above are informative with respect to their signs, but they are uninformative with 
respect to the magnitude they affect credit ratings, thus making it difficult to infer 
changes in the  
Table 4.5b: Estimation results for Moody’s / full world sample 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. The 
dependent variable is the Moody’s long-term Issuer rating (foreign) converted into an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 to 17, whereas Caa1 or worse corresponds to 1 and Aaa corresponds to 17. The 
explanatory variables are defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using 
cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next 
to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 














R.O.A.A. 0.2104 *** 4.26 0.4944  
Total Assets/Equity        -0.0025 -1.33 -0.83 4  
Net Loans/Total Assets         0.0062 1.46 0.1227  
Dep.&Funding/Total 
Assets 
       -0.0000 -1.53 -0.0389  
Oth r Op. Income/Avg 
Assets 
-0.1431 *** -3.78 -0.4036  
Country Rating 0.4801 *** 19.26 2.2366  
Multiple rating dummy        -0.1276 -0.93  -0.1498 
Year Indicators     
2000 -0.4020   ** -2.30  -0.4720 
2001 -0.5142   ** -2.54  -0.6037 
2002 -0.5386   ** -2.43  -0.6324 
2003 -0.5256   ** -2.21  -0.6171 
2004 -0.6386 *** -2.65  -0.7498 
2005 -0.6856 *** -2.82  -0.8050 
2006 -0.6861 *** -2.72  -0.8056 
2007        -0.1208 -0.46  -0.1419 
2008        -0.2054 -0.77  -0.2412 
2009 -0.4480   ** -1.65  -0.5260 
2010 -0.6064   ** -2.25  -0.7120 
2011 -0.8512 *** -3.22  -0.9994 
2012 -1.1454 *** -4.31  -1.3448 
2013 -1.2811 *** -4.81  -1.5042 
2014 -1.3658 *** -5.15  -1.6037 




Pseudo R2 0.171  
Clusters of Banks 746  
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 ‘behaviour’ of CRAs s. In order to infer such possible changes, in each table we 
present in the last two columns two products that will help assess the magnitude 
of the coefficient values, thus inferring whether such changes occurred. Column 
three presents for the non-dummy variables the product of its estimated coefficient 
and the variable’s standard deviation14, divided by the average distance between 
the rating categories, i.e. the average notch length. The product of the coefficient 
and the standard deviation measures the change in the conditional expectation in 
 
14 Standard deviations of variables in each table differ, as they are calculated for each 
CRA subsample, i.e. standard deviation of Log of Assets for the Fitch full sample is 
different from the standard deviation of Log of Assets for the Moody’s full sample. 
Table 4.5c: Estimation results for S&P / full world sample 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. The 
dependent variable is the S&P foreign currency long-term rating converted into an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 to 17, whereas CCC+ or worse corresponds to 1 and AAA corresponds to 17. The 
explanatory variables are defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using 
cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next 
to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 







Log of Assets 0.6431 *** 6.06 0.4786  
R.O.A.A. 0.1982 *** 3.75 0.4354  
Total Assets/Equity -0.0001 *** -9.78 -0.0255  
Net Loans/Total Assets        -0.0044 -1.05 -0.0890  
Dep.&Funding/Total 
Assets 
       -0.0003 -0.38 -0.0746  
Oth r Op. Income/Avg 
Assets 
-0.1270 *** -3.38 -0.5768  
Country Rating 0.5039 *** 19.50 2.0869  
Multiple rating dummy        -0.2149 -1.31  -0.2356 
Year Indicators     
2000 -0.3312     * -1.70  -0.3632 
2001 -0.4041     * -1.86  -0.4432 
2002 -0.6615 *** -2.82  -0.7255 
2003 -0.9278 *** -3.76  -1.0176 
2004 -0.8977 *** -3.59  -0.9846 
2005 -0.7463 *** -2.95  -0.8185 
2006 -0.5882   ** -2.29  -0.6451 
2007         -0.3868 -1.47  -0.4242 
2008 -0.4600     * -1.73  -0.5045 
2009 -0.6652   ** -2.50  -0.7295 
2010 -0.7794 *** -2.97  -0.8547 
2011 -0.8353 *** -3.16  -0.9161 
2012 -0.9253 *** -3.46  -1.0148 
2013 -1.0171 *** -3.79  -1.1154 
2014 -0.9883 *** -3.70  -1.0839 




Pseudo R2 0.1585  
Clusters of Banks 669  
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the latent variable given one standard deviation increase in the explanatory 
variable.  
The denominator, i.e. the average distance between the rating categories 
is calculated by finding the average distance between cut points15 (i.e. the average 
rating notch length is calculated as (μ16-μ1)/15, where μ16 is the last cut point, μ1 is 
the first cut point and number 15 is the number of the in-between categories). 
Column four presents a similar transformation for the dummy variables to units of 
rating notches. This is done by calculating dummy coefficients as multiples of the 
average distance between the rating categories, or as explained previously, the 
average distance between cut points. 
The values of column (3) in all tables provide for some interesting results. 
The most important  contributing financial characteristics in determining bank 
credit ratings for Fitch full world sample are:  Log of Assets, R.O.A.A. and Net 
Loans/Total Assets, for Moody’s:  Total Assets/Equity, Log of Assets and 
R.O.A.A., and finally  S&P:  Other Op. Income/Avg Assets, Log of Assets and 
R.O.A.A.  
So, for example, an increase/decrease of one standard deviation in log of 
assets coefficient on average increases/decreases a bank’s rating from Fitch by 
0.73 notches, from Moody’s by 0.79 notches and from S&P by 0.48 notches. 
Furthermore, multiple ratings dummy, as mentioned above, has a 
significant value only for the Fitch suggesting that in the presence of another 
CRAs credit rating, a bank’s Fitch rating increases by 0.37 notches.  
Country Rating appear to be another a key contributor in determining bank 
credit ratings for all three CRAs. An increase/decrease of one standard deviation 
in the country’s rating will on average increase/decrease a bank’s rating from Fitch 
by 1.87 notches, from Moody’s by 2.24 notches and from S&P by 2.09 notches.  
 The main interest of the magnitude that explanatory variables affect credit 
ratings is on the year indicator variables, which -as already mentioned- are the 
epicentre of this study. The negative signs and coefficient values of all the year 
indicator coefficients for all three CRAs do not give us a clear picture of any trends 
and possible breaks in the period of our analysis. To assess the existence of a 
trend we concentrate on the transformation of year indicator coefficients to units 
of rating notches as explained above. The results are presented on column (4) in 
 
15 In an ordered logit model, the distance between cut points are not equal. 
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all tables. Figure 4.1 plots column 4 in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c that respectively 
correspond to the full world sample regression of Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. 
Figure 4.1 
Plot of year indicator estimates for the full world sample, 2000 to 2015, for each CRA 
 
All three plots in Figure 4.1 show a pattern towards stringency from 2000 to 2015, 
but with discrepancies that vary among the three CRAs. Fitch displays a 
downward trend or tightening of credit standards from 2000 to 2003, a trend to 
stabilize from it rating standards from 2003 to 2007, and then from 2007 to 2015 
Fitch displays a generally stable pattern after a steep decrease on 2007. Moody’s 
displays a slightly downward trend from 2000 to 2005/6, an abrupt loosening of 
standards from 2006 to 2007, and then a stable downward trend that indicates 
stringency that stops at 2014. Lastly, S&P displays a downward trend or tightening 
of standards from 2000 to 2003, from 2003 to 2007 it displays an upward trend or 
loosening of standards, from 2007 to 2013 a downward trend and from 2013 to 
2015 a stable pattern. 
 
4.5.2. Results per world region 
 In this sub-section we estimate the same ordered logit model but this time 
for different world regions. The findings in related literature (Parker and Tarashev, 
2011, Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor, 2018) indicate that the 
hardening of bank rating policies by the three principal CRAs as a result of the 
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global financial crisis was different depending on the country or geographical area. 
As discussed in Part 3, an explanation for the observed differences in rating 
standards could either be due to a different calibration or bias in the application of 
the bank rating methodologies as CRAs structure their research departments into 
a number of offices/areas around the world which are responsible for the research 
in their region of concern/monitoring . In this way, we split our full world sample 
into three geographical areas, Europe, US & Canada and Rest of the World 
(RoW). Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the estimation results for the three world 
regions. 
The results from all subsamples regressions are very similar to the full 
world sample regressions. Specifically, coefficients of Log of Assets, R.O.A.A. and 
Country Rating are in most cases significant and positive as expected, with an 
exception for the R.O.A.A. coefficients for the RoW/Fitch and RoW/Moody’s 
subsamples which although have the correct signs are not significant. For the rest 
of the financial characteristics the results are again similar to the full world sample 
regressions. Total Assets/Equity coefficient has negative sign in all cases as 
expected, although not significant for Europe/Moody’s, US&Canada/Moody’s and 
US&Canada/S&P subsamples. The Net Loans/Total Assets coefficient has a 
negative sign for most cases, while it is not significant for Europe/S&P, RoW/Fitch 
and RoW/S&P subsamples. Deposits&Short-term Funding/Total Assets 
coefficient has a negative sign for all three European subsamples, a positive sign 
for RoW/Moody’s subsample, while it is not significant for all three US&Canada 
subsamples and for RoW/Fitch and RoW/S&P subsamples. Other operating 
income/Average Assets coefficient is not significant for all cases except for 
US&Canada/Moody’s and US&Canada/S&P subsamples. 
The rest of the explanatory variables from the subsamples regressions 
also bear similar results to that of the full world sample regressions. The Country 
Rating coefficient has a positive sign and is highly significant with an exception for 
the US&Canada/Fitch subsample, where it is not significant different from zero. 
Once again, this last finding for the country rating is indicative of the importance 
of the sovereign rating in determining a bank’s credit rating. 
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Table 4.6: Estimation results for European subsample per CRA 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the European subsample of commercial banks. The dependent variable is equivalently the Fitch long-term issuer default rating, the Moody’s long-term Issuer rating 
(foreign) and the S&P foreign currency long-term rating, all converted into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17, whereas CCC+/Caa1 or worse corresponds to 1 and AAA/Aaa corresponds to 17. The explanatory variables 
are defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond 
to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 






















Log of Assets    1.1851*** 8.31 0.7551      0.8504*** 4.45 0.6416       0.4418*** 2.89 0.3030  
R.O.A.A.    0.1132*** 3.08 0.1321      0.2511*** 4.36 0.4127       0.2620*** 3.33 0.2748  
Total Assets/Equity   -0.0001*** -10.02 -0.0351     -0.0060 -1.26 -2.9006      -0.0001*** -10.14 -0.0514  
Net Loans/Total Assets   -0.0136*** -2.79 -0.2103      0.0131** 2.00 0.2651       0.0057 1.06 0.1075  
Dep. & Funding/Total Asset   -0.0031*** -3.02 -0.2527     -
0.0001*** 
-4.00 -0.1228      -0.0034*** -4.10 -0.3594  
Other Op. Income/Avg Asse   -0.0402 -0.86 -0.0697     -0.0333 -1.61 -0.0841      -0.0181 -0.62 -0.0915  
Country Rating    0.7156*** 17.73 2.3005 
 





Multiple rating dummy   -0.1536 
 
-0.83  -0.1317     0.3033 1.25 
 
 0.3379     -0.0941 -0.35 
 
 -0.0881 
Year Indicators             
2000     0.0482 0.16  0.0414    -1.7229** -2.15  -1.9202     -0.8954*** -3.48  -0.8389 
2001    -0.0287 -0.12  -0.0246    -2.0530** -2.40  -2.2881     -1.1376*** -3.82  -1.0658 
2002    -0.1646 -0.75  -0.1412    -1.8999** -2.09  -2.1174     -1.2287*** -3.80  -1.1511 
2003    -0.6472*** -2.95  -0.5553    -1.7223* -1.82  -1.9196     -1.6143*** -4.49  -1.5125 
2004    -0.7548*** -3.55  -0.6475    -1.7729* -1.83  -1.9759     -1.5905*** -4.35  -1.4902 
2005    -0.7242*** -3.47  -0.6213    -1.8903* -1.94  -2.1068     -1.5811*** -4.28  -1.4813 
2006    -0.5762*** -3.00  -0.4944    -1.8951* -1.92  -2.1121     -1.5379*** -4.08  -1.4408 
2007    -0.5370*** -2.89  -0.4607    -1.1560 -1.16  -1.2884     -1.1583*** -2.88  -1.0852 
2008    -0.8034*** -4.23  -0.6892    -1.2958 -1.29  -1.4442     -1.2484*** -3.10  -1.1696 
2009    -1.0981*** -5.68  -0.9421    -1.6085 -1.61  -1.7928     -1.4986*** -3.79  -1.4040 
2010    -0.9666*** -5.37  -0.8292    -1.9694** -1.98  -2.1949     -1.5731*** -3.98  -1.4738 
2011    -0.9293*** -5.04  -0.7972    -2.3061** -2.31  -2.5702     -1.8817*** -4.66  -1.7630 
2012    -0.9455*** -4.71  -0.8112    -
2.8434*** 
-2.85  -3.1690     -2.0863*** -5.00  -1.9547 
2013    -0.9727*** -4.67  -0.8345    -
3.0883*** 
-3.09  -3.4419     -2.1585*** -5.21  -2.0223 
2014    -1.0926*** -5.17  -0.9374    -
3.3014*** 
-3.30  -3.6796     -2.0209*** -4.95  -1.8934 
2015    -0.9084*** -3.74  -0.7794    -
2.9469*** 
-2.95  -3.2844     -1.9397*** -4.71  -1.8173 
No. of observations  12,176 9,231 11,187 
Pseudo R2 .2484 .2103 .2201 
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Clusters of Banks 353 306 277 
Table 4.7: Estimation results for US & Canada  subsample per CRA 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the US & Canada subsample of commercial banks. The dependent variable is equivalently the Fitch long-term issuer default rating, the Moody’s long-term Issuer rating 
(foreign) and the S&P foreign currency long-term rating, all converted into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17, whereas CCC+/Caa1 or worse corresponds to 1 and AAA/Aaa corresponds to 17. The explanatory variables 
are defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond 
to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 


























Log of Assets    1.7896*** 5.93 1.4959     1.3758*** 6.34 1.4712     1.2879*** 4.84 1.0638  
R.O.A.A.    0.2502*** 3.63 0.6035     0.1455*** 3.39 0.4659     0.3255*** 5.72 0.8041  
Total Assets/Equity   -0.0032* -1.67 -0.0797     0.0159 0.33 0.3579    -0.0016 -0.78 -0.0279  
Net Loans/Total Assets   -0.0213** -2.13 -0.4680    -0.0167** -2.12 -0.4881    -0.0318*** -3.19 -0.7781  
Dep. & Funding/Total Asset   -0.0015 -1.52 -0.3283     0.0000 0.04 0.0035     0.0000 0.11 0.0092  
Other Op. Income/Avg Asse   -0.0534 -0.70 -0.1898    -0.1188*** -2.58 -0.6660    -0.1394*** -2.81 -0.6530  
Country Rating   -0.6541* -1.92 -0.0889  (omitted)       0.5170** 2.14 0.2551  






  -0.46973* -1.68 
 
 -0.7732    0.1343 0.54  0.1756 
Year Indicators             
2000       -0.2064 -1.27  -0.3397   -0.3681** -2.10  -0.4814 
2001   -0.0081 -0.13  -0.0101   -0.2748 -1.23  -0.4523   -0.4907** -2.38  -0.6418 
2002   -0.2753*** -2.70  -0.3428   -0.4471* -1.81  -0.7360   -0.8794*** -3.91  -1.1502 
2003   -0.4076*** -3.37  -0.5076   -0.6524** -2.48  -1.0738   -1.0477*** -4.45  -1.3702 
2004   -0.4773*** -3.77  -0.5943   -0.8386*** -3.42  -1.3804   -1.0283*** -4.16  -1.3449 
2005   -0.4956*** -3.47  -0.6171   -0.8223*** -3.29  -1.3535   -0.9386*** -3.71  -1.2276 
2006   -0.6127*** -3.88  -0.7629   -0.8537*** -3.26  -1.4051   -0.7498*** -2.81  -0.9807 
2007   -0.6511*** -3.53  -0.8108   -0.4160 -1.45  -0.6848   -0.7548*** -2.82  -0.9872 
2008   -0.7159*** -3.27  -0.8914   -0.6590** -2.26  -1.0847   -0.7707*** -2.67  -1.0080 
2009   -1.0189*** -3.53  -1.2687   -1.2974*** -3.20  -2.1354   -1.4889*** -4.53  -1.9473 
2010   -1.5154*** -5.06  -1.8870   -1.8034*** -4.26  -2.9683   -2.0424*** -6.22  -2.6712 
2011   -1.7220*** -5.58  -2.1442   -1.9476*** -4.66  -3.2057   -1.9170*** -5.85  -2.5071 
2012   -1.9904*** -6.41  -2.4784   -2.3710*** -5.57  -3.9026   -1.7937*** -5.13  -2.3458 
2013   -2.0418*** -6.83  -2.5424   -2.3151*** -6.00  -3.8106   -1.8757*** -5.54  -2.4531 
2014   -1.9768*** -7.33  -2.4615   -2.4350*** -6.37  -4.0080   -1.9048*** -5.78  -2.4912 
2015   -2.0029*** -6.96  -2.4940   -2.3192*** -6.12  -3.8173   -1.8992*** -5.69  -2.4838 
No. of observations  6,225 6,274 6,960 
107 
 
Pseudo R2 .135 .0701 .0842 
Clusters of Banks 162 185 174 
Table 4.8: Estimation results for RoW subsample per CRA 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the RoW subsample of commercial banks. The dependent variable is equivalently the Fitch long-term issuer default rating, the Moody’s long-term Issuer rating (foreign) 
and the S&P foreign currency long-term rating, all converted into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 17, whereas CCC+/Caa1 or worse corresponds to 1 and AAA/Aaa corresponds to 17. The explanatory variables are 
defined in the previous section. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond 
to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 


























Log of Assets    1.3080*** 5.83 0.6400     1.4020*** 5.61 0.6794     1.1541*** 4.36 0.5487  
R.O.A.A.    0.1131 1.39 0.2299     0.1426 1.59 0.2725     0.2201* 1.77 0.4585  
Total Assets/Equity   -0.0914*** -2.86 -0.6014    -0.0487* -1.78 -2.3800    -0.0236** -2.21 -0.1651  
Net Loans/Total Assets    0.0115 1.19 0.1183     0.0220** 2.04 0.2479    -0.0021 -0.18 -0.0248  
Dep. & Funding/Total Asset    0.0013 0.26 0.0452     0.0006*** 3.68 0.0815     0.0000 0.00 0.0000  
Other Op. Income/Avg Asse    0.0692 0.78 0.0704    -0.1898 -1.49 -0.2288    -0.0420 -0.43 -0.0670  
Country Rating    0.7301*** 14.28 2.1684     0.8404*** 12.24 2.6097     0.7929*** 12.31 2.3845  
Multiple rating dummy    1.2272*** 5.09  0.3828   -0.0215 -0.09  -0.0166    0.0137 0.05  0.0102 
Year Indicators             
2000       -0.2069 -0.66  -0.1602   -1.0645* -1.91  -0.7928 
2001   -0.5170** -2.35  -0.3828   -0.1872 -0.63  -0.1450   -1.3486*** -2.60  -1.0044 
2002   -1.0382*** -3.41  -0.7686   -0.0775 -0.18  -0.0600   -1.8022*** -2.82  -1.3421 
2003   -1.5625*** -4.70  -1.1568   -0.1763 -0.35  -0.1365   -2.2604*** -3.35  -1.6834 
2004   -1.6750*** -4.63  -1.2401   -0.3568 -0.68  -0.2763   -2.4034*** -3.52  -1.7898 
2005   -1.7490*** -4.96  -1.2949   -0.4125 -0.77  -0.3194   -1.8242*** -2.59  -1.3585 
2006   -1.9110*** -5.43  -1.4148   -0.4729 -0.87  -0.3662   -1.5404** -2.14  -1.1471 
2007   -1.8163*** -5.11  -1.3447   -0.0931 -0.16  -0.0721   -1.4886** -2.08  -1.1086 
2008   -1.7765*** -5.00  -1.3153   -0.0839 -0.15  -0.0650   -1.6154** -2.24  -1.2030 
2009   -1.6614*** -4.71  -1.2301   -0.0570 -0.10  -0.0441   -1.5183** -2.12  -1.1307 
2010   -1.7082*** -4.59  -1.2647    0.0652 0.12  0.0505   -1.7340** -2.44  -1.2913 
2011   -1.8384*** -4.80  -1.3610   -0.1739 -0.31  -0.1346   -1.6213** -2.24  -1.2074 
2012   -1.9559*** -4.79  -1.4481   -0.1711 -0.30  -0.1325   -1.5709** -2.13  -1.1698 
2013   -2.1581*** -5.30  -1.5977   -0.3193 -0.57  -0.2473   -1.7248** -2.35  -1.2844 
2014   -2.1769*** -5.13  -1.6117   -0.4023 -0.71  -0.3116   -1.7851** -2.44  -1.3294 
2015   -2.1523*** -4.97  -1.5935   -0.4393 -0.76  -0.3402   -1.8547** -2.53  -1.3812 
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No. of observations  8,146 6,793 7,939 
Pseudo R2 0.2916 0.317 0.2909 




Multiple rating dummy coefficient has a positive sign and high significance only 
for the US&Canada/Fitch and RoW/Fitch subsamples (also 10% significance level 
for US&Canada/Moody’s but with a negative sign), which is very much in 
accordance with the findings from the full world sample regressions, i.e. that Fitch 
gives higher credit ratings when at least one of the other two CRAs have also 
rated a particular bank at the same quarter, an inference which does not hold for 
the other two CRAs. 
In the same manner as before, in order to assign economic significance in 
each table, columns 3 and 4 assess the magnitude of the coefficient values. 
Column 3 presents the average notch length for the non-dummy variables and 
column 4 presents a similar transformation of units of rating notches for the 
dummy variables. 
In all instances, Log of Assets is the most contributing to what financial 
characteristic, except for Europe/S&P subsample where Dep. & Funding/Total 
Assets is the most contributing financial characteristics and Log of Assets is the 
second most contributing financial characteristics. The rest of the financial 
characteristics appear as second, third, etc most contributing financial 
characteristics but without any clear lead for any them for any CRA or world 
region.  
In the above manner, an increase/decrease of one standard deviation in 
log of assets on average increases/decreases a bank’s rating in the Europe/Fitch 
subsample by 0.76 notches, in the Europe/Moody’s subsample by 0.64 notches, 
in the Europe/S&P subsample by 0.30 notches, in the US&Canada/Fitch 
subsample by 1.50 notches, in the US&Canada/Moody’s subsample by 1.47 
notches, in the US&Canada/S&P subsample by 1.06 notches, in the RoW/Fitch 
subsample by 0.64 notches, in the RoW/Moody’s subsample by 0.68 notches and 
in the RoW/S&P subsample by 0.55 notches. 
Furthermore, for the multiple rating dummy, for which we observe 
significant values only for the US&Canada/Fitch and RoW/Fitch subsamples, a 
bank’s Fitch rating increases by 1.36 and 0.38 notches respectively in the 
presence of competition. Country Rating appear to be a key contributor in 
determining bank credit ratings for all three CRAs, but not for the US&Canada 
subsamples. An increase/decrease of one standard deviation in the country rating 
on average increases/decreases a bank’s rating in the Europe/Fitch subsample 
by 2.30 notches, in the Europe/Moody’s subsample by 2.43 notches, in the 
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Europe/S&P subsample by 2.45 notches, in the RoW/Fitch subsample by 2.17 
notches, in the RoW/Moody’s subsample by 2.61 notches and in the RoW/S&P 
subsample by 2.68 notches. 
 Lastly, we focus on the year indicator variables to identify the time-series 
variation in bank credit rating standards in the same manner as for the full world 
sample. Again, the negative signs and coefficient values of all all year indicator 
coefficients for all World region/CRA subsamples do not provide for a clear picture 
to assess the existence of a trend and the economic significance we concentrate 
on the transformation of year indicator coefficients to units of rating notches, which 
are found on column four in all three tables. Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. plot column 
4 of each CRA respectively from Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 that correspond to each 
of the world subsamples, i.e. the European, US&Cananda and RoW subsamples.  
Figure 4.2 Plot of year indicator estimates for the European subsample, 
from 2000 to 2015, for each CRA 
 
For the European subsample in Figure 4.2, we observe differentiated 
patterns of the three plots that correspond to the time trends from 2000 to 2015 of 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. Fitch displays a slightly downward pattern for the whole 
period. From 2000 to 2003 we observe a downward trend of approximately 0.5 
notch, then from 2003 to 2007 we observe a rather stable pattern with minor 
discrepancies, from 2007 to 2009 we observe a rather abrupt tightening of 
standards by 0.5 notch and then from 2009 to 2015 we observe a stable pattern 
with minor discrepancies. On the other hand, Moody’s displays a rather stable 
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pattern with minor discrepancies from 2000 to 2006, from 2006 to 2007 we 
observe a rather abrupt loosening of standards by almost 1.0 notch, and then from 
2007 to 2015 we observe a stable downward trend that indicates stringency that 
stops at 2014. Lastly, S&P displays a downward trend of approximately 0.5 notch 
from 2000 to 2003, from 2003 to 2006 it displays stable standards, from 2006 to 
2007 a loosening of almost 0.5 notch, from 2007 to 2013 a downward trend and 
from 2013 to 2015 a stable pattern. 
Figure 4.3 Plot of year indicator estimates for the US & Canada subsample, from 2000 
to 2015, for each CRA 
 
For the US & Canada subsample in Figure 4.3, we observe patterns of the three 
plots that again with similarities to the corresponding European patterns, but up 
until year 2008. Fitch displays a downward pattern for the whole period. From 
2000 to 2007 we observe a downward trend of approximately 1.0 notch, then from 
2007 to 2011 we observe an abrupt downward slope which translates into a 
sudden tightening of credit standards, and from 2011 to 2015 we observe a rather 
stable pattern. Moody’s displays a downward trend of approximately 1.0 notch 
from 2000 to 2004, from 2004 to 2006 a stable pattern, from 2006 to 2007 a rather 
abrupt loosening of standards by almost 1.0 notch, and similar to Fitch, from 2007 
to 2012 we observe an abrupt downward slope which translates into a sudden 
tightening of credit standards, and from 2012 to 2015 we observe a rather stable 
pattern. Lastly, S&P displays a downward trend of approximately 1.0 notch from 
2000 to 2003, from 2003 to 2006 it displays upward slope or loosening of 
112 
 
standards of approximate 0.5 notch, from 2006 to 2008 it displays stable 
standards, from 2008 to 2010 we observe an abrupt downward slope which 
translates into a sudden tightening of credit standards, and from 2010 to 2015 we 
observe a rather stable pattern. 
For the RoW subsample in Figure 4.4, we are distinguishing similar 
patterns for only of the two out of the three plots, i.e. for Fitch and S&P. Moody’s 
displays a rather stable pattern throughout the whole period, with minor 
discrepancies of no more than 0.5 notch in total. On the other hand, Fitch displays 
a downward pattern from 2000 to 2005, from 2005 to 2008 a slightly upward 
pattern and from 2008 to 2014 a slightly downward pattern. Lastly, S&P displays 
a downward trend of more than 1.0 notch from 2000 to 2004, from 2004 to 2007 
it displays upward slope or loosening of standards of approximately 0.5 notch, and 
from 2007 to 2015 it displays a rather stable pattern. 
Figure 4.4  
Plot of year indicator estimates for the RoW sample, 2000 to 2015, for each CRA 
 
 
4.5.3. Structural Break Tests 
All figures of the year indicator estimates, despite their apparent 
differences, they all share major similarities. We observe a movement toward 
more stringent standards from 2002 to 2005, then the loosening of standards until 
2008, and finally the abrupt tightening of standards from 2009. This is similar to 
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what we shown in Figure 3.1, where for the mean values of bank credit ratings 
from 2000 to 2015 of each of the three principal CRAs we observed a U-curve 
shape from 2000 to 2007, and then a worsening of bank credit ratings during the 
period 2008-9 and then further decline during the period 2010-12. So, all figures 
imply the existence of at least three structural breaks in the year indicators. To 
test for such breaks in the movements observed in all figures we proceed with 
structural break tests to examine a possible change in the level and slope of the 
year indicators.  
4.5.3.1. Structural Break Tests for the full world sample 
 In order to verify this overall pattern of the three structural breaks that we 
distinguish, we proceed with structural break tests for both the level and slope of 
the year indicators as in Alp (2013). The ordered logit model of equations (1) to 
(2) is modified so that year indicators are removed from the vector of the 
explanatory variables 𝛸𝑖𝑡 and three dummy variables D1, D2, and D3, are added, 
to test for the three structural breaks that create four time periods. In this way 
equation (2) becomes: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏1𝐷1 + 𝑏2𝐷2 + 𝑏3𝐷3 + 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  (3) 
Dummy variable D1 takes the value 1 for the years 2002 to 2005, dummy 
variable D2 takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2008, and dummy variable D3 
takes the value 1 for the years 2009 to 2015, while coefficients b1, b2 and b3 
correspond to the three dummy variables that measure the intercepts of the 
different time periods. 
In Table 4.9 (a) the values of the three coefficients of equation (3) are 
reported for the same models as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, i.e. for the world 
sample of bank ratings by each of the three principal CRAs. Next to each 
coefficient, the coefficient estimate in units of rating step length as previously is 
also reported, while in the last column the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is reported. The results of the 
Wald test reject the null of zero coefficients for all three models of the principal 
CRAs, which means that the intercepts for each time period is different, likewise 
for all three models of the principal CRAs. 
In the same fashion, in order to test the slopes of the year indicators for all 





𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏02𝑡𝐷0 + 𝑏11𝐷1 + 𝑏12𝑡𝐷1 + 𝑏21𝐷2 + 
𝑏22𝑡𝐷2 + 𝑏31𝐷3 + 𝑏32𝑡𝐷3 + 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (4) 
We add dummy D0 which takes the value 1 for years until 2001 and a quarterly 
trend variable t, so that coefficient estimates b02, b12, b22 and b32 measure the rate 
that rating standards change or the slope of the year indicators of the four time 
periods. 
In Table 4.9 (b) the values of the four coefficients of equation (4) are 
reported for the same models as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, i.e. for the world 
sample of bank ratings by each of the three principal CRAs, while in the last 
column the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all coefficients are 
Table 4.9: Estimation results for Structural Breaks for the World sample 
a. World sample: Wald test for intercepts 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. In each 
row we estimate the same model as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, equivalently, replacing year 
indicators with the three dummy variables D1, D2, and D3 to test for the three structural breaks defined 
above. All coefficients b1, b2 and b3 are found to be significant at 1%, while next to each coefficient 
we report next to each coefficient the coefficient estimates in units of rating step length as defined 
above. In the last column we report the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all 



















Fitch -0.388 -0.365 -0.486 -0.458 -0.662 -0.623 0.000 
Moody’
s 
-0.354 -0.419 -0.072 -0.085 -0.733 -0.868 0.000 
S&P -0.633 -0.696 -0.290 -0.319 -0.697 -0.766 0.000 
        
b. World sample: Wald test for slopes 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. In each 
row we estimate the same model as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, equivalently, replacing year 
indicators with the four dummy variables  D0, D1, D2, and D3 to test for the slope of the year indicators 
of the four time periods. Not all coefficients b02, b12, b22 and b32 are found to be significant at 10%, 5% 
or 1%. In the last column we report the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all 











Fitch -0.022 -0.022 -0.011 -0.003 0.030 
Moody’s -0.062 -0.013 0.054 -0.036 0.000 
S&P -0.046 -0.001 0.013 -0.014 0.002 
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equal is reported. The results of the Wald test reject the null of equal coefficients 
for all three models of the principal CRAs, but for Fitch only at the 3% level of 
significance. 
In order to interpret the structural break results for the world sample, we 
need to examine them alongside with Figure 4.1. Even though we have 
distinguished three structural breaks in all figures, not all three CRAs follow the 
same pattern in Figure 4.1.  
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s seems to be more apparent for the 
loosening of rating standards in 2006-8, where Fitch is not. Intercept coefficients 
of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are significantly lower than the previous 
period’s coefficients, but they are also lower than the following period’s 
coefficients. Their slope coefficients during 2006-8 are positive which confirms a 
clear loosening of rating standards. This is not the case for Fitch, for which the 
intercept coefficient during 2006-8 is higher than the previous period while the 
slope coefficient remains negative. The last period of 2009-15 where rating 
standards seem to tighten, again bears differences among the three CRAs as in 
Figure 4.1. There seems to be a different degree of tightening of the rating 
standards with Moody’s being more rigorous. The intercept coefficients for the 
period of 2009-15 of all three CRAs increase substantially, but the increase 
relative to the intercept coefficient of the previous period is greater for Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s. The slope coefficients for Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
turn negative from positive in the previous period of 2006-8, while for Fitch the 
slope coefficient sign remains negative but decreases. 
Overall from the full world sample structural break results, for Fitch we can 
say that according to the structural break tests there seems to be neither a 
loosening of bank rating standards before the global financial crisis nor a 
hardening of standards as an aftermath of the crisis. What can be inferred for Fitch 
by the full world sample is that there has been a constant hardening of bank rating 
standards, or a conservatism, through the whole period of our study, which was 
intensified in the last period of 2009-15. On the other hand, Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s loosened their bank rating standards just until the global financial crisis 
and then hardened their rating standards, with Moody’s being more rigorous. 
Moody’s hardening of rating standards in 2009-15 is approximately 0.80 notch 




4.5.3.2. Structural Break Tests per world region 
Likewise, we proceed with structural break test for each of the three 
subsamples and the results are reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. For the 
European subsample we again need to combine the results of Table 4.10 
alongside with Figure 4.2. Same as above, we observe again not all three CRAs 
follow the same pattern that we have distinguished with the three structural 
breaks. For Fitch, both intercept and slope coefficients do not indicate the 
loosening of rating standards in 2006-8, whereas for Moody’s and Standard & 
Table 4.10: 
Estimation results for Structural Breaks for the European Subsample 
a. European subsample: Wald test for intercepts 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the European subsample of commercial banks. In 
each row we estimate the same model as in Table 4.2, replacing year indicators with the three 
dummy variables D1, D2, and D3 to test for the three structural breaks defined above. All coefficients 
b1, b2 and b3 by Fitch and Standard & Poor’s are found to be significant at 1%, while next to each 
coefficient we report next to each coefficient the coefficient estimates in units of rating step length 
as defined above. In the last column we report the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis 



















Fitch -0.574 -0.534 -0.625 -0.582 -0.976 -0.908 0.000 
Mood
y’s 
-0.630 -0.721 -0.258 -0.295 -1.346 -1.539 0.000 
S&P -0.993 -0.939 -0.765 -0.722 -1.316 -1.249 0.000 
        
b. World sample: Wald test for slopes 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the full world sample of commercial banks. In each 
row we estimate the same model as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, equivalently, replacing year 
indicators with the four dummy variables  D0, D1, D2, and D3 to test for the slope of the year indicators 
of the four time periods. For the model of Fitch coefficients b12 and b22 are found to be significant (at 
1%), for the model of Moody’s coefficients b02, b22 and b32 are found to be significant (at 1%), and 
for the model of Standard & Poor’s all coefficients b02, b12, b22 and b32 are found to be significant ( 
b12 at 10% and the rest at 1%). In the last column we report the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the 











Fitch -0.008 -0.041 -0.029 0.001 0.014 
Moody’s -0.229 -0.004 0.065 -0.065 0.000 
S&P -0.127 -0.021 0.029 -0.023 0.000 
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Poor’s their intercept and slope coefficients indicate the loosing and then the 
hardening of rating standards. Also, similarly as in the world sample, Moody’s is 
more rigorous in the hardening, but Standard & Poor’s is also rigorous. Moody’s 
hardening of rating standards in 2009-15 is 1.24 notch versus 2006-8, whereas 
Standard & Poor’s is 0.53 notch. 
 
For the US & Canada subsample we once again combine the results of 
Table 4.11 alongside with Figure 4.3. Same as in the European subsample, Fitch’s 
both intercept and slope coefficients do not indicate the loosening of rating 
Table 4.11 
Estimation results for Structural Breaks for the US & Canada subsample 
a.  US & Canada subsample: Wald test for intercepts 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the US & Canada subsample of commercial banks. 
In each row we estimate the same model as in Table 4.2, replacing year indicators with the three 
dummy variables D1, D2, and D3 to test for the three structural breaks defined above. All coefficients 
b1, b2 and b3 are found to be significant at 1%, while next to each coefficient we report next to each 
coefficient the coefficient estimates in units of rating step length as defined above. In the last column 



















Fitch -0.404 -0.510 -0.648 -0.817 -1.703 -2.148 0.000 
Moody’
s 
-0.549 -0.778 -0.517 -0.733 -1.927 -2.730 0.000 
S&P -0.792 -1.038 -0.573 -0.751 -1.629 -2.136 0.000 
        
b. US & Canada subsample: Wald test for slopes 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the US & Canada subsample of commercial banks. 
In each row we estimate the same model as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, equivalently, replacing 
year indicators with the four dummy variables  D0, D1, D2, and D3 to test for the slope of the year 
indicators of the four time periods. For the model of Fitch coefficients b12 and b23 are found to be 
significant (at 1% and 5% respectively), for the model of Moody’s coefficients  b12 and b23 are found 
to be significant (both at 1%), and for the model of Standard & Poor’s only coefficient b02 is found to 
be significant (at 5%). In the last column we report the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis 











Fitch -0.006 -0.018 -0.017 -0.038 0.372 
Moody’s -0.034 -0.032  0.016 -0.042 0.142 
S&P -0.054 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 0.254 
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standards in 2006-8, but they indicate a hardening of rating standards in 2009-15. 
Again, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s intercept and slope coefficients indicate 
the loosening of rating standards in 2006-8 and then the hardening of rating 
standards in 2009-15. Standard & Poor’s loosening of rating standards in 2006-8 
is less pronounced, whereas for both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s the 
hardening in 2009-15 is more severe. Moody’s hardening of rating standards in 
2009-15 is 2 notches versus 2006-8, whereas Standard & Poor’s is 1.39 notch. 
Lastly, for the RoW subsample we observe the results of Table 4.12 
alongside with Figure 4.4. Significance levels are very low for many of the 
coefficients, while the model of S&P does not converge. For Fitch, similarly as 
above, both intercept and slope coefficients do not indicate the loosening of rating 
standards in 2006-8, but what distinguishes to the other world regions is the abrupt 
hardening of rating standards in 2002-5 by almost one notch. For Moody’s the 
results are ambiguous since on the one hand we have an inversion of the sign of 
the slope coefficients for the periods 2002-5 and 2006-8 (from negative to 
positive), but on the other hand Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all intercept 




4.6. Robustness Tests 
In this section we proceed with a variety of alternative specifications of the above 
models to check for the robustness of our results. Blume, Lime, and MacKinlay 
(1998) indicate two main criticisms that can challenge the validity of their results: 
first the assumption that the slope coefficients of their model are constant over 
time and second the likelihood of omitting important explanatory variables. The 
first criticism is also noted by Alp (2013) as an underlying assumption for the year 
indicator approach. I.e. if slope coefficients change over time then year indicators 
Table 4.12 
Estimation results for Structural Breaks for the RoW subsample 
a. RoW subsample: Wald test for intercepts 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the RoW subsample of commercial banks. In each 
row we estimate the same model as in Table 4.2, replacing year indicators with the three dummy 
variables D1, D2, and D3 to test for the three structural breaks defined above. All coefficients b1, b2 
and b3 by Fitch are only found to be significant (at 1%), while next to each coefficient we report next 
to each coefficient the coefficient estimates in units of rating step length as defined above. In the last 




















Fitch -1.095 -0.950 -1.371 -1.189 -1.467 -1.270 0.000 
Moody’
s 
-0.188 -0.146 -0.069 -0.054 -0.089 -0.069 0.821 
S&P -1.278 -1.025 -0.740 -0.593 -0.880 -0.705 0.000 
        
b. RoW subsample: Wald test for slopes 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model for the RoW subsample of commercial banks. In each 
row we estimate the same model as in Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c, equivalently, replacing year 
indicators with the four dummy variables  D0, D1, D2, and D3 to test for the slope of the year indicators 
of the four time periods.  For the model of Fitch coefficients b10 , b11 and b13 are found to be significant 
(all at 1%), and for the model of Moody’s coefficients b12 and b13 are found to be significant (at 5% 
and 1% respectively). The model of S&P does not converge. In the last column we report the p-value 











Fitch -0.165 -0.053  0.018 -0.024 0.000 
Moody’s -0.034 -0.027 0.048 -0.021 0.018 
S&P n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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are misleading as a measure of change in rating standards. The second criticism 
above is also addressed by Alp (2013), as in most of the related literature (Baghai, 
Servaes, and Tamayo, 2014, Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor, 2018). 
In the following two subsections we first proceed with robustness tests for 
alternative or additional variables and then we examine for the robustness of our 
year indicator approach. For the sake of brevity, given the extent of all the tests 
below findings are not presented.  
 
4.6.1. Robustness to Additional Explanatory Variables 
Omitting important explanatory variables could challenge the validity of our 
results, since an omitted variable or variables could be behind the explanatory 
power of the year effects, i.e. year effects may be capturing the time trend of an 
omitted variable or variables. Hence, we proceed by using a number of alternative 
or additional explanatory financial variables and specifications. However, it should 
be noted that for some of the alternative explanatory variables used in the 
robustness tests below there is limited number of observations, this is due to the 
fact that for most banks there is limited financial data before 2005 or 2000. 
Accordingly, we proceed with alternative specifications using appropriate 
different explanatory financial variables for the key financial characteristics that 
we defined in subsection 4.3.3.1. First, for profitability, as an alternative to ROAA 
we use:  a. Return on Average Equity (ROAE), b. Net Interest Margin and c. Net 
Interest Revenue divided by Average Assets. Second, for leverage, as an 
alternative to Total Assets divided by Equity we use: a. Tier 1 Ratio16, b. Total 
Capital Ratio17 and c. Equity divided by Net Loans. Third for asset structure and 
funding structure, as alternative to Net Loans divided by Total Assets, Net profits 
on trading and derivatives divided by Total Assets, and Short-term Funding 
divided by Total Assets, we use: a. Total Loans divided by Customer Deposits, b. 
Interbank Assets divided by Interbank Liabilities and c. Customer Deposits divided 
by Total Funding excluding Derivatives. All the above alternative variables give 
similar results, i.e. the figures of the year indicator estimates change very slightly. 
Furthermore, we proceed with the use of additional explanatory financial 
variables. Initially we use Growth of Total Assets and Growth of Gross Loans, but 
both bear no significance for all three CRAs. Next we use a number of different 
 
16 Tier 1 capital divided by total risk weighted assets.  
17 Total capital divided by total risk weighted assets. 
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variables that cover asset quality or risk factor, which was introduced in the 
revised standalone methodologies of both Fitch and Moody’s after 2011. The 
variables we use are: a. Loan Loss Reserves divided by Impaired Loans, b. 
Impaired Loans (NPLs) divided by Gross Loans, c. Impaired Loans divided by 
Equity, and d. Loan Loss Reserves divided by Gross Loans. Even though some 
of the above are significant in the re-specified regressions, again the figures of the 
year indicator estimates change very slightly. 
Finally bank size, which as explained previously is an important factor for bank 
ratings because it is related to the likelihood of external support from authorities, 
is difficult to proxy in order to check for its robustness. Salvador, Fernández de 
Guevara and Pastor (2018) use government support indicator for a robustness 
check for bank size. This indicator is directly provided by Fitch for the period of 
the authors’ analysis, and for Moody’s the indicator is constructed as the 
difference between the issuer rating and the Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). 
For Standard & Poor’s the authors cannot construct this indicator, so they do not 
perform a robustness check. In our case it is not possible to do the same as in 
Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor (2018), since our sample starts 
many years before the revised standalone indicators of Fitch and Moody’s were 
introduced, while we would not be able to check for Standard & Poor’s. 
Alternatively, we proceed with a robustness check for bank size, by calculating 
bank size divided by GDP of the country the bank is based or mainly operates. 
Again, all the regressions give similar results, i.e. the figures of the year indicator 
estimates barely change. 
 
4.6.2. Robustness to Year Indicator Approach 
As noted above, constant slope coefficients over time is the underlying 
assumption behind the year indicator approach. If slope coefficients are not 
constant and change over time, then the calculated year indicators are misleading, 
and thus the conclusions for our structural shifts for the rating standards are 
unreliable 
In order to test for constant slope coefficients, we include the square and 
cube terms of all financial explanatory variables in order to allow for nonlinearities. 
The increase in all models’ explanatory power compared to the base models is 
minor, and the figures of the year indicator estimates do really alter. For the 
increase in the explanatory power, it is indicative to say that the adjusted R2 of the 
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Fitch base model of the world sample increase only by 0.014 when the square 
and cube terms of all financial explanatory variables are added. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This essay analyses the time-series variation in bank credit rating 
standards 2000 to 2015 by the three principal CRAs. We investigate whether the 
criticism of relaxed and subsequent tightened credit rating standards during the 
period of our analysis is empirically supported for banks. Overall we distinguish 
three structural breaks in the bank credit rating standards dividing the time -span 
of our analysis to the following periods compared to the initial period before the 
2001-2 high profile corporate collapses, as follows, a) the period after the 2001-2 
high profile corporate collapses when credit rating standards tightened, b) the 
period before the global financial crisis started when bank credit rating standards 
loosened, and c) the period after the global financial crisis when bank credit rating 
standards tightened. 
Each of the three principal CRAs displays a different evolution of ratings 
in each of the three sub-periods. Fitch has followed a constant tightening of bank 
rating standards throughout, while this ‘trend’ was intensified after the global 
financial crisis. This pattern for Fitch is more intense in the European and 
US&Canada subsamples, i.e. Fitch followed a continued tightening of bank rating 
standards for European, US and Canadian banks in the period after the global 
financial crisis. E.g. credit ratings by Fitch for European banks tightened by 0.33 
notch after the global financial crisis, by 1.33 notches for US and Canadian banks, 
and by 0.08 notches for RoW banks.  
In comparison Moody’s has started with a tightening of bank rating 
standards in the post Dot-com crash period, followed by a loosening of bank rating 
standards in the pre-global financial crisis period, and a tightening of bank rating 
standards in the post global financial crisis period. The loosening of bank rating 
standards in the pre global financial crisis period is more evident for European 
banks, compared to the US and Canadian banks. E.g. credit ratings by Moody’s 
for European banks loosened by 0.43 notch before the global financial crisis, and 
only by 0.05 notch for US and Canadian banks, and by 0.09 notch for RoW banks. 
The hardening of bank rating standards in the post global financial crisis period is 
more intense for European, US and Canadian banks, while not evident for the 
RoW banks. E.g. credit ratings by Moody’s for European banks tightened by 1.24 
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notches after the global financial crisis, by 2.00 notches for US and Canadian 
banks, and by 0.09 notch for RoW banks. 
Standard & Poor’s, similar to Moody’s, has followed a tightening of bank 
rating standards in the post Dot-com crash period, then a loosening of bank rating 
standards in the pre global financial crisis period, and a loosening of bank rating 
standards in the post global financial crisis period. The loosening of bank rating 
standards in the pre global financial crisis period is almost the same for all 
geographical regions. E.g. credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s for European banks 
loosened by 0.22 notch before the global financial crisis, by 0.29 notch for US and 
Canadian banks, and by 0.43 notch for RoW banks. The hardening of bank rating 
standards in the post global financial crisis period is very intense for the US and 
Canadian banks, while much less intense for European, US and Canadian banks. 
E.g. credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s for European banks tightened by 0.53 
notch after the global financial crisis, by 1.39 notches for US and Canadian banks, 
and by 0.11 notch for RoW banks.  
Overall we can say that for the period of our study, Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s were rather more aligned in their structural shifts of  bank credit rating 
standards, and all three principal CRAs were unanimous in the hardening of bank 
credit rating standards for US and Canadian banks in the post global financial 
crisis period. A possible explanation of our findings is that Fitch, as the last entrant 
to the credit rating industry, seems to have followed a more conservative policy 
before the global financial crisis compared to the other two agencies which 
dominated the market of credit ratings.  In the presence of competition, Fitch gives 
higher credit ratings for US, Canadian and RoW banks. The unanimous hardening 
of bank credit rating standards for US and Canadian banks by all three principal 
CRAs can be attributed to the more severe effects that the collapse of the 
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This essay proposes a model to investigate the existence of stickiness in bank 
ratings by the three principal CRAs for a worldwide sample from 1988 to 2015. 
We consider stickiness as the factor that affects credit quality, and indirectly 
impacts rating accuracy and stability, up to 12 months before a bank’s credit rating 
is either upgraded or downgraded. We find that bank ratings by all three CRAs 
are sticky and that there exists an asymmetry for upgrades and downgrades. The 
average notch effect of upgrade stickiness is close to one for all three CRAs, while 
S&P has the highest average notch effect of downgrade stickiness of 0.17, 
Moody’s has almost zero and Fitch surprisingly has negative downgrade 
stickiness that we name as downgrade conservatism. When examining high 
versus low credit quality bank ratings, we that find Fitch and Moody’s have higher 
upgrade stickiness for their investment-grade subsamples compared to their 
speculative-grade subsamples, whereas the opposite is true for S&P. Moody’s 
and S&P have small downgrade stickiness for their investment-grade 
subsamples, while downgrade conservatism is only found in all three CRAs’ 
speculative-grade subsamples, but also in Fitch’s investment-grade subsample. 
Our findings are concluded with chronological structural breaks in stickiness 
practices by the three principal CRAs as we observe a decrease of stickiness in 
the periods that follow the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses and an increase 







“For weeks, Wall Street wondered whether Moody's Investors Service, Standard 
& Poor's and Fitch's, the three major agencies rating corporate debt, would drop 
Enron's rating below investment grade.” 
---- The New York Times, 2001 
The above extract is indicative of the criticism the three principal Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) received during and after the 2001-2 high profile corporate 
collapses. In the case of Enron, all three principal CRAs downgraded the company 
below the investment grade by the time its acquisition deal failed, and default was 
more than likely. The case of Enron was the reason that corporate financial 
officers and treasury professionals in the US blamed the lack of competition in the 
CRA industry (Association for Financial Professionals, 2002). The criticism for the 
industry, which is dominated by a small number of major agencies was for the lack 
of incentives to timely respond to the needs of credit rating users. The additional 
increases in defaults in the 2001–2002 period, gave rise to significant criticism to 
the three principal CRAs’ slow reaction and as a result timeliness of ratings came 
under closer scrutiny and criticism.  
 But this was not the only instance that the three principal CRAs were 
criticized for their inertia. The rather sudden meltdown in Asian countries and 
corporations that took place a few years before in 1997-8, had also drawn much 
attention by the media and policymakers. Moreover, the Asian crisis of 1997-8 
had been followed by Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999, and again much attention 
was drawn by the media and policymakers mainly on sovereign credit ratings. For 
the Asian crisis, CRAs have been criticized for failing to predict the coming crisis, 
and for exacerbating the crisis when they excessively downgraded the countries 
in the midst of the financial turmoil. Interestingly enough, the International 
Monetary Fund in 1998 highlighted that no sovereign credit rating was 
downgraded throughout 1996 and the first half of 1997 for the East Asian 
countries, with the exception of Thailand by Moodys in April 1997. During the 
crisis, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand were downgraded to below investment-
grade. 
 In the 2007-2008 financial crisis the role of the three principal CRAs once 
again came under increased scrutiny. Similar to previous instances, but probably 
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this time for different reasons, many banks that failed during the crisis enjoyed 
investment grade ratings just before defaulting. The case of Lehman Brothers, 
reminds the case of Enron, as Lehman Brothers, an investment bank with a 158-
year history, on Monday, September 15th, 2008 filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
while Lehman Brothers’ bonds were rated “A”, an investment grade. Similar 
situations existed for ratings of bank products and as a result the overall 
impression has been that the entire rating system was flawed. Posch (2011) 
claims that is the credit crisis of 2007–2009 showed the dark side of stability. 
 However, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) has 
highlighted the fact that credit ratings are not estimates of short-term default risk 
but should rather be characterized as looking through the over the cycle estimates 
of default risk. For example, Moody's has historically intended to preserve a rating 
system characterized by stable ratings, with a time horizon extending to several 
years and an intention to "rate through the cycle” (Mahoney, 2002). The result of 
Moody’s dialogue with market participants after the 2001-2 corporate events 
supported their "rating through the cycle” philosophy (Cantor and Mann, 2003). In 
this manner, a partial explanation for the investment grade ratingsEnron enjoyed 
when it collapsed could be the well observed phenomenon in literature (Carey and 
Hrycay, 2001; Löffler, 2004; Altman and Rijken, 2004) of through-the-cycle 
ratings. According to Altman and Rijken (2004), this through-the-cycle 
methodology that rating agencies use is a well-accepted explanation for the 
perception of some investors that rating agencies are slow in adjusting their 
ratings. In this way ratings exhibit a much larger stability rather than would current-
condition ratings because ratings are intended to be a measure of default risk over 
long investment horizons . According to Cantor and Mann (2003), Moody’s 
corporate bond ratings’ two key characteristics are accuracy and stability, and the 
performance of Moody’s ratings should be measured by those two characteristics. 
Accuracy is about the correlation between ratings and defaults and stability is 
about the frequency and magnitude of ratings changes.  
 
1.2. Motivation 
Accuracy and stability in corporate credit ratings have been assessed, even 
though limited, especially after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses (e.g. 
Cantor and Mann, 2003; Löffler, 2004; Altman and Rijken, 2004). However, in the 
aftermath of the 2007-8 global financial crisis, no similar assessment can be found 
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in the literature for accuracy and stability in corporate credit ratings. After the 
2007-8 global financial crisis, literature on credit ratings focused in aspects such 
as rating quality over the business cycle and incentive problems between rating 
agencies and rating users (e.g. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009; Bolton, 
Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012; Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011). But since credit rating 
agencies faced increased pressure from regulatory authorities and criticism from 
investors and academics, it would be interesting to examine how credit rating 
agencies rated before the 2007-8 global financial crisis and also how they 
responded to that pressure and criticism in the aftermath of the crisis, with respect 
to accuracy and stability. 
Moreover, in the scant literature for bank ratings, research focuses mainly on 
bank rating quality and its variation within business cycles (e.g. Hau, Langfield 
and Marques-Ibanez, 2012). So, there exists no literature that specifically 
examines accuracy and stability in bank ratings, even before the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis. But, since literature in accuracy and stability of corporate credit 
ratings have given us important insights, it is interesting enough to examine 
accuracy and stability in bank ratings, not only before and after the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis, but even before that periods. Overall, our findings from our 
previous essay on structural shifts in bank credit ratings give us motivation, 
similarly to Cheng and Neamtiu (2009), to explore the existence of accuracy and 
stability in bank credit ratings and how those two properties have been affected 
by the heavy criticism towards the three principal CRAs on all different occasions 
during the past two decades. 
 
1.3. Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this essay is to fill the two-fold gap in literature for the existence 
of accuracy and stability in bank ratings and for the changes, if any, of those 
properties in bank ratings, not only before and after the 2001-2 high profile 
corporate collapses, but also for the 2007-8 global financial crisis. Those two 
properties of credit ratings are important because they affect rating agencies’ 
decisions for all credit ratings, i.e. these two properties are a part of rating 
standards (Cantor and Mann, 2003). Also, the response of rating agencies to 
financial historical events combined with the pressure and criticism that rating 
agencies receive affect rating standards and hence accuracy and stability (Cantor 
and Mann, 2006), 
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In order to explore the mechanism that affects the two conflicting goals of 
accuracy and stability in bank ratings, we should take into account that higher 
rating stability compared to accuracy, means that credit quality changes but the 
ratings do not. Credit ratings are changed only when agencies are confident that 
observed changes in an entity’s risk profile are likely to be permanent (Altman and 
Rijken, 2004). So, timeliness in credit ratings affects accuracy and it is in fact the 
most criticized aspect of ratings (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009). But, if ratings lack 
of timeliness then there should be a factor that can be quantified and affects credit 
quality. So, we name this factor that simultaneously and indirectly affects rating 
accuracy and stability as rating stickiness, since if either credit quality changes 
but the ratings do not or credit ratings are characterized by slow respondence then 
we consider that ratings are sticky. 
This essay aims to shed light on the timeliness and accuracy of bank credit 
ratings, by examining stickiness. In more detail we will attempt to answer the 
following questions: 
1) Is there stickiness in bank credit ratings and does it differ across all three 
principal CRAs? 
2) If stickiness exists in bank ratings, is it symmetric or asymmetric for 
upgrades and downgrades? 
3) If stickiness exists in bank ratings, is it the same or different in higher 
versus lower credit quality bank ratings? 
4) If stickiness exists in bank ratings, is it constant over time across all three 
principal CRAs? 
5) How does the criticism after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses 
and in the aftermath of the 2007-8 global financial crisis affected 




2. Literature Review 
Before investigating empirical literature on credit ratings and the strand of 
literature that focuses on their accuracy and stability, we will present a short 
review of the theoretical literature on credit ratings. Theoretical literature for credit 
ratings focuses on the role of CRAs as information intermediaries, and 
consequently it is related to the literature on information intermediaries. In this way 
CRAs are motivated by reputation costs in order to provide accurate information. 
Most of the early theoretical literature (Kuhner, 2001; Boot, Milbourn and 
Schmeits, 2006; Farhi, Lerner and Tirole, 2008) consider non-strategic CRAs, i.e. 
agencies that do not strategically build on their reputation so as to later on inflate 
their ratings to gain more business by their clientele, and eventually more profits. 
Later studies that came during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-8, 
mostly examined the framework of a strategic CRA in a dynamic model. Mathis, 
McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) are two 
of the most cited papers within this framework. Two of the main conclusions of 
Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) is that competition among CRAs reduces 
efficiency because of rating shopping and that ratings can be inflated in good 
times of economic expansion, implying countercyclicality of ratings. Similarly, Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro (2013) use a dynamic model of credit ratings to obtain insights 
on ratings’ quality over the business cycle. The authors find that ratings quality is 
countercyclical, i.e. booms have lower quality ratings than do recessions, due to 
the incentive of CRAs to ”milk” the reputation built during in lean times. Additional 
factors that reduce ratings quality are increased fee-income, high competition for 
analyst in the labour market during booms, and naive investors in the market. In 
a different context, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) model the labour market for 
rating analysts to explore their incentive problem that was spotted before the 
global financial crisis. The authors’ main finding is that ratings accuracy is likely to 
be countercyclical due to the labour market structure. So, for the scope of this 
study, the common finding in most of the theoretical literature on credit ratings for 
the countercyclical character of rating accuracy is quite interesting. 
Empirical literature on credit ratings mainly focuses on informativeness, 
perceived bias, and changes of rating standards over time. A number of studies 
focuses on the last subtopic of changing rating standards in an attempt to explain 
the reported declining credit quality observed since the 1990s. Blume, Lim, and 
Mackinlay (1998) is one of the early studies and one of the most cited in the strand 
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in the literature that investigates the changes in rating standards over time. The 
authors find that the declining credit quality from 1978 to 1995 is not fully explained 
by changes in credit quality, and that it is partly explained by an apparent 
stringency in the rating standards by the CRAs. In this way, the authors attribute 
at least a part of the downward trend in credit ratings in the CRAs’ conservatism. 
Alp (2013) is study very much related in Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) that 
not only also finds stringency in declining credit quality but also quantifies this 
effect. The main findings by Alp (2013) are that from 2002 to 2007 a structural 
shift occurs towards stringency by 1.5 notch drop in rating standards, and that 
from 1985 to 2002 a “divergent pattern” exists between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade rating standards, i.e. investment-grade standards tighten and 
speculative-grade standards loosen. Similar to Alp’s (2013), Baghai, Servaes, and 
Tamayo (2014) find that CRAs have become more stringent or conservative 
during the period 1985 to 2009, with average ratings dropping by 3 notches. 
According to the authors, this finding is not consistent with the observed decrease 
in the default rates during this period. Contrary to all the above findings for 
stringency or conservatism in rating standards there is a study by Jorion, Shi, and 
Zhang (2009). The authors, similar to Alp (2013), find that the downward trend in 
rating standards do not apply to speculative-grade issuers, but contrary to all the 
above studies for the changes in rating standards, the apparent tightening of rating 
standards can be mainly attributed to the temporal decline in accounting quality. 
However, the above strand of studies that relies either on the ordered 
probit or logit models mainly suffers from the criticism of ignoring the time-varying 
nature of rating standards and the effect of omitted variables (Blume et al., 1998; 
Shumway, 2001; Alp, 2013). Shumway (2001) also criticizes the static model for 
its timeliness bias, as there is no dynamics of the rating mechanism to explain 
rating migrations. Most of the models in the above strand of studies use rolling 
average covariates that lack of the necessary dynamics which are essential to 
reflect the true level corresponding the explanation of the migration mechanism. 
Empirical literature on bank credit ratings is sparse (Salvador, Pastor and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2014), as few studies for credit ratings focus exclusively 
on bank ratings. One of the early studies in this strand of the literature is by Cantor 
and Packer (1995), who find evidence that CRAs disagree more about bank 
ratings that non-financial firm ratings. Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez (2012) 
is one of the most comprehensive studies of the information content of bank credit 
ratings. The authors use an international sample of approximately 39,000 
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quarterly bank ratings over the period 1990–2011 from the three principal CRAs 
and find that bank rating quality is countercyclical, i.e. information content of credit 
ratings is higher during banking crises, and that bank ratings in the upper 
investment grade range do not correspond to their expected default probabilities, 
i.e. are less risky. Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012) find that S&P have 
stricter bank rating standards compared to Moody’s, while Moody’s standards are 
more sensitive to the economic climate. Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de 
Guevara (2014) examine the Spanish banking sector for ratings during 2000-2009 
and find that ratings are procyclical as the worsening of bank credit ratings that 
followed the global financial crisis of 2007-8 is partly attributed to the hardening of 
rating standards. The findings of the three last studies on bank ratings, i.e. for the 
countercyclical rating quality, the sensitivity of standards to the economic climate 
and the procyclical bank ratings, are also interesting for the scope of this study. 
However, there is no empirical literature for the timeliness and accuracy of bank 
credit ratings. 
Studies, such as that by Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998), Jorion, Shi, 
and Zhang (2009) and Alp (2013), even though they attribute the observed rating 
deterioration to time-varying rating standards, cannot put a definitive end to the 
debate. The stream of literature on the stability of credit ratings or timeliness of 
rating policies, and the stability of credit ratings through business cycles is a well 
observed phenomenon (Carey and Hrycay, 2001; Löffler, 2004; Altman and 
Rijken, 2004). This phenomenon is also called in literature as through-the-cycle 
ratings and it the situation that rating updates fall behind variation of credit quality, 
and consequently affect the accuracy of ratings. Carey and Hrycay (2001) study 
empirically internal bank ratings and compare them to agency ratings. The authors 
conclude that agency ratings demonstrate less cyclical variation and are more 
stable than the current condition, point-in-time ratings, which are used by most 
bank’s internal rating system. Löffler (2004) using a structural model of default find 
that observed empirical irregularities of credit ratings can be the result of a 
separation of permanent and cyclical components of default risk, a method 
required according to the author for the through-the-cycle in ratings employed by 
most of the CRAs. Furthermore, the author finds that ratings through-the-cycle are 
highly stable, but their default prediction is low. Altman and Rijken’s study  (2004) 
is the first in a number of studies that goes beyond the through-the-cycle 
explanation for rating stability, i.e. ratings being changed only when the CRAs 
being confident that the observed changes in the entity’s risk profile have a 
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permanent character. According to the authors, long investment horizons explains 
only part of the relative stability of agency ratings. The other part of the through-
the-cycle in the CRAs’ methodology is a certain threshold level that rating 
migrations are triggered when the actual through-the-cycle credit quality exceeds 
by 1.25 notches the average credit quality for a given rating class. Posch (2011) 
further extends the modelling of threshold levels on rating migrations by extending 
the model with frictions to allow for non-constant thresholds. The default 
probability must change by at least two notches before a CRA reacts, while the 
timeliness changes across the rating spectrum and over the years. Also, it is 
interesting that during periods with high defaults and for low credit quality of rated 
entities, CRAs tend to rate more timely. In the same context, stickiness has been 
also been observed in sovereign ratings. Mora (2006) investigates the behavior 
of sovereign credit ratings in the context of the East Asian crisis to question the 
widely held view that ratings were procyclical and concludes that sovereign ratings 
were sticky. However, Auh (2015) provides evidence that credit ratings are 
procyclical, by examining a sample of U.S. corporate bond ratings from 2002 to 
2011. 
Finally, Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) examine the quality of ratings with 
respect to timeliness, accuracy and stability before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX). This act in the US Senate came as a result for the high-profile 
bankruptcies of 2001-2 and is considered by the authors to have increased the 
regulatory pressure and criticism to CRAs. The authors define two periods, the 
period before SOX (1 January 1996 - 25 July 2002) as the pre-criticism period and 
the period after SOX (25 July 2002 - 31 Dec 2005) as the criticism period, while 
using credit ratings by the three principal CRAs. They find that the average ratings 
of defaulted companies one-year period leading to default are lower in the criticism 
period compared to pre-criticism period. So, they conclude that CRAs improved 
both timeliness and accuracy of their ratings after SOX, while also reducing rating 
volatility. According to the authors this combination is achieved by the CRAs 
through the improvement of their credit analysis and not by sacrificing one 
characteristic for the other as CRAs have suggested through the potential trade-





3. Stability and Accuracy in Bank Rating 
Methodologies 
It is a general observation, that CRAs are obliged to balance two conflicting 
goals: rating stability and rating accuracy (Posch, 2011). For this reason, CRAs 
have spent significant resources to investigate and to demonstrate to market 
participants, i.e. investors, issuers and regulators, that a balance among the two 
rating characteristics is necessary. 
In early 2002, Moody’s initiated a dialogue with all market participants for 
issues of credit quality in the aftermath of recent events that included the 
September 9th 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the global economic contraction, 
and the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses (Mahoney, 2002a). Moody’s 
expected feedback from market participants regarding potential changes to their 
rating processes, due to the increase in the frequency or extent of recent rating 
adjustments which had resulted from the volatile credit environment caused by 
the recent events. This dialogue continued for some months (Mahoney, 2002b; 
Fons, Cantor and Mahoney, 2002), and Moody’s concluded that market 
participants generally desire rating stability and no changes such as increasing 
the frequency of rating changes without reviews and streamlining or eliminating 
rating outlooks were necessary (Fons, Cantor and Mahoney, 2002). Another 
conclusion of this dialogue was that market participants supported greater 
disclosure by Moody’s of how they arrived at their ratings and why they change 
them, so Moody’s developed some metrics that can be used to measure the rating 
system performance. 
Ratings accuracy is described by Moody’s as the correlation between 
ratings and the risk of default, while stability is described as the frequency and 
magnitude of rating changes, but also the likelihood that a rating will prove to be 
enduring (Cantor and Mann, 2006). Cantor and Mann (2006) focus on two metrics 
respectively for accuracy and stability, the one-year-horizon accuracy ratio18 and 
the share of ratings that remain unchanged over the course of a year, but for the 
EDF-implied ratings19. According to Moody’s (Cantor and Mann, 2006), their rating 
 
18 The accuracy ratio (AR) is defined in Cantor and Mann (2003) and is measure of relative 
accuracy of Moody’s ratings that compress the information in the cumulative accuracy 
profile (or power curve) into a single number. 
19 EDF-implied ratings are "credit ratings" mapped from EDFs (Expected Default 




system embodies a tradeoff between accuracy and stability that apparently meets 
the needs of ratings users as at a one-year horizon, their ratings are slightly less 
accurate, but they are more accurate at longer horizons. 
Figure 2.1 
The Accuracy/Stability Frontier 
 
Source: Cantor and Mann (2006) 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the tradeoff between accuracy and stability at a one-year 
horizon again according to Cantor and Mann (2006). A move from point X to point 
Z, or from X to Z is thought as an improvement in the methodology that increase 
the accuracy or stability, but a movement from Y to Z or the opposite is thought 
as a movement in the Accuracy/Stability Frontier. In such a case a movement from 
Y to Z is thought as improving accuracy at the expense of stability while a 
movement from Z to Y is thought as improving stability at the expense of accuracy. 
Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) use a similar figure to not only show the “parallel” 
movement as explained in the above figure, but also the prospect of expanding 
the Accuracy/Stability Frontier by improving credit analysis. However, it is 
important to note that no matter how much the frontier is pushed out, there will 
always be a trade-off decision between accuracy and stability. 
 
default over a specified period of time. EDF-implied ratings are called Market Implied 
Ratings (MIR) since 2010.  
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 In its latest effective rating definitions (Moody’s, 2019), we observe an 
altered definition of stability by the rating agency. Moody’s states that their rating 
methodologies contain key rating assumptions (KRAs) that are fixed inputs and 
involve assumptions such as that there is very strong interdependence. KRAs are 
expected to a degree of stability in credit ratings as the change in in response to 
long-term structural changes, and they are unlikely to change as a result of a 
short-run change in economic or financial market conditions. So, given that in 
Moody’s latest effective rating definitions there are no references for the trade-off 
between stability and accuracy as we observed existed after the 2001-2 high 
profile corporate collapses and before the global financial crisis of 2007-8, we 
conclude that there has been a change in the agency’s assessment for stability 
and accuracy. 
The other major market player in the ratings market, i.e. Standard and 
Poor’s, has mainly through their older published rating criteria repeatedly 
expressed the attribute of rating stability. Standard and Poor’s considered as ideal 
to rate ‘through the cycle’ as they consider that there is no point in assigning high 
ratings to a company enjoying peak prosperity if that performance level is 
expected to be only temporary. Similarly, there is no need to lower ratings to reflect 
poor performance if it can be reliably anticipated that better times are just around 
the corner (Standard & Poor’s, 2002). Also, in subsequent published rating 
criteria, Standard & Poor’s (2003) expressed the position that ‘‘the value of its 
products is greatest when its ratings focus on the long term and do not fluctuate 
with near term performance”. In a subsequent published ratings criteria (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2006), Standard and Poor’s again expressed that it is ideal to rate 
“through the cycle”, i.e. holding constant ratings throughout the cycle, or, allowing 
ratings to vary within a narrow band. However, they recognized the fact that rating 
through the cycle requires an ability to predict the cyclical pattern which is difficult 
to do, but also that even in predictable cycles there may be a lasting impact on 
credit quality. Therefore, ratings may be adjusted within the phases of a cycle, 
with the typical relationship of ratings and cycles like that in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 




Source: Standard and Poor’s, Corporate Ratings Criteria 2006. 
On May 3, 2010, Standard and Poor’s published a criteria article named 
“Credit Stability Criteria” (Standard and Poor’s, 2010) to highlight the fact that their 
global rating methodology incorporates credit stability as an important factor in its 
rating opinions. Nevertheless, this criteria article, which is still effective, involves 
an asymmetric definition as it concerns solely the event of credit deterioration due 
to moderate stress conditions20 over a one-year and three-year horizons. For 
example, according to the table in the article, a rating of 'AA' would not be 
assigned to an entity if it has high likelihood to fall below 'A' within one year under 
moderate stress conditions, or below ‘BB’ within three years.  
In its latest effective rating definitions (Standard and Poor’s, 2009; 
Standard and Poor’s, 2011), Standard & Poor’s refers to credit stability as a 
secondary credit factor21 as defined in the above criteria article “Credit Stability 
Criteria”. So, similarly as for Moody’s, given that in Standard and Poor’s latest 
effective rating definitions there are no references for rating through the cycle as 
we observed existed after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses and before 
the global financial crisis of 2007-8, we conclude that there has been a change in 
the agency’s assessment for stability. 
 Given all the aforementioned for how the two major market players in the 
CRA industry has evolved their assessment in their rating methodologies for rating 
stability and accuracy, it is noteworthy to have a foretaste of bank rating data about 
rating stability which is more readily observable. In Figure 2.3 we present the 
 
20 Moderate stress conditions are defined as the U.S. recession of 1982 and the U.K. 
recession in the early 1990s. 




metric employed by Moody’s (Cantor and Mann, 2006) to assess rating stability: 
Rating Action Stability Rate. The Rating Action Stability Rate is the average 
fraction of issuers whose ratings are unchanged over any twelve-month period. 
The data used are in Figure 2.3 are from our world sample of bank ratings by the 
three principal CRAs from 1995 to 2015, which is analysed in the next section. 
Figure 2.3 
Average yearly Rating Action Stability Rate for calendar years from 1995 to 2015, 
for the three principal CRAs 
 
According to Cantor and Mann (2003), in a typical year, less than a quarter of 
issuers rated experience a rating change of any type22, which in other words 
means that the Rating Action Stability Rate is expected to be more than 75%. The 
findings in Figure 2.3 are quite interesting. First, we observe that until year 2000, 
the average yearly Rating Action Stability Rate for bank ratings for Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s is 100% and for Fitch is very close to 100%. For Standard 
and Poor’s the Rating Action Stability Rate is 100% until 2002. From year 2001 
until 2006, we observe a shift towards a rather varying Rating Action Stability Rate 
in the bank ratings of all three principal CRAs. Lastly, from year 2007 for Moody’s 
and from 2011 for Standard and Poor’s, we observe a sharp increase in the 
volatility of the Rating Action Stability Rate of their bank ratings. Overall, we can 
 
22 The authors also mention that less than five-percent of issuers experience large rating 




say that from 1995 to 2015, Fitch is the CRA that experiences the most stable 
Rating Action Stability Rate for its bank ratings, while the opposite for Moody’s. 
Nevertheless, the above findings may or may not entail a change in rating stability 
and accuracy, since there may other factors affecting bank ratings and thus further 






4. Stickiness in bank ratings 
4.1. Introduction 
This essay aims to investigate whether bank ratings are sticky. We use an 
international sample of banks that cover a period of more than 20 years, until 
2015, and assess aspects of the dynamic behaviour of bank ratings by all three 
principal CRAs. Initially we will investigate if bank ratings are sticky, and in case 
that there are signs of stickiness we shall attempt to examine whether stickiness 
is different in the event of a downgrade and an upgrade decision by the three 
CRAs. We shall also examine whether stickiness is asymmetrical for investment 
grade and speculative grade ratings. Furthermore, given the broad time horizon 
of our sample, we are in a position to examine whether stickiness is constant 
during the time horizon that our sample covers, since during this period we have 
had many incidents of failures that were partly attributed to bad practices by 
CRAs. 
 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
In order to investigate whether bank ratings are sticky, we estimate an 
ordered logit model where bank ratings are modelled as a function of a set of 
financial explanatory variables and a dummy variable in order to capture the effect 
of stickiness. The model is: 
     17      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇16, ∞) 
     16      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇15, 𝜇16) 
     15      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇14, 𝜇15) 
       𝑅𝑖𝑡 =    ⋮    (1) 
       3      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇2, 𝜇3) 
       2      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝜇1, 𝜇2) 
       1      if 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ∈ (−∞, 𝜇1) 
 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (2) 
The first part corresponds to the 17 rating categories, as explained in the next 
section, where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the credit rating of bank i at quarter t according to the 
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latent variable 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and the partition points μi that distinguish each rating category. 
The second part, relates the latent variable with the explanatory variables, 𝛽 is the 
vector of slope coefficients and 𝛸𝑖𝑡 is vector of the financial explanatory variables 
of bank i at quarter t, and lastly 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the dummy variable necessary to capture 
the effect of stickiness and γ its coefficient. Variable 𝑆𝑖𝑡 takes the value of 1 if in 
any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, the bank’s i credit rating is 
changed, i.e. upgraded or downgraded. In this way we choose four quarters or 
one year to check for the existence of stickiness in bank ratings. According to the 
CRAs’ rating practices it is ideal to rate “through the cycle” (Standard & Poor’s, 
2006), which is translated that the tradeoff between accuracy and stability that 
apparently meets the needs of ratings users is within a one-year horizon (Cantor 
and Mann, 2006). So, we expect that if there exists stickiness in bank ratings it 
should be sought in the one-year window before a rating change takes place. 
 Conditional on the presence of stickiness, our analysis will be extended as 
dummy variable 𝑆𝑖𝑡 will be replaced by two such variables 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 to 
examine whether stickiness is different in the event of a downgrade and an 
upgrade decision. In this way equation (2) becomes: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  (3) 
𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡  takes the value of 1 if in any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and 
t+4, the bank’s i credit rating is downgraded, and in all other instances, 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡  takes 
the value of 0. The expected sign of coefficient γ of 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡  is positive because if over 
the next 4 quarters a downgrade takes place, the presence of stickiness inflates 
the currently reported rating. E.g. if the current rating of bank i at time t is A-, which 
is translated to 10 according to the rating transformation we define, and in the next 
4 quarters a one notch downgrade to BBB+ takes place, which is translated to 9, 
then the stickiness effect, if there exists one, has a positive effect on the ratings 
at time t, that preserve the rating to this higher level. Conversely, 𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 takes the 
value of 1 if in any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, the bank’s i 
credit rating is downgraded. In all other instances, 𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 takes the value of 0, and 
the expected sign of coefficient δ of 𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡  is negative because if in the next 4 
quarters an upgrade takes place, the presence of stickiness deflates the currently 
reported rating. In this way, we choose two variables to capture the effect of 
stickiness because we expect different signs in case of an upcoming downgrade 




4.3. Sample and variables 
 In order to proceed with our empirical analysis, we use Bankscope 
database as the source for bank ratings and financial variables. Bankscope 
database has information on more than 20,000 banks from all over world, but in 
order to have homogeneity in our sample, we apply three selection criteria in 
Bankscope with respect to size, bank’s specialization and ultimate owner criterion. 
We only consider banks that have book value of assets greater or equal to $5bill. 
in 2006 (i.e. the year before the global financial crisis begun) or in the last year 
that bank’s data are available. The reason we use the size criterion is that on the 
one hand to screen out smaller banks that are rarely rated and on the other hand 
to have a global sample that accounts for most of the global banking system. For 
the specialization criterion we choose only values of Commercial Banks, Savings 
Banks, Cooperative Banks and Bank Holding & Holding Companies (BH&HCs), 
so as to maintain homogeneity in our sample by concentrating broadly on 
commercial banks (i.e. excluding investment banks, custodian banks, etc). Lastly, 
we apply the ultimate owner criterion in order to avoid double-counting ratings of 
banks that are junior within a single ownership structure.  
The credit ratings of banks by each of the three principal CRAs we choose 
to use in our analysis are the long-term issuer ratings which are used in all related 
literature for bank ratings (e.g. Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012; Van 
Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens, 2012; Salvador, Pastor and Fernandez de 
Guevara, 2014). The long-term issuer ratings are the primary issuer ratings of 
each CRA and in particular for Fitch we use their the long-term issuer default rating 
(IDR), for Moody’s we use their long-term Issuer rating (foreign) and for Standards 
and Poor’s we use their foreign currency long-term Issuer Credit Rating (ICR). 
Our full sample of bank ratings by all three CRAs totals approximately 
90,000 quarterly ratings and it is an unbalanced panel that spans from 1988 to 
2015 (we start at 1988 because available financial data start at this year). The full 
sample is analysed in Table 4.1. 




Fitch Moody’s S&P Grand Total 
Europe 13,335 12,940 11,846 38,121 
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US & Canada 6,931 7,238 7,716 21,885 
RoW 9,903 10,974 8,857 29,734 
 30,169 31,152 28,419 89,740 
 
All credit ratings obtained are transformed from their letter form into a 
numerical value that corresponds to an ordinal scale. In all related literature for 
credit ratings we find studies that use ordinal scales from 4 categories to 17 
categories. E.g. Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) use an ordinal scale of 4 
categories, whereas Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens (2012) use an ordinal 
scale of 17 categories. Given the size of each of our three subsamples, i.e. each 
CRAs subsample, we choose to use an ordinal scale of 17 categories, according 
to the Table 4.2. 
 Next we choose to use six financial variables that are mostly found in 
related literature for bank ratings (e.g. Hau, Langfield and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, 
Van Laere, Vantieghem and Baesens, 2012), but also in CRAs’ methodologies 
(Fitch, 2018; Moody’s, 2018). Those financial characteristic variables cover bank 
size, profitability, leverage, asset structure and funding structure. For bank size 
we the natural log of total assets, for profitability we choose Return on Average 
Assets (ROAA), for leverage we choose Total Assets divided by Equity, for asset 
structure is measured by both Net Loans divided by Total Assets, and for funding 
structure we choose Deposit & Short-term Funding divided by Total Assets, and 
also Other Operating Income divided by Average Assets.  
 Lastly, we use as explanatory variable the sovereign credit rating to proxy 
the external support element according to CRAs’ methodologies (Fitch, 2018; 
Moody’s, 2018), something that is also found in related literature (Van Laere, 
Vantieghem and Baesens, 2012; Salvador, Fernández de Guevara and Pastor, 
2018). In this way sovereign credit rating proxies not only the external support as 
considered by the CRAs in the long-term issuer ratings, but also the economic 
environment of the bank. So, we choose the sovereign credit rating by the same 
CRAs and the equivalent time periods (i.e. if we have a bank rating for a bank at 
period t by Fitch, we obtain the bank’s country credit rating by Fitch again for 
period t). 
 Summary statistics for Bank Credit Ratings and the Explanatory Variables 
are presented respectively in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Bank Credit Ratings 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Obs 
World Sample 9.23 3.32 30,169 9.71 3.62 31,152 9.71 3.22 28,419 
Europe 10.08 3.17 13,335 10.35 3.57 12,940 10.63 3.15 11,846 
US & Canada 9.66 3.16 6,931 10.83 2.93 7,238 9.92 2.80 7,716 





Table 4.2: Rating Transformation Table 
 
Fitch Rating Scale Number Moody’s Rating Scale Number S&P Rating Scale Number 
AAA 17 Aaa 17 AAA 17 
AA+ 16 Aa1 16 AA+ 16 
AA 15 Aa2 15 AA 15 
AA- 14 Aa3 14 AA- 14 
A+ 13 A1 13 A+ 13 
A 12 A2 12 A 12 
A- 11 A3 11 A- 11 
BBB+ 10 Baa1 10 BBB+ 10 
BBB 9 Baa2 9 BBB 9 
BBB- 8 Baa3 8 BBB- 8 
BB+ 7 Ba1 7 BB+ 7 
BB 6 Ba2 6 BB 6 
BB- 5 Ba3 5 BB- 5 
B+ 4 B1 4 B+ 4 
B 3 B2 3 B 3 
B- 2 B3 2 B- 2 
CCC+ 1 Caa1 1 CCC+ 1 
CCC 1 Caa2 1 CCC 1 
CCC- 1 Caa3 1 CCC- 1 
CC 1 Ca 1 CC 1 
C 1 C 1 C 1 
RD 1   R 1 
D 1   SD 1 
    D 1 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Financial Explanatory Variables 
  World Sample Europe US & Canada RoW 
  Mean Std 
Dev 




Log of Assets 7.07 0.73 7.08 0.72 7.08 .67 7.05 0.77 
R.O.A.A. .809 2.87 0.52 2.87 0.96 2.28 1.10 3.08 
Total Assets/Equity 18.34 318.13 26.12 337.12 11.95 14.88 11.82 367.2 
Net Loans/Tot. Assets 58.01 17.96 59.02 19.30 61.35 16.95 55.15 16.2 
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets 153.95 786.36 163.61 585.97 173.91 1609.2 132.64 121.0 






4.4. Empirical Results 
 In this Subsection, initially we estimate the ordered logit model of 
equations (1) and (2) for the full world sample of banks, for each CRA, to 
investigate in the first place if bank ratings are sticky. Then we estimate the 
ordered logit model of equations (1) and (3), for each CRA, to investigate whether 
stickiness is different in the event of a downgrade and an upgrade decision. Our 
analysis continues for investment grade and speculative grade bank ratings and 
concludes with different time periods and structural breaks. 
The coefficient estimates for all explanatory variables in all our models are 
informative with respect to their signs, but they are uninformative with respect to 
the magnitude each variable affects bank ratings. So, just by observing the 
coefficient estimates it is difficult to infer economic significance, except for their 
signs. Following Alp (2013), in order to infer economic significance, we calculate 
the average notch effect of all explanatory variables. For the non-dummy 
explanatory variables, we calculate the product of the estimated coefficient and 
each variable’s standard deviation, divided by the average distance between the 
rating categories or cut points, i.e. the average notch length23. The product of the 
coefficient and the standard deviation measures the change in the conditional 
expectation in the latent variable given one standard deviation increase in the 
explanatory variable. Similarly, for the dummy variables we calculate their 
coefficients as multiples of the average distance between the rating categories, or 
as explained previously, the average distance between cut points. The average 
notch effect is displayed next to each variable’s coefficients and z-stat, in columns 
three and four in all the results tables that follows.  
 
4.4.1. Results for Preliminary Analysis 
 The results of our preliminary analysis model of equations (1) and (2) are 
presented in Table 4.5. We observe that the coefficients of almost all financial 
explanatory are uniformly statistically significant and having the same expected 
signs across CRAs. In particular, Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. are highly significant 
 
23 The average rating notch length is calculated as (μ16-μ1)/15, where μ16 is the last cut 
point (i.e. the cut point that distinguishes the 16th and the 17th rating categories), μ1 is the 
first cut point (i.e. the cut point that distinguishes the 1st and the 2nd rating categories) and 
number 15 is the number of the in-between categories. 
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across all three CRAs with positive signs as expected. Total Assets/Equity is 
significant for   
Fitch and S&P, with negative sign as expected, Other operating income/Average 
Assets is significant for Moody’s and S&P, also with negative sign as expected, 
Table 4.5: Preliminary analysis estimation results for full sample 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (2) for the full world sample of 
commercial banks, for each CRA. The dependent variable is equivalently Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
long-term issuer ratings, and the financial explanatory variables together with the Stickiness dummy 
are defined above. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of 
variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively 
correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Fitch 






Log of Assets 1.175*** 13.46 0,78  
R.O.A.A. 0.118*** 3.80 0.23  
Total Assets/Equity -0.0001*** -9.56 -0.02  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets -0.011*** -3.29 -0.18  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets -0.001*** -3.05 -0.15  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets        -0.047 -1.14 -0.09  
Country Rating 0.482*** 19.88 1.88  
Stickiness -0.464*** -8.21  -0.44 
No. of observations  26,587 
Pseudo R2 0.183 
Clusters of Banks 777 
Moody’s 






Log of Assets 0.863*** 8.80 0.67  
R.O.A.A. 0.210*** 4.27 0.50  
Total Assets/Equity        -0.001 -0.53 -0.29  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets         0.005 1.15 0.09  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets        -0.000* -1.58 -0.04  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets -0.134*** -3.55 -0.38  
Country Rating 0.511*** 20.98 2.41  
Stickiness -0.340*** -5.80  -0.40 
No. of observations  22,298 
Pseudo R2 0.163 
Clusters of Banks 746 
Standard and Poor’s 






Log of Assets 0.537*** 5.33 0.40  
R.O.A.A. 0.202*** 3.84 0.45  
Total Assets/Equity -0.000*** -8.64 -0.02  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets        -0.006 -1.43 -0.11  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets        -0.000 -0.38 -0.08  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets -0.124*** -3.33 -0.57  
Country Rating 0.518*** 20.32 2.16  
Stickiness -0.319*** -5.30  -0.35 
No. of observations  26,086 
Pseudo R2 0.154 
Clusters of Banks 669 
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and Deposits&Short-term Funding/Total Assets is significant for Fitch and 
Moody’s, again with negative sign as expected. Net Loans/Total Assets is 
significant only for Fitch with negative sign as expected. 
Country Rating coefficients have, again as expected, a positive sign and 
high significance levels for all three CRAs. Positive sign is expected as higher 
country credit rating is expected to raise a bank’s rating. This reflects the 
importance of the country’s ability and propensity to support a bank in determining 
the bank’s credit rating (Fitch, 2018). Lastly, the Stickiness dummy coefficients 
strikingly present uniformly a negative sign and with high significance levels for all 
three CRAs. Negative sign for all the CRAs’ Stickiness coefficients is translated 
as follows: if in any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, a bank’s 
credit rating is changed, i.e. upgraded or downgraded, then this bank’s current 
credit rating is deflated or kept at a lower rating level by the stickiness effect. This 
is the expected explanation but only for the case of an upgrade. In the case of a 
downgrade we would expect a positive sign for stickiness implying that the current 
rating is inflated by the stickiness effect. But since our model of preliminary 
analysis involves a single variable for stickiness, there is no way to distinguish the 
effect of stickiness for each of the two cases. What is certain from our model of 
preliminary analysis is the presence of Stickiness in Bank credit ratings; 
subsequently, based on this evidence,we need to further investigate using the 
extended model of equations (1) and (3). 
But before proceeding further, we shall infer the economic significance of 
the above results as explained in the beginning of this subsection. Columns (3) 
and (4) in Table 4.5 help us assess the magnitude that the coefficient values affect 
bank ratings, thus also inferring the magnitude of the stickiness effect in the 
preliminary results. Column (3) presents the average notch effect for all the non-
dummy variables, i.e. all financial explanatory variables and the Country Rating, 
and Column (4) presents the notch effect for the dummy variables or the stickiness 
effect for each CRA. A bank’s country rating is by far the most contributing attribute 
in determining the bank’s rating. An increase/decrease of one standard deviation 
in the country’s rating will on average increase/decrease a bank’s rating by Fitch 
by 1.88 notches, by Moody’s by 2.41 notches and by S&P by 2.16 notches. In 
turn, the most contributing financial characteristic in determining bank credit 
ratings is the Log of Assets for Fitch and Moody’s: an increase/decrease of one 
standard deviation in log of assets coefficient on average increases/decreases a 
bank’s rating by Fitch by 0.78 notches, from Moody’s by 0.67 notches, while for 
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S&P the most contributing financial characteristic is Other operating 
income/Average Assets: an increase/decrease of one standard deviation in Other 
operating income/Average Assets coefficient on average decreases/ increases a 
bank’s rating by S&P by 0.57. We observe the rest of the average notch effect of 
the remaining financial characteristic variables of the three CRAs in Table 4.5. As 
far as the stickiness effect is concerned, the average notch effect is the greatest 
for Fitch, and smallest for S&P. So, e.g. for Fitch the average notch effect of rating 
stickiness is -0.44 notches, meaning that the if in any of the next 4 quarters a 
bank’s credit rating is changed, i.e. upgraded or downgraded, then then this 
bank’s current credit rating will be lower on average by 0.44 notches due to rating 
stickiness. 
4.4.2. Full sample results for Downgrade and Upgrade 
Stickiness 
Subsequently, we proceed with the ordered logit model of equations (1) 
and (3) to investigate whether stickiness is different in the event of a downgrade 
or an upgrade decision. Table 4.6 displays the estimation results, again for the full 
world sample of banks, for each CRA. 
Similar to the preliminary results, the coefficients of almost all financial 
explanatory variables are uniformly statistically significant and have the same 
expected signs across CRAs. Furthermore, the values of all the explanatory 
variables’ coefficients in Table 4.6 barely differ from the values of the respective 
coefficients in Table 4.5. For example, Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. are again 
highly significant across all three CRAs with positive sign as expected. For Fitch, 
Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. coefficients in Table 4.5 are 1.175 and 0.118, while 
in Table 4.6 they are 1.164 and 0.128. For Moody’s, Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. 
coefficients in Table 4.5 are 0.863 and 0.210, while in Table 4.6 they are 0.867 
and 0.226. And for S&P, Log of Assets and R.O.A.A. coefficients in Table 4.5 are 
0.537 and 0.202, while in Table 4.6 they are 0.867 and 0.226. The similarities that 
we observe for the coefficients of the financial explanatory variables are 
equivalent for the coefficients of the Country Ratings variables. 
 However, contrary to the aforementioned similarities, the coefficients of 
the two Stickiness dummy variables, which are the focus of this study, present a 
totally different picture that distinguishes not only upgrade and downgrade 
stickiness, but also the stickiness practice in bank ratings among the three CRAs. 
Fitch has negative coefficients for both upgrade and downgrade stickiness, while 
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Moody’s and S&P have negative coefficients for upgrade stickiness but positive 
coefficients. The expected sign  
Table 4.6: Estimation results for the full sample 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (3) for the full world sample of 
commercial banks, for each CRA. The dependent variable is equivalently Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
long-term issuer ratings as defined above , together wih the financial explanatory variables, andthe 
Stickiness dummmies. Standard errors are calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of 
variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, **, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively 
correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Fitch 






Log of Assets 1.164*** 13.25 0.77  
R.O.A.A. 0.128*** 3.87 0.25  
Total Assets/Equity -0.000*** -9.52 -0.02  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets -0.012*** -3.40 -0.19  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets -0.002*** -3.18 -0.16  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets        -0.045 -1.09 -0.09  
Country Rating 0.482*** 19.75 1.87  
Upgrade Stickiness -0.756*** -2.94  -0.71 
Downgrade Stickiness -0.224*** 10.11  -0.21 
No. of observations  26,587 
Pseudo R2 0.184 
Clusters of Banks 777 
Moody’s 






Log of Assets 0.867*** 8.75 0.67  
R.O.A.A. 0.226*** 4.06 0.54  
Total Assets/Equity        -0.001 -0.31 -0.18  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets         0.005 1.18 0.10  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets        -0.000* -1.68 -0.04  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets -0.135*** -3.51 -0.39  
Country Rating 0.513*** 20.89 2.41  
Upgrade Stickiness -0.833*** 0.10  -0.98 
Downgrade Stickiness         0.007 10.04  0.01 
No. of observations  22,298 
Pseudo R2 0.165 
Clusters of Banks 746 
Standard and Poor’s 






Log of Assets 0.521*** 5.14 0.39  
R.O.A.A. 0.226*** 3.85 0.50  
Total Assets/Equity -0.000*** -8.35 -0.02  
Net Loans/Tot. Assets        -0.006 -1.59 -0.13  
Dep.&Funding/Tot Assets        -0.000 -0.44 -0.10  
Oth.Op.Income/Avg Assets -0.128*** -3.36 -0.58  
Country Rating 0.521*** 20.09 2.15  
Upgrade Stickiness -0.837*** 2.02  -0.91 
Downgrade Stickiness         0.161** 11.25  0.17 
No. of observations  26,086 
Pseudo R2 0.1573 
Clusters of Banks 669 
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 for upgrade stickiness is negative, as if in any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, 
t+2, t+3 and t+4, a bank’s credit rating is upgraded, then in the presence of 
upgrade stickiness the bank’s credit rating remain at a lower notch until the time 
the rating upgrade is announced. In other words, in the presence of upgrade 
stickiness, we would expect a negative factor contributing to the existing rating 
quality before the rating upgrade takes place (i.e. at t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1), so that 
the rating process result in a sticky or unchanged or lower credit rating. In the 
same fashion, the expected sign for downgrade is positive, as if in any of the next 
4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, a bank’s credit rating is downgraded, then 
in the presence of downgrade stickiness the bank’s credit rating remain at a higher 
notch until the time the rating downgrade is announced. 
So, the negative coefficient for downgrade stickiness by Fitch is an 
unexpected finding that has a different economic interpretation: if in any of the 
next 4 quarters, i.e. at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, a bank’s credit rating is downgraded, 
the bank’s credit rating remains at a lower notch until the time the rating 
downgrade is announced. Or, in other words, before a downgrade takes place, 
we would expect a negative factor contributing to the existing rating quality (i.e. at 
t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1). We name this case of negative coefficient for downgrade 
stickiness as pre-downgrade conservatism, since Fitch before the event of a 
downgrade exerts conservatism on the bank’s current ratings. The reason behind 
this may be that when Fitch observes signs of future deterioration at a bank’s 
credit rating quality (that may eventually lead to a downgrade), it becomes 
conservative for the current credit ratings (at t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1 before the 
downgrade). 
 Besides the above, it should be emphasized all three CRAs have 
coefficients for upgrade stickiness that are statistically significant at the 1% level 
and values close to one. Moreover, while Fitch exerts this negative downgrade 
stickiness or downgrade conservatism, the other two CRAs have both small 
coefficients for downgrade stickiness, out of which Moody’s downgrade stickiness 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
But more interesting is the economic significance of the above results as 
inferred from Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.6. The observed values of the 
average notch effect for all the non-dummy variables, i.e. all financial explanatory 
variables and the Country Rating variables, in column (3) again barely differ from 
the respective values in Table 4.5 for all three CRAs. So, we focus on the average 
notch effect for upgrade and downgrade stickiness for each CRA in Column (4). 
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Our above findings regarding the economic interpretation of the signs of the 
stickiness dummies are now completed since we also assess the average notch 
effect of stickiness. Moody’s has the largest negative notch effect of upgrade 
stickiness compared to the other two CRAs that is 0.98 notches, S&P follows with 
0.91 notches and Fitch with 0.71. The full economic interpretation is that a bank 
having all characteristics constant between t and any of the next 4 quarters, i.e. 
at t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4, during which a rating upgrade, e.g. by Moody’s takes 
place, its Moody’s rating will be lower by 0.98 notches at t, therefore exhibiting 
rating stickiness. The existence of upgrade stickiness implies that a CRA’s bank 
ratings exhibit more stability vs accuracy at a one-year horizon. So, an alternative 
interpretation to Moody’s having higher upgrade stickiness compared to that of 
S&P and Fitch is that Moody’s bank ratings exert higher stability versus accuracy 
compared to bank ratings by Fitch and S&P. 
With respect to downgrade stickiness, S&P has the largest positive notch 
effect of downgrade stickiness compared to the other two CRAs that is 0.17 
notches, Moody’s with 0.01 notches, and Fitch with the negative downgrade 
stickiness of 0.21 notches. So, besides the unexpected negative downgrade 
stickiness of Fitch, that we already named downgrade conservatism, we observe 
that the other two CRAs exhibit downgrade stickiness of an absolute notch effect 
significantly lower than that of upgrade stickiness. In fact, for Moody’s downgrade 
stickiness is essentially non-existent versus an upgrade stickiness of almost one, 
and for S&P downgrade stickiness is more than 5 times greater than downgrade 
stickiness. Therefore, we conclude that for all CRAs upgrade stickiness is close 
to one notch, while downgrade stickiness is significantly lower. 
Lastly, in Table 4.7 we test whether the upgrade and downgrade 
coefficients in all three samples are statistically different. 
 Table 4.7: Testing for the equality of Stickiness coefficients across CRAs 
Stickiness coefficients and their rating notch length are from Table 4.6 for each CRA. In the last 
column we observe the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all upgrade stickiness or 
downgrade stickiness coefficients are equal. The asterisks * next to the p-values correspond to 
significance levels 5% and denote that we are able to reject the null hypothesis 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Wald 
test 
 Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 





-0.756 -0.71 -0.833 -0.98 -0.837 -0.91 0.6355 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 




The null hypothesis that upgrade stickiness coefficients by Fitch, Moody’s and 
S&P are equal is not rejected, while for downgrade coefficients the null hypothesis 
is rejected indicating that the three downgrade coefficients are not simultaneously 
equal. Thus, for the full samples we conclude that all three CRAs are aligned in 
upgrade stickiness, while the opposite holds for downgrade stickiness. This 
general conclusion may have a different interpretation: all three CRAs are aligned 
to the degree of conservatism up to 4 quarters before a rating upgrade takes 
place, while the opposite holds in the event of a downgrade.  
One last but very interesting finding when observing Tables 4.6 and 4.7 is 
the magnitude of the asymmetry observed between upgrade and downgrade 
stickiness for each CRA when comparing the notch effects. This is evident for all 
CRAs with S&P having the most asymmetrical stickiness effects. 
 
4.4.3. Results for Investment and Speculative Grade 
Subsamples 
 Next, we proceed again with the ordered logit model of equations (1) and 
(3) but splitting our sample into investment-grade and speculative-grade 
subsamples as in Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998), Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) 
and Alp (2013). The purpose of splitting our sample as in most of the related 
literature is to examine whether there exists a distinct practice for bank rating 
stickiness in higher versus lower credit quality bank ratings. Investment-grade 
ratings are ratings of “BBB-”/”Baa3” or better, which translates to a rating scale 
number of 8 or higher. Speculative-grade ratings are ratings of “BB+”/”Ba1” or 
better, which translates to a rating scale number of 7 or lower. Table 4.8 displays 
the estimation results, again for the full world sample of banks, for each CRA, 
separately for the investment-grade and speculative-grade subsamples. 
 The two subsamples give differentiated results with respect to both the 
explanatory variables and the stickiness variables. Key explanatory variables 
such as Log of Assets, R.O.A.A. and the Country Rating follow a pattern of higher 
values of coefficients for one subsample and lower values of coefficients for the 
other subsample. Log of Assets have statistically significant coefficients with the 
expected positive signs, but higher coefficient values for the speculative-grade 
subsamples of all three CRAs compared to the values of the respective 
coefficients of the investment-grade. The same is true for R.O.A.A. coefficients, 
except for Moody’s even though the notch effect that we observe below gives the 
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same result (i.e. greater notch effect for speculative-grade subsample). Country 
Rating follows the opposite pattern with higher coefficient values for the 
investment-grade subsamples of all three CRAs compared to  
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the values of the respective coefficients of the speculative-grade. The remaining 
financial explanatory variables coefficients’ do not follow similar patterns, and also 
Table 4.8 Estimation results for Investment- and Speculative-Grade Subsamples 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (3) for the full world sample of 
commercial banks, for each CRA, split into investment-grade and speculative-grade subsamples. The 
dependent variable is equivalently Fitch, Moody’s and S&P long-term issuer ratings, and the financial 
explanatory variables together with the stickiness dummies are defined above. Standard errors are 
calculated using cluster-correlated robust estimate of variance at the bank level, and the asterisks *, 
**, and *** next to the coefficients values respectively correspond to significance levels 10%, 5% and 
1%. 
Fitch 
 Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
Variable Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭 × 𝐒𝐃
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡




Log of Assets 0.905*** 9.54 0.45 1.248*** 6.02 0.99 
R.O.A.A.       0.093* 1.88 0.14 0.098*** 2.77 0.23 
Total Assets/ 
    Equity -0.0001*** -10.42 -0.01    -0.002 -1.02 -0.48 
Net Loans/ 
    Total Assets 
-0.015*** -3.73 -0.18     0.013* 1.93 0.24 
Dep.&Funding/ 
    Total Assets 
     -0.001 -1.29 -0.05    -0.001* -1.87 -0.14 
Oth.Op.Income/ 
    Avg Assets 
     -0.015 -0.31 0.02    -0.040 -1.21 -0.10 
Country Rating 0.487*** 15.04 1.43 0.226*** 6.41 1.05 
 Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡





    Stickiness 
-0.858*** -8.10 -0.61 -0.412*** -3.36 -0.46 
Downgrade 
    Stickiness 
-0.222*** -2.43 -0.16 -0.457*** -3.25 -0.52 
No. of observations  19,560 
0.1840 
7,027 
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.118 
Clusters of Banks 618 311 
Moody’s 
 Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
Variable Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭 × 𝐒𝐃
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡




Log of Assets 0.772*** 6.78 0.47 0.972*** 4.57 0.91 
R.O.A.A.   0.224*** 4.15 0.41     0.161** 1.77 0.46 
Total Assets/ 
    Equity 
     -0.001 -0.32 -0.14     0.005 0,61 1.89 
Net Loans/ 
    Total Assets 
      0.002 0.51 0.04     0.012* 1,75 0.29 
Dep.&Funding/ 
    Total Assets 
  -0.0001*** -2.53 -0.04    -0.001* -1,88 -0.68 
Oth.Op.Income/ 
    Avg Assets 
     -0.126 -2.49 -0.28    -0.026 -0,83 -0.09 
Country Rating 0.446*** 14.75 1.64 0.199*** 6,22 1.13 
 Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡





    Stickiness 
-0.774*** -8.11 -0.72     -0.177 -1,19 -0.25 
Downgrade 
    Stickiness 
      0.089 1.07 0.08     -0.011 -0,07 -0.02 
No. of observations  16,992 
0.1840 
7,027 
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.118 
Clusters of Banks 583 311 
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we observe that their statistical significance varies from one subsample to the 
other. 
Table 4.8 - Continued 
Standard and Poor’s 
 Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
Variable Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭 × 𝐒𝐃
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡




Log of Assets     0.279** 2.54 0.18 1.001*** 4.40 0.79 
R.O.A.A.     0.123** 2.27 0.23     0.205** 2.33 0.48 
Total Assets/ 
    Equity 
     -0.0003 -0.31 -0.08     0.003 0.23 0.98 
Net Loans/ 
    Total Assets 
     -0.008* -1.83 -0.14     0.012 1.38 0.26 
Dep.&Funding/ 
    Total Assets 
     -0.000 -0.06 0.00 
   -0.002 -1.19 
-0.36 
Oth.Op.Income/ 
    Avg Assets 
     -0.086 -1.43 -0.33    -0.047 -1.24 -0.23 
Country Rating 0.455*** 12.26 1.60 0.263*** 5.42 1.15 
 Coefficient Z stat 𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭
𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡





    Stickiness 
-0.744*** -7.95 -0.69 -0.766*** -5.83 -0.89 
Downgrade 
    Stickiness 
0.232*** 2.81 0.22     -0.245 -1.52 -0.28 
No. of observations  20,272 
0.1840 
5,814 
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.130 
Clusters of Banks 538 268 
 With respect to the stickiness variable, the results become even more 
interesting. We observe that upgrade stickiness coefficients are more negative in 
the investment-grade subsamples of all three CRAs compared to the speculative-
grade subsamples. This is more evident for Moody’s but for S&P the difference is 
very small. The opposite holds for downgrade stickiness but only for Fitch, i.e. 
downgrade stickiness coefficients are more negative in the speculative-grade 
subsamples compared to the investment-grade subsamples. For Moody’s 
downgrade stickiness coefficients are very small and not statistically significant, 
and for S&P the investment-grade subsample has a statistically significant and 
positive downgrade stickiness coefficient, but a not statistically significant and 
negative coefficient for the speculative-grade subsample. 
 All the above results have very interesting economic interpretation. The 
aforementioned effect of some of the explanatory variables having higher values 
of coefficients for one subsample and lower values of coefficients for the other 
subsample is confirmed observing the average notch effect. All three CRAs have 
significantly higher average notch effect for Log of Assets in their speculative-
grade subsamples. The same is true for R.O.A.A. coefficients average notch 
effect, with Moody’s having the least difference (speculative-grade subsample 
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average notch effect of R.O.A.A. coefficient is 0.46 versus 0.41 for the investment-
grade). This effect is translated that CRAs rate banks so that some of the 
explanatory variables have a diminishing positive or negative effect in their credit 
rating. I.e. Log of Assets average notch effect diminishes as a bank’s credit rating 
increases or bank size is less important for bank credit ratings as the size of a 
bank increases. The opposite is true for Country Rating, i.e. for all three CRAs 
have significantly higher average notch effect for Country Rating in their 
investment-grade subsamples. In turn, this is translated that Country Rating 
average notch effect increases as a bank’s credit rating increases or a bank’s 
Country Rating is more important for higher bank credit ratings than for lower bank 
credit ratings. 
 With respect to upgrade stickiness, Fitch and Moody’s have a higher or 
more negative upgrade stickiness for their investment-grade subsamples, but 
S&P has lower or less negative upgrade stickiness for their investment-grade 
subsample. An alternative interpretation is that Fitch and Moody’s exert higher 
stability versus accuracy for their investment-grade subsamples compared to the 
speculative-grade subsamples, whereas the opposite is true for S&P. With respect 
to downgrade stickiness, Moody’s and S&P have small, but positive as expected 
downgrade stickiness for their investment-grade subsamples, versus negative 
downgrade stickiness for their speculative-grade subsamples. Fitch has negative 
downgrade stickiness for its investment-grade and speculative-grade 
subsamples. So, now we can  distinguish that the unexpected negative 
downgrade stickiness or downgrade conservatism is only found in all three CRAs’ 
speculative-grade subsamples, but also in Fitch’s investment-grade subsample. 
As expected, this downgrade conservatism is more strong for Fitch’s speculative-
grade subsample. 
Lastly, in Table 4.9 we test whether the upgrade and downgrade 
coefficients in the investment and speculative-grade subsamples are statistically 
different. This time only the null hypothesis that upgrade stickiness coefficients in 
the investment-grade subsample by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P are equal is not 
rejected, while the null hypothesis is rejected for upgrade stickiness coefficients 
in the speculative-grade and for downgrade coefficients in both the investment 
and speculative grade subsamples. Thus, we conclude that all three CRAs are 
aligned only in upgrade stickiness in the investment-grade subsample, while the 
opposite holds for upgrade stickiness in the investment-grade subsample and for 
downgrade stickiness in both the investment and speculative grade 
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subsamples.With respect to the asymmetry between upgrade and downgrade 
stickiness for each CRA, when observing Tables 4.8 and 4.9 again it is evident 
when comparing the notch effects. S&P again is having the most asymmetrical 
stickiness effects. 
 Table 4.9 Testing for the equality of Stickiness coefficients across 
Investment and Speculative-Grade Subsamples  
Stickiness coefficients and their rating notch length are from Table 4.9 for each CRA. In the last 
column we observe the p-value for the Wald χ2 test for the hypothesis that all upgrade stickiness or 
downgrade stickiness coefficients are equal. The asterisks * next to the p-values correspond to 
significance levels 5% and denote that we are able to reject the null hypothesis 
Investment Grade 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Wald 
test 
 Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 





-0.858 -0.61 -0.774 -0.72 -0.744 -0.69 0.6560 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 
-0.222 -0.16 0.089 0.08 0.232 0.22 0.0001* 
Speculative Grade 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Wald 
test 
 Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 





-0.412 -0.46 -0.177 -0.25 -0.766 -0.89 0.0021* 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 
-0.457 -0.52 -0.011 -0.02 -0.245 -0.28 0.0296* 
 
4.4.4. Structural Breaks in Stickiness 
Besides the differences examined for bank rating stickiness with respect 
to the level of credit quality in bank ratings, we now proceed to examine whether 
there exist differences in bank rating stickiness when we split our CRAs’ samples 
chronologically. In this way we may examine whether stickiness in bank ratings 
changes over time in response to financial historical events or periods combined 
with pressure and criticism that CRAs received in the past, thus inferring structural 
breaks in bank rating stickiness.. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) define two periods, 
the period before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)24 and the period after SOX to 
examine whether the increased the regulatory pressure and criticism to CRAs 
improving their credit analysis. In a similar fashion we define three periods to 
 
24 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed on July 25, 2002 by both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives in the US, as a response to the financial turmoil caused by the 




investigate whether each CRA changed the stickiness effect found above, as a 
response increased criticism in different instances. The first period is until year 
2003, that similarly to Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) we assume that the criticism 
after the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses led CRAs to changes in the rating 
methodologies, including the lack of timeliness, accuracy and volatility. We 
assume that 2003 was a year of adjustment (Cantor and Mann, 2006), and that 
the second period starts from 2004 and ends in 2010, that the global financial 
crisis concluded. The third period starts from 2011, after the global financial crisis 
assumingly again brought changes in the rating methodologies, and ends in 2015, 
that our sample is concluded. Results for stickiness coefficients and rating notch 
effects per CRA and the three time periods defined above are shown in Table 
4.10. 
Our analysis for structural breaks in Table 4.10 is focused only on the two 
stickiness variables, so results for the remaining coefficients are disregarded. 
Interestingly enough, the results in Table 4.10 bear similarity with the results in 
Table 4.7. In Table 4.7 only the null hypothesis that the three CRAs’ downgrade 
stickiness coefficients are equal is rejected. Equivalently, in Table 4.10 only the 
null hypotheses that each of the three CRAs’ downgrade stickiness coefficients 
are equal across the three time periods are rejected. So, the results of Table 4.10 
Table 4.10 Estimation results for Structural Breaks in Stickiness 
at the different time periods 
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (3) for the full world sample of 
commercial banks, for each CRA, split into three different periods: until 2003, 2004-2010, and 2011-
2015. In each row the coefficient and rating notch length for each CRA and time period is displayed 
and in the last column the p-values for the Wald χ2 test for the hypotheses that all coefficients are 
equal.  The asterisks * next to the p-values correspond to significance levels 5% and denote that we 
are able to reject the null hypothesis 
a. Upgrade Stickiness (minus expected) 
Period: until 2003 2004-2010 2011-2015 Wald 
test 
 Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
p-value 
Fitch -1.026 -0.909 -0.855 -0.775 -0.829 -0.943 0.6592 
Moody’s -0.830 -1,041 -0.719 -0.772 -1.037 -1.193 0.1152 
S&P -0.926 -0.976 -0.880 -0.914 -1.017 -1.128 0.7187 
        
b. Downgrade Stickiness (plus expected) 
Period: until 2003 2004-2010 2011-2015 Wald 
test 
 Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
Coeff. Rating Notch  
Length 
p-value 
Fitch -0.027 -0,024 -0.361 -0,327 0.003 0.003 0.0367* 
Moody’s -0.418 -0,524 -0.099 -0.106 0.362 0.417 0.0058* 
S&P 1.800 1.897 0.123 0.128 0.295 0.301 0.0000* 
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indicate that there exist structural breaks in 2004 and 2011 for all CRAs but only 
for downgrade stickiness. In other words, the three principal CRAs did not had a 
rather different practice in bank rating stickiness in upgrades, during the periods 
defined above, but each CRA had a different practice in bank rating stickiness in 
downgrades during the same periods.  
Furthermore, we observe that all three CRAs have their upgrade and 
downgrade stickiness coefficients reduced in period 2004-2010, except for the 
downgrade stickiness coefficient by Fitch. This finding is confirmed when 
observing the rating notch effects of stickiness coefficients of all three CRAs in 
2004-2010, and it is an indication that CRAs move to improve their bank rating 
accuracy and rating timeliness. S&P have the most notable reduction in 2004-
2010 for its downgrade stickiness with its rating notch length reduced from 1.897 
to 0.123. Our overall finding for the reduction of stickiness in 2004-2010 is in line 
with Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) which similarly find that all three CRAs improve 
rating accuracy and reduce rating volatility in the period following the 2001-2 high 
profile corporate collapses. 
In the last period of 2011-2015, the opposite occurs for both upgrade and 
downgrade stickiness coefficients and their respective rating notch effects of all 
three CRAs, i.e. all three CRAs’ upgrade coefficients’ rating notch effect become 
more negative and downgrade coefficients’ rating notch effect become more 
positive. This is translated that in the post-global financial crisis era, CRAs’ bank 
rating accuracy worsens and rating timeliness decreases. With respect to 
downgrade stickiness we should note that Fitch and Moody’s have their 
coefficients’ rating notch effects’ signs change from negative in 2004-2010 to 
positive in 2011-2015, which is the expected sign for downgrade stickiness. So, 
the unexpected negative downgrade stickiness, that we named previously pre-
downgrade conservatism, ends in 2011-2015 for Fitch and Moody’s. 
The last finding in Table 4.11 is that the asymmetry between upgrade and 
downgrade decisions observed in the full sample is persistent for each period, i.e. 
in all periods -except for the period until 2003 for Standard and Poor’s – upgrade 
stickiness is significantly greater than downgrade stickiness. . S&P again is having 
the most asymmetrical stickiness effects than the other two CRAs but only in the 
first two periods, and in 2011-2015 Moody’s has the most asymmetrical stickiness 
effects. On the other hand, Fitch is having the least asymmetrical stickiness 
effects in all periods. 
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Nevertheless, all the above findings are prone to the criticism of a bias in 
defining the time periods for finding structural breaks in bank rating stickiness. 
Moreover, it is not necessary that all three CRAs have common structural breaks. 
So, we proceed to estimate the structural breaks in a more intuitive way. In Table 
4.11 we split our full sample into yearly subsamples, and for each pair of 
consequent subsamples’ stickiness coefficients we perform a Wald χ2 test for the 
hypothesis that upgrade or downgrade stickiness coefficients or are equal.  
The results in Table 4.11 allow us to re-define the periods in Table 4.10 
and re-assess the structural breaks. We can now define more than three periods 
for each CRA and thus examine the presence of more structural breaks, but most 
important is that now we can define different periods for each CRA. So, the periods 
are re-defined for each CRA as in Table 4.12, according to the findings in Table 
4.11. In cases that we have consecutive yearly breaks as for example in 2010/11, 
2011/12 and 2012/13 in upgrade stickiness for S&P, we choose only one of the 
three so as not to end up with too many structural breaks. Again our analysis for 
structural breaks in Table 4.12 is focused only on the two stickiness variables, so 
results for the remaining coefficients are disregarded. The most significant new 
finding of Table 4.12 is the existence of structural breaks in both upgrade and 
downgrade stickiness coefficients in the newly defined periods for each CRA. So, 
we observe that each CRA had a different practice in bank rating  
Table 4.11 Estimation results for Structural Breaks on consequent years 
Wald χ2 tests for Upgrade and Downgrade coefficients from the estimation results for the ordered logit 
model of equations (1) and (3) for pairs of yearly consequent subsamples. The asterisks (*) next to the 
p-values correspond to significance levels of 5% and denote that we reject the null hypothesis that 
coefficients are equal. 













 p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value 
2001 vs 2002 0.7704 0.9538 0.2233 0.2027 0.0049* 0.8669 
2002 vs 2003 0.7725 0.3962 0.2778 0.8705 0.6997 0.0020* 
2003 vs 2004 0.2998 0.6091 0.3398 0.1904 0.3559 0.0464* 
2004 vs 2005 0.2032 0.0044* 0.3921 0.5602 0.5128 0.9893 
2005 vs 2006 0.9662 0.7183 0.1368 0.5391 0.0006* 0.5903 
2006 vs 2007 0.2628 0.0006* 0.7577 0.4593 0.0086* 0.8836 
2007 vs 2008 0.7172 0.9601 0.4562 0.5520 0.8061 0.1106 
2008 vs 2009 0.5367 0.0088* 0.1559 0.0169* 0.9793 0.4971 
2009 vs 2010 0.0070* 0.0276* 0.5679 0.0311* 0.3203 0.0000* 
2010 vs 2011 0.2228 0.1246 0.1430 0.8567 0.0095* 0.5607 
2011 vs 2012 0.9811 0.2436 0.0241* 0.7289 0.0142* 0.0034* 
2012 vs 2013 0.9568 0.6622 0.5650 0.0002 0.0480* 0.0455* 
2013 vs 2014 0.0003* 0.3906 0.3591 0.3934 0.6014 0.0655 
2014 vs 2015 0.0000* 0.5529 0.4648 0.0394* 0.8532 0.5065 
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 stickiness in both upgrades and downgrades during the redefined periods. So, 
the breaks that we distinguish are for Fitch in 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2014, for 
Moody’s in 2004, 2009 and 2012 and for S&P in 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. For 
the periods that coincide the criticism period after the 2001-2 high profile corporate 
collapses we observe for each CRA that similarly as above stickiness is reduced 
and thus all three CRAs improve rating accuracy and reduce rating volatility. A 
new finding is that is the periods before the global financial crisis of 2007-8, 
stickiness is further reduced. This can be translated as a lax of rating standards, 
since stickiness constitute a part of them. In the periods following the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8, similarly as above stickiness increases, especially 
upgrade stickiness. This in turn can be translated as a conservatism in rating 
Table 4.12 Estimation results for Structural Breaks in Stickiness Coefficients 
according to the results of Table 4.11 
  
Estimation results for the ordered logit model of equations (1) and (3) for the full world sample of 
commercial banks, for each CRA and for periods set according to Table 4.12. In each row the coefficient 
and rating notch length for each CRA and time period is displayed and in the last column the p-values for 
the Wald χ2 test for the hypotheses that all coefficients are equal.  The asterisks * next to the p-values 
correspond to significance levels 5% and denote that are able to reject the null hypothesis 
Fitch 


























-0.912 -1.13 -1.021 -0.81 -0.726 -0.64 -1.372 -1.61 -0.468 -0.52 0.0112* 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 
-0.041 0.04 -1.858 -1.48 -0.169 -0.15 0.013 0.01 -0.162 -0.18 0.0029* 
Moody’s 






















-0.830 -0.80 -0.797 -0.81 -0.555 -0.62 -1.169 -1.33 0.0460* 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 
-0.418 -0.52 -0.420 -0.42 0.265 0.30 0.137 0.16 0.0102* 
S&P 


























-1.151 -1.16 -0.966 -1.03 -0.659 -0.67 -0.520 -0.54 -1.609 -1.62 0.0007* 
Downgrade 
Stickiness 
2.397 2.43 0.525 0.56 -0.108 -0.11 0.835 0.86 0.002 0.00 0.0000* 
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standards. For Fitch, in 2014 we observe reduction in stickiness and thus a 
reduction of conservatism. Last but not least, asymmetry between upgrade and 




 This essay uses a mechanism to model stickiness in bank credit ratings 
by the three principal CRAs for a worldwide sample from 1988 to 2015. The 
novelty of our research is that the mechanism used is simple as it is included in a 
model of prediction of bank ratings, similar to that found in related literature. We 
define stickiness as the factor incorporated into published ratings that can be 
quantified as it affects credit quality. Stickiness indirectly impacts rating accuracy 
and stability, up to 12 months before a bank’s credit rating is changed, i.e. 
upgraded or downgraded. Our initial finding is that bank credit ratings are sticky, 
i.e. there exists stickiness in all three CRAs’ bank ratings. Fitch bank ratings have 
the greatest average notch effect of stickiness and S&P bank ratings have the 
lowest average notch effect of stickiness.  
 Next, we examine whether stickiness is symmetric or asymmetric for 
upgrades and downgrades in bank ratings. Our findings are clear that stickiness 
is asymmetric for upgrades and downgrades. The average notch effect of upgrade 
stickiness is close to one notch, with Moody’s bank ratings having the greatest 
average notch effect of upgrade stickiness and Fitch bank ratings having the 
lowest average notch effect of upgrade stickiness. The average notch effect of 
downgrade stickiness is greatest for S&P bank ratings and almost zero for 
Moody’s bank ratings, while Fitch surprisingly has negative downgrade stickiness, 
something that we named pre-downgrade conservatism, i.e. when a CRA 
observes signs of deterioration of a bank’s credit rating quality that may eventually 
lead to a downgrade, it becomes conservative up to 12 months before the 
downgrade takes place keeps the rating lower. The asymmetry between upgrade 
and downgrade stickiness reveals the CRAs’ overall conservative attitude due to 
the higher stickiness in upgrades, i.e. CRAs need to be more confident that 
observed changes in an bank’s risk profile are likely to be permanent in the event 
of an upgrade rather than in the event of a downgrade. 
 Also, we examine whether the three principal CRAs employ a distinct 
practice for bank rating stickiness in higher versus lower credit quality bank 
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ratings. We split each CRA’s sample into the investment-grade and the 
speculative-grade subsamples and find an asymmetry in stickiness practices by 
all three CRA’s in the two subsamples. Our results show that Fitch and Moody’s, 
which have higher upgrade stickiness for their investment-grade subsamples, 
exert higher stability versus accuracy for their investment-grade subsamples 
compared to the speculative-grade subsamples, whereas the opposite is true for 
S&P. Moody’s and S&P have small, but positive as expected downgrade 
stickiness for their investment-grade subsamplesThe unexpected negative 
downgrade stickiness or downgrade conservatism is only found in all three CRAs’ 
speculative-grade subsamples, and also in Fitch’s investment-grade subsample.  
 Lastly, we examine whether there are differences in bank rating stickiness 
when we split our CRAs’ samples chronologically. In this way we assess the 
existence of structural breaks in stickiness as we are mainly interested to see the 
reaction of the three principal CRAs to pressure and criticism due to financial 
historical events, i.e. the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses and the 2007-8 
global financial crisis. There are evidence of a structural break in 2004 and 2011 
for all CRAs, but only for downgrade stickiness, while the asymmetry between 
upgrade and downgrade decisions observed in the full sample is persistent for 
each period, except for the period until 2003 for S&P. When we reassess the time 
periods in a more intuitive way, we find evidence of structural breaks also for 
downgrade decisions. Reaction of CRAs to pressure and criticism due to financial 
historical events is similar as our initial results for structural breaks, while 
asymmetry between upgrade and downgrade decisions is confirmed in the 
redefined periods for each CRA. In both cases, i.e. either in the initial results for 
structural breaks or in the redefined periods, the reaction that we observe is a 
decrease for the effect of stickiness in the periods that follow the 2001-2 high 
profile corporate collapses and an increase in the effect of stickiness in the periods 
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 This PhD dissertation aims to fill gaps in the scant literature of bank credit 
ratings. We draw attention to three aspects of bank credit ratings, namely 
governance, structural shifts and stickiness in rating standards. All three aspects 
of credit ratings that we examine in the equivalent essays have drawn the attention 
of market participants and academics on many occasions in the past. Weak 
corporate governance has been singled out as the leading cause not only for high-
profile cases of corporate fraud, but also failure of risk management in banks. 
Similarly, rating standards and methodologies have been the epicenter of criticism 
in the aftermath of financial crises. The main novelty of our research is that none 
of three aspects of bank credit ratings has been examined in the literature of bank 
ratings. Moreover, the size and the international character of our dataset of bank 
ratings, which also covers all three principal CRAs, makes our study one of the 
most comprehensive analysis of bank credit ratings. 
 In the first essay for governance, we present evidence that a selection of 
governance variables explain bank credit ratings for all three principal CRAs, after 
controlling for bank financial characteristics and sovereign ratings that prior 
literature has shown to be related to bank credit ratings. The same evidence is 
presented as a preamble of our work using principal components drawn from PCA 
analysis. Similar evidence to that for governance variables is presented using a 
set of country institutional components. Interestingly enough, we find no evidence 
that the relationship between governance variables and bank credit ratings for any 
of the three principal CRAs changes in the periods before and after the global 
financial crisis, i.e. for the periods until 2008 and from 2009. Our analysis can be 
extended with respect to the PCA analysis to further enhance our evidence. Also, 
further work on this topic could expand the dataset of governance variables, since 
our dataset is only limited to variables that cover board structure and processes, 
including risk management functions. This could also help understand the 
unexpected negative sign for risk management related governance variables that 
we found. Other governance variables could include ownership structure of banks, 
financial transparency, managerial compensation schemes, and stakeholder 
rights. Moreover, it would be interesting to examine whether the relationship of 
governance and bank ratings is affected by the level of the ratings, e.g. for 
investment or speculative-grade. Our results also need to be examined with 
alternative specifications to enhance their robustness. Alternative specifications 
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could include further analysis for structural breaks for the period that our dataset 
covers, since our analysis considers only one break/two periods. 
 In the second essay for structural shifts in bank ratings, we investigate the 
time-series variation in bank rating standards for each of the three principal CRAs. 
We focus on the period 2000-2015 and on three different geographical regions. 
Evidence suggests that there exist three structural breaks, dividing the time-span 
of our analysis to the period before and after the 2001-2 high profile corporate 
collapses when credit rating standards tightened, the period before the global 
financial crisis started when bank credit rating standards loosened, and the period 
after the global financial crisis when bank credit rating standards tightened. 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s were rather more aligned in their structural shifts 
in bank credit rating standards, and all three principal CRAs were unanimous in 
the hardening of bank credit rating standards for US and Canadian banks in the 
post global financial crisis period. Fitch, as the last entrant to the credit rating 
industry, seems to have followed a more conservative policy before the global 
financial crisis compared to the other two agencies which dominated the market 
of credit ratings. Our findings conclude with Fitch improving their bank ratings in 
the presence of competition. Further research on should include an alternative 
specification for the estimation of structural breaks as a further robustness check, 
probably in a more intuitive way. Also, we could examine how bank rating 
standards have performed for investment or speculative-grade bank ratings, and 
also if there exists evidence for procyclicality or countercyclicality in bank rating 
standards.  
In the third and last essay for stickiness, we propose a simple but at the 
same time novel mechanism to quantify the factor that affects rating accuracy and 
stability for bank ratings. When either credit quality changes but the ratings do not, 
or credit ratings are characterized by slow respondence, then we consider that 
ratings are sticky. We find evidence that bank ratings are sticky and that there 
exists an asymmetry with upgrade stickiness being significantly greater than 
downgrade stickiness. We also find evidence for different stickiness practices 
among the three principal CRAs, and a further asymmetry in the investment-grade 
and the speculative-grade bank ratings by the three principal CRAs. Evidence 
concludes with findings of chronological structural breaks in stickiness practices 
by the three principal CRAs. We observe a decrease of stickiness in the periods 
that follow the 2001-2 high profile corporate collapses and an increase in the effect 
of stickiness in the periods that follow the 2007-8 global financial crisis. This last 
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finding could lead us to interpret stickiness in bank ratings as an alternative 
explanation to that of tightening bank rating standards in Essay 2. So, further 
research is necessary to distinguish the two effects and find the net effect for each 
in bank ratings. Also, alternative specifications of the model are necessary for 
robustness checks and further work could also include the effect of business 
cycles in stickiness. 
